None of these opinions is about the murders. On September 21, 1989, Craig C. Price, fifteen, appeared in the Rhode Island Family Court, admitted sufficient facts to be adjudicated delinquent on four charges of murder, and was committed to the Training School until he turned twenty-one. He had been accused of killing Joan M. Heaton and her two small daughters, Jennifer and Melissa, in their home in Warwick on the night of September 4, 1989, and Rebecca Spencer in her home on the night of July 27, 1987, when he was thirteen. As a juvenile he could be held no longer than that, and these four opinions show how the state, over the next decade, made sure he did not go free when the time ran out.
The first route ran through a court order. On the day of his adjudication the Family Court ordered him to undergo psychiatric evaluation as part of his treatment. At the second session, on November 16, 1989, when the doctors said they meant to ask him about the killings, he stopped cooperating, and he refused for the next five years despite repeated orders. In August 1994 the state charged him with criminal contempt. The Supreme Court held on August 2, 1994, that the Family Court could bring such a charge; on March 26, 1996, in Justice Lederberg’s opinion, it held that criminal contempt was not capped at one year, as the Family Court had ruled, so that a sentence could run well past his release date. On April 18, 2003, the court affirmed his conviction for criminal contempt and the sentence of twenty-five years, ten to serve and fifteen suspended.
The second route ran through the Training School itself. On the evening of October 1, 1993, a juvenile program worker named Mark Petrella found cigarettes and a lighter on him and wrote him up, and Price, in an outburst other staff members had to calm, was said to have threatened to “snuff out” Petrella; the witnesses disagreed about whether he actually said it. The Family Court asked the State Police to investigate, a grand jury indicted him, and a jury in Providence Superior Court convicted him of simple assault and extortion. Justice Goldberg’s opinion of February 10, 1998, rejects his claim that he was singled out for prosecution and affirms both convictions.
Price was never tried for the four killings. He was adjudicated delinquent on his own admission of sufficient facts, a juvenile proceeding that is not a criminal conviction, and the opinions refer to the murders only as background to the contempt and assault cases. The contempt cases arose from a treatment order, and Price’s lawyers argued throughout that he had a right not to discuss the killings with the doctors. His later prison convictions and his transfer out of Rhode Island came after 2003 and are not part of this record.
The four opinions are public records of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Rebecca Spencer and the Heatons keep their names. So do the juvenile program workers, the cottage manager and the psychiatrists and psychologists who examined Price or testified about the evaluation, all of whom appear in their official or professional roles, and the lawyers and judges. The one private person given an initial is a prospective juror, Mr. M., whose removal from the 1994 jury was challenged as racially motivated.
The Caselaw Access Project text is printed as scanned. The 1994 opinion is a short answer to a certified question and quotes the two statutes it relied on in full. The 1996 opinion includes a long history of the contempt power in English law, with its old spellings kept as the court quoted them, and the 2003 opinion was written by Chief Justice Weisberger after his retirement. We closed words the printer had split across lines only where the whole word appears elsewhere in the text, and nothing has been spell-checked. Each opinion is followed by its own footnotes.
In re Craig PRICE.
No. 94-400-M.P.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Aug. 2, 1994.
ORDER
This matter came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on July 29, 1994, pursuant to a question certified by the Chief Judge of the Family Court pursuant to Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure for Domestic Relations.
The question is:
Whether the Family Court has the power to initiate criminal contempt proceedings for a repeated refusal by the respondent to follow an order of the court?
This Court would point out that the General Laws of Rhode Island Section 8-6-1 provides:
“Judgments, decrees, and orders — Writs and process — Punishment of contempt.— The supreme and superior courts shall have power to enter such judgments, decrees, and orders, and to frame and issue such citations, executions and other writs and processes, as may be necessary or proper to carry into full effect all the powers and jurisdiction which are or shall be conferred upon them respectively by the constitution or by law. They shall have power to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or both, all contempts of their authority.”
and also Section 8-10-38 provides in part:
“Like powers are hereby conferred upon the family court as are conferred upon the superior court by the provisions of § 8-6-1, entitled General powers of supreme and superior courts * *
Without any reference to the issues raised in the captioned case, this court is of the opinion that these statutes confer on the Superior Court and Family Court broad powers to initiate contempt proceedings against any individual, juvenile or adult, who acts in defiance of a lawful order of those courts.
For these reasons the certified question is answered in the affirmative.
Entered as an Order of this Court this 2nd day of August 1994.
STATE v. Craig C. PRICE.
No. 94-736-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
March 26, 1996.
Aaron Weisman, Asst. Atty. General, Michael Stone, Joseph P. Youngs, III, Special Asst. Attys. Gen., for Plaintiff.
Robert B. Mann, Providence, for Defendant.
[OPINION BY LEDERBERG, Justice. type=majority]
OPINION
LEDERBERG, Justice.
