Usman Khan

Victims
2 killed at Fishmongers' Hall, London, 2019; never tried. Inquest juries found both victims unlawfully killed; his only conviction is a 2012 guilty plea to preparing acts of terrorism
Years active
2010 (arrest, Stoke-on-Trent group); December 24, 2018 (release on license); November 29, 2019 (two deaths, City of London)
Location
Stoke-on-Trent and Stafford, Staffordshire; City of London
Method
Two deaths found by inquest juries to be unlawful killings, in what the juries' agreed facts called part of a terrorist attack; no criminal charge, as he died the same day
Status
Detention for public protection, minimum 8 years (February 2012); replaced on appeal by a 21-year extended sentence, April 2013. Released on license December 24, 2018; died November 29, 2019

On November 29, 2019, two people died at Fishmongers' Hall, the livery company hall that stands beside London Bridge in the City of London. They had come to an anniversary and alumni event run by Learning Together, a prison education program linked to the University of Cambridge that brought students and prisoners into the same classrooms. Usman Khan, a 28-year-old from Staffordshire who had once taken its courses in prison, had been invited as one of its alumni. He had been released on license eleven months earlier, part way through a sentence for a terrorism offense, and he was still under the supervision of the probation service and the watch of the Security Service, MI5. Jack Merritt, of Cottenham, Cambridgeshire, and Saskia Jones, of Stratford-upon-Avon, Warwickshire, were fatally injured, and three other people were hurt. Khan died on London Bridge the same afternoon after armed officers of the City of London Police and the Metropolitan Police intervened.

Because he died that day, no criminal court ever heard the case. The legal record is the work of two inquests held at the Guildhall in 2021 before a senior judge sitting as coroner, each with a jury. The first, on the two victims, found that each had been unlawfully killed and that failings by the agencies managing Khan, and in the organization and security of the event, had contributed to the deaths. The second, on Khan himself, reached a conclusion of lawful killing. Together with the coroner's later report, they form one of the fullest official accounts of how a man convicted of terrorism was released, supervised and allowed to travel, and of the gaps that opened in that supervision in the last months of 2019.

Stoke-on-Trent and the 2012 conviction

Khan grew up in Stoke-on-Trent, in Staffordshire, and the coroner's summary records a history of involvement in violence as a teenager. On December 20, 2010, at 19, he was arrested with eight other men from Stoke, Cardiff and London and remanded in custody. He would not live in the community again until December 2018.

On January 31, 2012, at the Crown Court at Woolwich, he pleaded guilty to engaging in conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism, an offense under the Terrorism Act 2006. On February 9, 2012, he was sentenced to detention for public protection, the indeterminate sentence used for offenders under 21, with a minimum term of eight years, and made subject to terrorist notification requirements for 30 years. Under that sentence, release after the minimum term would have depended on the Parole Board.

The arithmetic behind that minimum term was set out in open court. The judge found that every man who had admitted the offense presented a significant risk of causing serious harm, the test of dangerousness under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. For Khan he took 20 years as the term that would have followed a conviction after trial, already reduced slightly for his youth, and deducted four years, a discount of 20 percent for a plea entered at the outset of the trial. That left a notional determinate term of 16 years. Because he chose the indeterminate sentence, he fixed the minimum term at half that figure, eight years, less the 408 days already spent on remand, and he found the open-ended sentence necessary despite Khan's youth.

It did not stand. On appeal, the Court of Appeal left the finding of dangerousness in place but held that the Stoke defendants could not safely be treated as more dangerous than the London men, who had received determinate terms. The court's reasoning turned on risk, not on the seriousness of the offense. It accepted that the trial judge had been entitled to treat the offending of the two groups as equally serious, and it left the 16-year figure he had reached for Khan untouched. It held that, at the date of sentence, anyone convicted of this kind of offense could properly be found dangerous. But if the plans of the two groups were equally serious, the court reasoned, the risk to the public could not be greater from men who were much further from realizing their aims than from men who were closer. It warned against leaning too heavily on recorded conversations to rank one group as more sophisticated than another, and it noted that there was no suggestion any of the Stoke defendants had in fact been trained. The two other Stoke men's indeterminate sentences fell on the same ground, which placed the Stoke defendants in the same position as the London defendants.

On April 16, 2013, the court quashed the indeterminate sentence and substituted an extended sentence of 21 years: 16 years in custody and a five-year extension, with the 30-year notification requirements left in force. A sentence of that type, available at the date of his conviction, carried automatic release at the halfway point of the custodial term, with no reference to the Parole Board, and the rest served on license. That type of sentence was abolished for offenders convicted from December 3, 2012, but the change did not reach back to his case.

Eight years inside

MI5 had been part of the investigation that sent him to prison, and while he was inside it kept him under its lowest level of investigation, the tier for terrorist prisoners judged not currently active but at risk of re-engaging. It closed that investigation in February 2015, having received no intelligence that he was involved in anything of national security concern.

In prison, the warnings were consistent. A specialist extremism risk assessment by a prison psychologist in April 2018 concluded that his engagement with extremism remained strong and that there was a high risk he would become involved in extremist activity on release.

In the same years he took up education. From November 2017 he took courses run by Learning Together, in which Cambridge undergraduates studied alongside prisoners inside prisons, and he kept in contact with its staff through the program's alumni network.

From June 2018 he was managed under the statutory Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements, known as MAPPA, through regular meetings of the police, the National Probation Service and other agencies; the panel met four times before his release. At his release he was still a high-risk Category A prisoner, one of very few people released into the community with that status, and an August 2018 probation assessment rated him a very high risk of serious harm to the public.

MI5 reopened its investigation on August 8, 2018, in anticipation of his release. On November 22 it told Staffordshire Police Special Branch and the West Midlands Police counterterrorism unit that it had done so, gave its assessment that the residual risk of his re-engaging was low, and passed on information, uncorroborated and of unknown validity, that he intended to carry out an attack after release. On December 6, 2018, it raised the investigation to a higher priority because of that information and his earlier conviction. Shortly before his release, two strands of intelligence suggested he intended to return to terrorist offending after release. The inquest heard that this intelligence was treated as low grade.

Release and the last months

Khan was released on license on December 24, 2018, at the halfway point of his custodial term, as the law then required. His license conditions were strict and overseen by an offender manager from the National Probation Service. He lived at first in approved premises, a probation hostel, in Stafford, under its curfew and sign-on times. The license also required him to surrender his passport, to take no work without his supervising officer's permission, to use no internet-enabled device without approval, to let the police inspect his phone, and to enter no airport, port or railway station, and attend no gathering, without his offender manager's approval. Officers from the Staffordshire Prevent team managed his notification requirements and visited him, about once a week until mid-February 2019 and about every two weeks after that, and he was given mentors. MI5 and the West Midlands Police counterterrorism unit ran their priority investigation into him; reviews in March and October 2019 found no intelligence of activity of national security concern. Through early 2019 he appeared to comply. He did not reconnect with old associates, he saw his offender manager and mentors regularly, and his curfew was progressively relaxed.

Learning Together wanted him at its events from the start. In January 2019 his offender manager judged an overnight event in Cambridge planned for March too soon: Khan had been out of prison for about twelve weeks, and the risks he posed could not yet be stated with confidence. Permission was refused, with a note that later events would be given serious consideration.

The formal measures of his risk drifted in the same months. On May 15, 2019, his offender manager, after discussion with a line manager, cut his risk-of-serious-harm rating from very high to high. The change was recorded in a few words, with no detailed rationale, and no updated assessment was carried out in the year after his release, although the MAPPA agencies went on treating him as very high risk. A revised extremism risk assessment, prepared by the offender manager with a specialist counterterrorism probation officer in the second half of 2019, was almost finished when he died. The coroner found it far less detailed than the psychologist's 2018 report and markedly more optimistic, proposing a much lower rating; neither of its authors had much practical experience of terrorist offenders.

In August 2019, Learning Together staff invited him to the anniversary and alumni event planned for November at Fishmongers' Hall. His offender manager gave him permission to go. The event came up in two or three MAPPA meetings, the last on November 14, but the agencies do not appear to have considered the risks of his attending expressly. There was no formal record of the permission or the reasoning behind it, and the evidence conflicted over whether the panel had ever endorsed it.

The autumn changed his circumstances. On September 3, 2019, a Prevent officer told him that his practical mentor would no longer visit, because of contractual problems with the mentoring provider. That mentor had given him supervised access to the internet to look for work. No replacement was allocated before his death, amid confusion among the agencies over whether finding one was a priority. On September 24 he moved from the hostel into a private flat in Stafford. Prevent visits became less regular, and the coroner's summary describes a man growing more socially isolated; the inquest heard that Prevent officers spent only 18 minutes with him after he left the hostel. On an unannounced visit on October 31, officers found him going to the gym less often and, without a mentor, unable to get online to look for jobs. On November 14, 2019, two Prevent officers visited the flat at the suggestion of the MAPPA agencies. He was upset, apparently regarding the visit as an invasion of his privacy, and he asked them to leave, which they did. His reaction caused some concern among the investigating officers.

On November 18, MI5, the West Midlands counterterrorism unit and Staffordshire Special Branch met and recorded that no intelligence of concern had been seen since his release, that he had withdrawn markedly since moving into the flat, and that he planned to attend the London event, which MI5 had learned of in late October. They discussed increasing the monitoring of him.