The issue before us is whether criminal contempt can be punished by incarceration for a period longer than one year. The State of Rhode Island (state) has appealed to the Supreme Court the finding by a Family Court justice that G.L.1956 § 11 — 1—1—the statute that sets forth the punishment for common-law offenses not covered by statute — applies to criminal contempt and consequently establishes a maximum penalty for that offense. For the reasons related below, we sustain the state’s appeal and reverse the judgment of the Family Court. A summary of the pertinent facts and travel of this case follows.
Facts and Procedural History
On September 21, 1989, Craig C. Price (defendant), then aged fifteen, appeared before the Family Court, admitted sufficient facts to be adjudicated delinquent on four charges of murder, and was committed to the Rhode Island Training School until the age of twenty-one. On the same date, the trial justice ordered defendant to undergo psychological or psychiatric evaluation as part of a court-ordered treatment plan.
On August 4, 1994, the state filed a felony complaint in the Family Court, charging defendant with criminal contempt on the grounds that he had, on various dates between November 16, 1989, and July 6, 1994, repeatedly refused to participate in the court-ordered evaluation and treatment program. On October 31, 1994, defendant filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to compel amendment of the felony complaint against him, arguing that contempt constitutes a misdemeanor offense, not a felony.
At a hearing on November 14, 1994, the trial justice denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and found that criminal contempt was a misdemeanor at common law. The trial justice ruled that § 11-1-1 provides that offenses that were misdemeanors at common law “and for which no punishment is prescribed by the general laws” may not be punished by a prison “term * * * exceeding one year.” Therefore, the trial judge ruled that criminal contempt may not be punished by a sentence in excess of one year. On November 16, 1994, the state filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-24r-32.
Contempt of Court
On appeal, the state argued that the trial justice erred in applying § 11-1-1 to criminal contempt because the statute was never intended to apply to the inherent power of the courts to punish contempt of their authority. We agree.
“Contempt of court” has been defined as “any act in willful contravention of [the court’s] authority or dignity, or tending to impede or frustrate the administration of justice.” A Law Dictionary 257 (Henry C. Black 2d ed. 1910). “[CJriminal contempts are acts done in disrespect of the court or its process or which obstruct the administration of justice or tend to bring the court into disrespect,” in consequence of which “a fine or imprisonment is imposed upon the eon-temnor for the purpose of punishment.” Id. at 257-58. “A sentence for a definite term for criminal contempt is * * * purely punishment to vindicate the court’s authority and dignity.” 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 232 (1990) (citing Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 78 S.Ct. 128, 2 L.Ed.2d 95 (1957)). “Courts of justice have an inherent power to punish all persons for contempt of their rules and orders, for disobedience of their process, and for disturbing them in their proceedings.” 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 420 (1897).
Contempt Powers at Common Law
It is well settled that Rhode Island and the other original colonies adhered to English common law after gaining their independence, Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1042 (R.I.1995), and that this state “recognizes all common law offenses that have not been specifically abrogated or superseded by statute.” In re Marlene B., 540 A.2d 1028, 1029 (R.I.1988).
“Under the common law of England courts had inherent power to punish for contempt.” Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law 531 (2nd ed. 1969) (citing Douglas v. Adel, 269 N.Y. 144, 146, 199 N.E. 35, 36 (1935)). Moreover, contempts against the King’s Courts, which included the Court of King’s Bench, Chancery, Common Pleas or Exchequer, were regarded as serious offenses “highly punishable by Fine and Imprisonment.” William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, ch. XXI, “Of Contempts against the King’s Courts” at 57-58 (1739). The exercise of contempt powers by English courts and the imposition of punishments were well documented in the eighteenth century. Hawkins reported, for example, that a person who drew his sword on any judge, “whether he strike or not,” in the presence of the King’s courts, could “lose his Hand and his Goods, and the Profits of his Lands during Life, and suffer perpetual Imprisonment;” whereas those who disturbed such Courts “by threatening or reproachful Words to any Judge sitting in them” were “guilty of a High Misprision,” and those who made “an Affray in the Palace-Yard near the said Courts, but out of their View” were subject to a severe fine and imprisonment “during the King’s Pleasure.” Id. at 57.
The inherent power to punish for contempt has long been recognized as part of our country’s common law. Perkins, Criminal Law, at 531 (citing Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36, 10 S.Ct. 424, 426, 33 L.Ed. 801, 804 (1890); In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 227 (1893); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); In re Hayes, 72 Fla. 558, 73 So. 362 (1916); State ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo. 1238, 152 S.W.2d 640 (1941)). “The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of [the] power [to punish for contempt].” Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wah.) 505, 510, 22 L.Ed. 205, 207-08 (1873). In Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242, 248 (1821), the United States Supreme Court stated that “Courts of justice are universahy acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose süence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.” The source of judicial authority in respect to contempt was cogently identified in In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257 (1859): “The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court. It is a power not derived from any statute, but arising from necessity; implied, because it is necessary to the exercise all other powers.” (Emphasis added.)