Much of what the agencies knew never reached the people managing him. The coroner found that the chair of the MAPPA panel had only limited security clearance and did not know of the covert priority investigation. The senior investigating officer of that investigation and the deputy did not generally attend MAPPA meetings and did not know what was being passed on; the senior officer believed the attack intelligence had been shared, but most of the panel never learned of it, though it could have been passed on without compromising security. The panel's membership changed from meeting to meeting, some participants never received the minutes, and not all of them knew the conclusions of the 2018 psychologist's report. Nor did the panel know that the Prevent visits had become less regular.

On November 29, 2019, he traveled alone to London for the event, which marked five years of the program. Both of those who died had come through their own part in Learning Together. The young man from Cottenham was the more deeply involved of the two; the young woman from Stratford-upon-Avon had volunteered with the program and had given her energy to other causes as well, among them victims of serious crime, and of sexual violence in particular. During an afternoon break, both were fatally injured inside the hall and three other people were hurt. Attendees, staff of the hall and members of the public confronted him, and he died on London Bridge after armed police intervened.

The findings

The Independent Office for Police Conduct ran two investigations:

On the officers on London Bridge: no indication that any officer had committed an offense or used force that was unnecessary, disproportionate or unreasonable, and no wrongdoing by any officer (November 2020).

On Staffordshire Police's management of Khan, including its part in the decision to let him attend the event: the four Prevent officers involved had not been adequately trained for the level of risk he posed, and their role had not been clearly defined; there was no evidence that he had ever breached his notification requirements; no misconduct and no performance issues (March 2021).

The inquests, heard by the Recorder of London sitting as coroner, opened at the Guildhall on April 12, 2021.

May 28, 2021: the jury found each victim unlawfully killed.

It agreed the coroner's statement of the basic facts of each death, which recorded that each was part of a terrorist attack.

It found that failures in the management of Khan in the community by state agencies contributed to the deaths, including serious deficiencies in MAPPA management, insufficient experience and training, and no psychological assessment after his release.

It found that failures in information sharing and guidance between the agencies monitoring him contributed.

It found that failures in the organization and security of the event contributed, including the lack of any event-specific risk assessment by any party.

It described a blind spot toward his risk, which it put down to his image as a model of rehabilitation.

June 10, 2021: a second jury, on Khan's own death, returned a conclusion of lawful killing.

Disputed and unproven points

Khan was never tried for the deaths of November 29, 2019, and no court has convicted him of murder. The findings that the two victims were unlawfully killed are inquest determinations, reached on the balance of probabilities and without naming any person as responsible; they are not verdicts of a criminal court. His only conviction is the 2012 plea to a terrorism offense.

Whether his attendance at the event was ever approved is not settled: his offender manager gave permission and the event was discussed at MAPPA meetings, but no record of a positive decision exists. How much weight the pre-release intelligence deserved was also contested at the inquest. Whether the abrupt end of his mentoring played any part in what he did is unclear, and the coroner did not find that it did. The juries' findings on contributing failures did not rank or apportion responsibility among MI5, the police, the probation service and the event's organizers, and a report on preventing future deaths does not apportion blame.

Timeline

December 20, 2010: Khan is arrested with eight other men and remanded in custody.

January 31, 2012: He pleads guilty at the Crown Court at Woolwich to engaging in conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism.

February 9, 2012: Sentenced to detention for public protection, minimum term eight years less 408 days on remand.

April 16, 2013: The Court of Appeal substitutes an extended sentence of 21 years (16 years custody, five years extension).

February 2015: MI5 closes its in-prison investigation, having received no intelligence of national security concern.

November 2017: He begins Learning Together courses in prison.

April 2018: A prison psychologist's extremism risk assessment finds a high risk of extremist activity on release.

June 2018: MAPPA management begins.

August 8, 2018: MI5 reopens its investigation ahead of his release.

December 6, 2018: MI5 raises the investigation's priority.

December 24, 2018: Released on license at the halfway point of his custodial term.

January 2019: Permission to attend a Learning Together event in March is refused as too soon.

May 15, 2019: His offender manager lowers his risk-of-serious-harm rating to high.

August 2019: Invited to the Learning Together anniversary and alumni event in London.

September 3, 2019: He is told his practical mentor will no longer visit.

September 24, 2019: Moves from the hostel to a private flat in Stafford.

November 14, 2019: Prevent officers visit the flat.

November 18, 2019: MI5 and the police record that he has withdrawn since moving.

November 29, 2019: Two people die at Fishmongers' Hall, City of London, and three others are injured; Khan dies on London Bridge.

November 2020: The police conduct watchdog finds no wrongdoing by officers on London Bridge.

March 2021: It finds the four Prevent officers inadequately trained, with no misconduct.

April 12, 2021: The inquests into the two deaths open at the Guildhall.

May 28, 2021: The jury finds both victims unlawfully killed and records contributing failings.

June 10, 2021: A second jury returns a conclusion of lawful killing on Khan's death.

November 3, 2021: The coroner issues his report on preventing future deaths, with 22 matters of concern.