Rhode Island Contempt Statute: G.L.1956 § 8-6-1
The inherent power of our state’s courts to punish for contempt was expressly recognized by the General Assembly in 1798 by the enactment of “An Act to Establish a Supreme Judicial Court in This State.” Public Laws of 1798, Section 4. This act stated that the “Supreme Judicial Court [of Rhode Island] shall have power to * * * punish by fine or imprisonment, at the reasonable discretion of said Court, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.” Section 4 was eventually codified as G.L.1956 § 8-6-1, which provides that the Supreme and the Superior Courts “shall have power to punish, by fine or imprisonment, or both, all contempts of them authority;” § 8-10-38 extends the same power to the Family Court.
Thus, we conclude that the Legislature intended § 8-6-1 as an affirmation of the inherent power of the courts of this state to punish for contempt of their authority and as a codification of the contempt powers of the courts at common law. Moreover, there has been no legislative enactment evincing an intent to delimit the fine or the term of imprisonment that the courts may impose for contempts. Thus, because the General Assembly has imposed no limitation on the power of the courts to punish for contempt, we must ineluctably hold that the courts of this state possess inherent power to impose in their reasonable discretion such penalties as they deem appropriate.
The formulation of § 8-6-1 is strikingly similar to that of the federal contempt statute, and we are persuaded to give the same interpretation to § 8-6-1 as the United States Supreme Court has given to 18 U.S.C. § 401. The precursor of § 401 was § 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, which provided that the federal courts “shall have power to * * * punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.” The “generality of this language suggests that § 17 was intended to do no more than expressly attribute to the federal judiciary those powers to punish for contempt possessed by English courts at common law.” Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 169, 78 S.Ct. 682, 635, 2 L.Ed.2d 672, 679 (1958). Hence, § 17 did not grant but, rather, affirmed the power of federal courts to punish certain contempts by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts. Id. at 179, 78 S.Ct. at 640, 2 L.Ed.2d at 685.
In 1831, Congress limited the exercise of the authority of the federal courts by the enactment of legislation that delineated the conduct that was punishable under the contempt powers of the courts. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 203, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1482-83, 20 L.Ed.2d 522, 529 (1968). In the Act of 1831, 4 Stat. ch. 334, § 1, the offenses described as contemptuous are identical to those propounded in the present federal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401.
Section 401 of 18 U.S.C. differs in phraseology but not in substance from the Act of 1831 and provides that a federal court “shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
“(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
“(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
“(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.”
Although, since 1789, the federal statute has restricted the punishment for contempt to a fine or to imprisonment, and since 1831, has defined contempt in terms of the three categories cited ante, Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 510, 512, 22 L.Ed. at 207-08, 208, it is nonetheless indisputable that Congress has imposed no statutory limitation on the extent of the punishment that the federal courts may impose in sentencing for contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401. Green, 356 U.S. at 188, 78 S.Ct. at 645, 2 L.Ed.2d at 690.
Rule 42 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and Other Statutory Authority
Moreover, Rule 42 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, under which the Superior Court may punish all criminal contempts of its authority, imposes no restriction on the court’s authority to punish contempts. Specifically, Rule 42(a) directs that in summary dispositions of criminal contempt, “[t]he order of contempt shall recite the adjudication and sentence.” Similarly, in the dispositions of contempt upon notice and hearing under Rule 42(b), “[ujpon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.” Rule 42 is virtually identical to its federal counterpart, and neither rule sets limitations on sentences or maximum penalties for criminal contempt.
In addition, a number of statutes provide for the punishment of contempt in specific circumstances. None of these, however, specifies a maximum penalty for criminal contempt. For example, G.L.1956 § 9-10-10, entitled “Penalty for failure of juror to attend,” provides that any duly notified juror who fails to attend court as required and fails to give a satisfactory excuse for not attending, upon being judged in contempt, “shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20.00);” and § 10-9-23, entitled “Enforcement of writ by attachment as for contempt,” provides that when any person to whom a writ of habeas corpus is directed refuses to receive or neglects to obey and execute the writ without sufficient excuse, the court “shall proceed forthwith, by process of attachment as for a contempt, to compel obedience to the writ and to punish the person guilty of the contempt.”
Common Law Offense Statute: G.L.1956 § 11-1-1.
The state contended, and we agree, that the inherent power of the courts to punish for contempt of their authority is not controlled by the common law offense statute, § 11-1-1. The statute provides:
“Every act and omission which is an offense at common law, and for which no punishment is prescribed by the general laws, may be prosecuted and punished as an offense at common law. Every person who shall be convicted of any such offense which is a misdemeanor at common law shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year or be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500). Every person who shall be convicted of any such offense which is a felony at common law shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding five (5) years or be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000).”
Section 11-1-1 addresses offenses at common law for which the General Laws do not prescribe a punishment. This common law offense statute assures that a person who has committed an offense at common law cannot evade prosecution and punishment because the offense has not been declared a crime in the laws of the state. Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., 1 Substantive Criminal Law, § 2.1(f) at 101 (1986). Because courts clearly possess inherent power to punish for contempt, we are firmly convinced that such a saving statute would be inapplicable and wholly unnecessary to ensure that contempts could be punished. Moreover, §§ 8-6-1, 8-10-38, 9-10-10, and 10-9-23 and Rule 42 fully evince the intent that contempt be punishable by fine or imprisonment without limitation on the court’s power to punish. Because the courts of this state are endowed with inherent power to punish contempts, we hold that § 11-1-1 was not intended as a restraint on the courts’ power to punish contempts of their authority in their discretion.
Conclusion — Discretion to Punish Contempt
We conclude that contempt was a serious offense at common law for which courts could impose often severe punishments in their reasonable discretion. Moreover, “[t]he inherent power of courts to punish for contempt of their orders has long been recognized by our jurisprudence.” E.M.B. Associates, Inc. v. Sugarman, 118 R.I. 105, 108, 372 A.2d 508, 509 (1977) (citing Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 510, 22 L.Ed. at 207).
We recognize that courts, endowed with the power to impose severe punishment for contempt in their discretion, might abuse that discretion. The United States Supreme Court has held that “where Congress has not seen fit to impose limitations on the sentencing power for contempts the district courts have a special duty to exercise such an extraordinary power with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumspection. The ‘discretion’ to punish vested in the District Courts by § 401 is not an unbridled discretion. Appellate courts have here a special responsibility for determining that the power is not abused, to be exercised if necessary by revising themselves the sentences imposed.” Green, 356 U.S. at 188, 78 S.Ct. at 645, 2 L.Ed.2d at 690. In consideration of both the authority of our state courts to punish contempt in their reasonable discretion as well as the responsibility of this Court to ensure that such power not be abused, we shall review a decision in respect to the punishment of contempt for abuse of that discretion.
In summary, we sustain the appeal of the state and reverse the judgment of the Family Court, to which we return the papers in this case.
The "common law” has been defined as “nothing else but statutes worn out by time. All our law began by consent of the legislature, and whether it is now law by usage or writing is the same thing. (2 Wils. 348).” 1 Sharswood's Blackstone's Commentaries, at 73 n. 14 (1860). The common law, or leges non scriptae, has been described as derived from “immemorial custom” as "from time to time declared in the decisions of the courts of justice * * * and digested for general use in the authoritative writings of the venerable sages of the law.” Id. at 73.
In G. & P. Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 343 (1856), this Court held that the General Assembly may not constitutionally exercise judicial functions. Given our holding in Taylor and our conclusion that the power to punish for contempt rests inherently in the courts, were the General Assembly to enact legislation regulating the contempt powers of this state’s courts, such action could give rise to a fundamental issue of separation of powers.
Cf. G.L.1956 § 8-8-5 (power of District Court to punish contempt); G.L.1956 § 8-9-21, (power of Probate Courts to punish contempt); G.L.1956 § 27-13.1-4 (failure to obey court order).
STATE v. Craig C. PRICE.
No. 95-471-C.A.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Feb. 10, 1998.
Robert B. Mann, Providence, for Plaintiff.
Andrea J. Mendes, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Defendant..
Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.
[OPINION BY GOLDBERG, Justice. type=majority]
OPINION
GOLDBERG, Justice.
This case comes before us on the appeal of Craig C. Price (defendant) from his judgments of conviction following a jury trial in Providence Superior Court on charges of simple assault and extortion. The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in numerous respects and that as a consequence his convictions, specifically his conviction on the charge of extortion, should be reversed. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the trial justice committed no reversible error and affirm the judgments of conviction. The facts of this case are as follows. Additional facts will be supplied insofar as they are pertinent to each issue raised on appeal.
At the time of the incident giving rise to this indictment, Mark Petrella (Petrella) was employed as a juvenile program worker (JPW) at the Rhode Island Training School. Testimony elicited at trial indicated that on the evening of October 1, 1993, Petrella and another JPW, Darrin Lucas (Lucas), were assigned to supervise residents at the school’s program building, which serves as a recreational facility for the school’s residents during the evening hours. The defendant, an inmate at the Training School Youth Correctional Center (YCC) at this time, was one of the residents present at the program building that evening. At approximately 9:00 p.m., Petrella escorted defendant and another resident back to the YCC where normal procedure requires that a member of the YCC staff conduct a strip-search of the resident. Petrella was informed, however, that the YCC was short staffed that evening and that as a result he would have to conduct the strip-search of the two youths himself. During the search of defendant, Petrella discovered and confiscated four cigarettes and a lighter that defendant had obtained at the program building and secreted on his person. Petrella claimed that defendant appeared nervous and asked if he would be disciplined. Petrella further testified that he told defendant that he was required to report the incident stating, “You did what you have to do and now I have to do what I have to do.”
The defendant then dressed and entered the dayroom. Petrella proceeded to the control room to compose a discipline report and an unusual-incident report regarding his discovery of the contraband on defendant. Pursuant to Training School policy, copies of the incident report are forwarded to the shift coordinator and the building manager, and a copy of the discipline report is presented to the resident. Petrella testified that upon completing the reports, he entered the dayroom where two other JPWs, Antwyon Carter (Carter) and Robert Paci (Paci), had been assigned and showed Carter the discipline report. Carter then called to defendant, who came forward and received the report. Petrella testified that upon reading the report, defendant became extremely agitated and began ranting and raving, swearing at Petrella, and stating: “I’m going to have you snuffed out. If you ever come up here, you’ll be mine. You’d better take some advice from me, don’t ever come up and work here.”
During the course of defendant’s outburst, Carter stood between defendant and Petrella, restraining defendant and trying to calm him down. Two other JPWs, Lucas and Stephen Shears, also observed the incident. These witnesses disagreed concerning whether defendant actually threatened to “snuff out” Petrella, but most did concur that defendant was extremely agitated and annoyed. In an attempt to diffuse the situation, Carter and Paci suggested that Petrella leave the scene. Petrella complied and returned to the control room where he composed additional discipline and unusual-incident reports regarding defendant’s outburst. Thereafter Petrella discussed the incident with his shift coordinator and another superior at the Training School. Petrella never attempted to contact the police.
A disciplinary board at the Training School met the next day to discuss the incidents of the previous evening involving defendant. Disciplinary boards are composed of a cottage manager, who serves as chairman, a staff member, and a resident, and are generally convened to handle internal disciplinary matters stemming from infractions of Training School rules or regulations. Brian Terry (Terry), a cottage manager for the Training School and the chairman of defendant’s disciplinary board, testified that if a resident is charged with more than one infraction arising from the same incident or incidents occurring in a short period of time, only the charge carrying the stiffer penalty will be considered for purposes of discipline. In this instance, the first charge, “possession of contraband,” carried a penalty of a five-day lockup whereas the second charge, “words, threats or gestures intended to provoke the staff,” carried a penalty of a two-day lockup. Accordingly defendant was charged only with “possession of contraband.”
Terry stated that at the hearing defendant admitted to the offense, offered an explanation, and testified as follows: defendant had acquired the cigarettes and lighter at the program building; Petrella knew about the contraband because he had approached defendant at the program building, asked him what was going on, and stated that he did not care what defendant brought back to the YCC as long as it was not drugs; defendant admitted to Petrella that he had the contraband; Petrella became concerned upon learning that he himself would have to perform the strip-search of defendant and told him that he would have to take the cigarettes and write a disciplinary report because Petrella was still on probationary status; defendant became angry when given the report and said some things to Petrella that he “shouldn’t have said.” After weighing defendant’s admission, reports of his recent good behavior, and the maximum penalty for the infraction, the board chairman imposed a penalty of a two-day lockup.
On October 21, 1993, a Family Court trial justice conducted a review of defendant’s case on ancillary matters. At that time a representative from the Attorney General’s office advised the court of its concerns regarding the incident with Petrella. The trial justice requested that the State Police investigate the matter. He also ordered the Training School to notify the Attorney General’s office and the Public Defender’s office of any activity that might be of a criminal nature so that an investigation could be conducted to determine if any crimes had been committed.
On October 22, 1993, the State Police contacted Petrella and later met with him at the Training School; they would meet with Petrella on three to six more occasions. The State Police also interviewed other Training School staff members regarding the October 1, 1993 incident. This information was then submitted to members of the Attorney General’s office who in turn presented it to the Grand Jury. On June 8,1994, the-Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant with one count of simple assault and one count of extortion.
A jury trial was scheduled for October 3, 1994, in Providence County Superior Court. Immediately prior to trial defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging selective prosecution by the Attorney General. The trial justice conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion in which defendant presented the testimony of a Training School cottage manager who stated that he could not recall any other resident who had previously been indicted or informed against for making threats to a Training School staff member. The defendant attempted to call the Attorney General himself to testify, anticipating that he would acknowledge that he was prosecuting defendant simply because he was dissatisfied with the sentence defendant had received for his prior offenses. The trial justice refused to require the Attorney General to testify. The defendant offered no further evidence in support of his motion, nor did the state offer any additional evidence in response. The trial justice then denied the motion to dismiss, and the trial commenced. At the close of the state’s evidence, defendant moved for judgments of acquittal, arguing that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of either offense. ■ The trial justice denied these motions as well.
The defendant then presented his ease and eventually took the stand in his own defense. He acknowledged that he had been at the program building on the evening of October 1, 1993, and admitted that he had' obtained the cigarettes and lighter, intending to bring them back to the YCC. The defendant stated that he was not worried about getting caught because Petrella had a reputation for letting the residents smoke. The defendant further testified that upon learning he would be responsible for the strip-search, Petrella told defendant that he would have to confiscate the cigarettes from him because the YCC had strict rules on contraband and if defendant were later caught with the cigarettes, it would jeopardize Petrella’s future during his probationary status. The defendant maintained, however, that Petrella agreed not to write a disciplinary report on the matter. The defendant testified that he was upset when Petrella later presented him with the discipline report and admitted yelling at Petrella but claimed the intent was to expose Petrella as a hypocrite. The defendant denied that he ever threatened to kill or “snuff out” Petrella.
On October 7, 1994, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial that was summarily denied. The defendant appeals from his conviction on the charge of extortion.
I
Extortion
On appeal, defendant, asserts several points of error related to the trial justice’s refusal to recognize an objective victim standard as it relates to the charge of extortion. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial justice erred in (1) refusing to employ a reasonable person standard in his instructions to the jury, (2) refusing to let Training School employees testify about whether the reasonable staff member would be afraid to return to work following the alleged threat, and (3) denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on the extortion charge because defendant’s words would not have created a well-founded fear or apprehension of immediate injury on the part of a reasonable person. The defendant argues that the application of an objective standard is necessary because extortion involves “not the • subjective response of a putative victim, but what is reasonable.” In support of his argument, defendant analogizes the instant case to State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183 (R.I.1988), in which this court employed an objective standard in considering an assault with a dangerous weapon charge. The defendant urges this court to apply the same standard to the crime of extortion. The state maintains, however, that the way in which a threat would have an impact on a “reasonable person” is not an element of the crime of extortion and that the trial justice was correct in refusing to recognize one. As all three arguments necessarily succeed or fail on the issue of whether the crime of extortion contains an element of “reasonable” fear, we begin our analysis by reviewing the crime of extortion.
General Laws 1956 § 11-42-2, “Extortion and blackmail,” provides:
“Whoever, verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of a crime or offense or by a verbal or written communication maliciously threatens any injury to the person, reputation, property, or financial condition of another, or threatens to engage in other criminal conduct with intent thereby to extort money or any unlawful pecuniary advantage, or with intent to compel any person to do any act against his or her will, or to prohibit any person from carrying out a duty imposed by law shall be punished by imprisonment in the adult correctional institutions for not more than fifteen (15) years, or by a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both.” (Emphases added.)
In interpreting this statute, this court has consistently stated that the crime of extortion consists of two basic elements: (1) an oral or a written threat to harm a person or property, (2) accompanied by the intent to compel someone to do something against his or her will. See State v. Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1097-98 (R.I.1982); State v. Sabitoni, 434 A.2d 1339, 1342 (R.I.1981); State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 788 (R.I.1980); State v. Davis, 120 R.I. 82, 86, 384 A.2d 1061, 1064 (1978); State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261, 266, 274 A.2d 742, 745 (1971). Absent from this extensive discourse on the crime of extortion, however, are any indicia that would support the construction of § 11^2-2 urged upon us by defendant as requiring proof of an element of reasonable fear upon the part of the victim. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that the relevant statutory and case law militates against defendant’s proposed interpretation.
In Mancini this court previously considered and ultimately rejected an argument similar to that advanced by this defendant. The defendant in Mancini appealed his conviction on charges of extortion, arguing that a directed verdict should have been granted because the state had failed to prove that the victim was fearful of or persuaded by him. We stated that “[i]rrespective of how the crime of extortion may be defined in other states, the only requirement for establishment of the crime under our statute is that the specified threat be made with intent to extort.” Mancini, 108 R.I. at 275, 274 A.2d at 749. Accordingly, in applying § 11-42-2, we are of the opinion that the focus should be on a defendant and his or her subjective intent as demonstrated by his or her conduct and by the words he or she used; how the incident would be perceived by a reasonable person is not a relevant factor to the crime of extortion. We do not recognize a reasonable person standard as an element to the crime of extortion, nor are we prepared to imply one.
Turning then to defendant’s specific points of appeal, we hold that the trial justice did not err in refusing to give defendant’s requested jury instruction that applied a reasonable person standard or in refusing to let Training School employees testify about whether the reasonable staff member would be afraid to return to work following the alleged threat. There is no objective person standard implicit in the statute, and thus the requested instruction and proffered testimony would have been inappropriate.
Similarly, we are unable to discern any error in the trial justice’s decision to deny defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of extortion. In so doing, we note that on appeal defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to either element of the crime of extortion. Rather defendant argues only that were an objective person standard applied to this evidence, a judgment of acquittal would be mandated. As we do not recognize a reasonable person component to the crime of extortion, we must also reject this point of appeal.
II
Jury Instructions
Next defendant maintains that the trial justice erred in his instructions to the jury. Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial justice erred in refusing his request that the jury be instructed as follows:
“[Tjhreatening words have to be considered in the context in which they were uttered, State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261, 274 A.2d 742, 1971, cited in State v. Berberian, 469 [sic] A.2d 928, 930, a 1983 case.
A threat to kill without more does not constitute a criminal offense. State v. Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1097 (R.J.1982).
Thus if you find the defendant made a threat to kill, but did not accompany the threat to kill with the intent to compel Mark Petrella to do an act against his will or to prohibit Mark Petrella from carrying out a duty imposed by law, you must find the defendant not guilty of extortion.”
An examination of a party’s challenge to specific jury instructions must begin with a review of the charge to the jury in order to determine its sufficiency and correctness. See State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 997 (R.I.1996); State v. Gordon, 508 A.2d 1339, 1349 (R.I.1986). “We will not examine single sentences. Rather, the challenged portions must be examined in the context in which they were rendered.” LaRoche, 683 A.2d at 997 (quoting Gordon, 508 A.2d at 1349). Furthermore, this court has often stated its approval of the trial justice’s common practice of using his or her own words to summarize the elements of the offense and the applicable case law. See State v. Durfee, 666 A.2d 407, 409 (R.I.1995). “[A] trial justice’s refusal to grant a request for jury instruction is not reversible error if the requested charge is fairly covered in the general charge.” Taylor v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 610 A.2d 108, 109 (R.I.1992). See also State v. Lane, 609 A.2d 633, 636 (R.I.1992); State v. Jette, 569 A.2d 438, 442 (R.I.1990).
After reviewing the instructions as given, we hold that defendant’s argument is wholly without merit ánd is simply not supported by the record. With respect to the first request, the trial justice did instruct the jury, albeit in his own words, on this precise issue, stating, “You may take into account all of the circumstances then existing at the time the threat was made.” Similarly, defendant’s second request was adequately covered in that the trial justice clearly stated that the state had to prove the existence of a threat as well as the “specific intent of the defendant in making the threat.” Therefore, we hold that the instructions were both sufficient and correct and that defendant’s appeal on this issue must fail.
Ill
Batson Objection
The defendant next argues that the trial justice improperly allowed the state to exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse the only remaining black juror available for service. In the jury questionnaire and during voir dire, juror No. 212 admitted that he had been convicted of an offense in 1983. Upon further investigation the state learned that juror No. 212 had also been convicted of a drug possession offense, of resisting arrest, and of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. He also admitted to a prior arrest in New Jersey. The state then exercised a peremptory challenge, and the juror was excused.
The defendant objected to the state’s use of its peremptory challenge, alleging that such challenge was used in a racially discriminatory manner. The state responded that the juror’s extensive criminal history constituted a race-neutral basis upon which it could properly exercise a peremptory challenge and that because of this history there was a risk that this juror may feel resentment toward law enforcement officers and harbor disrespect for authority. The trial justice found that defendant had made a prima facie showing of discrimination based on the fact that both defendant and the potential juror were black and on the fact that the state had previously exercised a peremptory challenge with respect to another black juror. Nevertheless, the trial justice accepted the state’s race-neutral rationale and overruled defendant’s objection.
On appeal, defendant argues that allowing the state to remove juror No. 212 violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and the right to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community. He asserts that if the state is allowed to exercise a peremptory challenge on the basis of prior contacts with law enforcement officials, a disproportionate number of minorities would be excluded from jury service. The state maintains that its use of the peremptory challenge was appropriate in that the numerous criminal convictions of the potential juror constitute a race-neutral explanation.
Under the Batson rule, when confronted with an objection to a challenge of a prospective juror made on the basis of race, the trial justice must first determine whether there is a prima facie' showing that the challenge was motivated by race. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate its race-neutral reason(s) for challenging that particular juror. The trial court is then left to determine whether the defendant has carried his or her burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination. See State v. Mollicone, 664 A.2d 311, 324 (R.I.1996); State v. Holley, 604 A.2d 772, 777 (R.I.1992). See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 87-89 (1986). “The reasons given must establish a basis for challenge other than race. However, the challenge need not rise to the level necessary to sustain a challenge for cause.” Mollicone, 654 A.2d at 324 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88); see also Hernandez v. New York, 600 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). “[T]he decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.” Holley, 604 A.2d at 778 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. at 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d at 409). The trial justice’s evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind is accorded great deference. Id.
In the instant case the trial justice found that a prima facie showing of racial bias was established but that the race-neutral explanation offered by the prosecution was credible. Although defendant offered evidence of discrimination through his claim of disproportionate exclusion, he failed to prove that such disparity was motivated by racial animus. Accordingly we hold the trial justice did not err in overruling defendant’s Batson objection.
IV
Selective Prosecution
The next point of error asserted by defendant concerns the trial justice’s refusal to grant his motion to dismiss based upon selective prosecution. The defendant argues that he was singled out for prosecution because (1) the Attorney General was frustrated by defendant’s impending release due to his status as a minor at the time he committed the murders for which he was incarcerated and (2) the fact that defendant had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to undergo a mental-health examination ordered by a Family Court justice.
The case law in this area is uniform in recognizing the extreme deference due prosecutors in their prosecutorial decisions and the official discharge of their duties. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985); United States v. Sepulveda, 952 F.Supp. 94 (D.R.I.1997); United States v. Roman, 931 F.Supp. 960 (D.R.I.1996). There is a presumption of good faith in every prosecution that can only be rebutted with clear evidence to the contrary that demonstrates a discriminatory effect motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463-65, 116 S.Ct. at 1486, 134 L.Ed.2d at 698. This discretion, however, is not totally unfettered. Rather it is subject to constitutional constraints and cannot infringe upon the liberties guaranteed by the equal protection component of the due process clause. Id.; see also Sepulveda, 952 F.Supp. at 95; State ex rel. Scott v. Berberian, 109 R.I. 309, 315, 284 A.2d 590, 594 (1971). “A defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is ‘directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons * * * with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that the system of prosecution amounts to a ‘practical denial’ of equal protection of the law.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464-65, 116 S.Ct. at 1486, 134 L.Ed.2d at 698 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1073, 30 L.Ed. 220, 227 (1886)). This burden, while not impossible, is a heavy one to satisfy. See Sepulveda, 952 F.Supp. at 96.
In State v. Ricci, 704 A.2d 210 (R.I.1997), this court recently stated that when called upon to review a claim of selective prosecution, we shall follow the rule of law announced by the United States Supreme Court in Wayte. “Following Wayte, a claim of selective prosecution can prevail only if the defendant can prove that the challenged enforcement has both a discriminatory éffect and is ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or some other arbitrary classification * * * including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights.’” Ricci, at 211 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 1531, 84 L.Ed.2d at 556). Being singled out for prosecution alone, however, does not warrant a dismissal. The defendant must also demonstrate that the selection was intentional or purposeful. See Berberian, 109 R.I. at 315, 284 A.2d at 594.
In this case the trial justice properly conducted an evidentiary hearing during which sevéral witnesses testified that to their knowledge no other Training School resident has ever been criminally prosecuted for threatening a staff member. There was also testimony that internal disciplinary procedures are uniformly employed when a resident is accused of threatening a staff member. Were we to accept this as true and hold that defendant has demonstrated that he was singled out from prosecution from others who are similarly situated, defendant has nevertheless failed to satisfy the second prong of the test that requires the discrimination be invidious. Indeed we hold on the facts of this case that defendant is unable to demonstrate invidious discrimination. This prosecution was not instituted because of any personal enmity on the part of the Attorney General but rather because a Family Court judge ordered the State Police to conduct an investigation into the conduct of defendant— an individual whose presence at the YCC and appearance beforé the Family Court were occasioned by his admitted commission of four murders — to determine if defendant’s conduct was of a criminal nature. The State Police conducted their investigation and then submitted the information to the Attorney General’s office. The Attorney General presented the case to a Grand Jury which in turn voted to issue an indictment. Relying upon these facts, we hold that defendant faded to satisfy the second prong of the test and therefore affirm the decision of the trial justice to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss.
V
Right to Trial Publicity
The defendant’s last argument alleges that the trial justice erred in denying his request for televised proceedings. The defendant, together with a local cable company, argued that electronic media coverage was included in his right to a public trial under both the Rhode Island and the United States Constitutions. The defendant also argued that televised coverage of the trial would provide him with a “more balanced public presentation.” The state expressed concern about whether television coverage of the trial would upset or unnerve the jury; ten of the fourteen jurors had objected to the idea when questioned by the trial justice. Nevertheless, the state indicated that it would defer to the trial justice’s discretion on the matter. As was previously stated, the trial justice denied the request, stating that he feared the networks would manipulate the video by taking short segments out of context. Moreover, he feared that the presence of cameras and the attendant publicity would serve to prejudice defendant unduly as they would serve as a constant reminder to the jury that defendant had previously murdered four people.
On appeal, defendant acknowledges that the decision to allow television coverage is a decision that rests within the sound discretion of the individual trial justice. The defendant urges this court to revisit the issue, arguing that the “electronic age” of contemporary society requires that defendant’s right to a public trial afforded by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution include the televised coverage of his trial. The state responds by simply stating that the Sixth Amendment does not afford a defendant a right to televised coverage, citing United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir.1988).
Article VII of the Supreme Court Rules, “Rules of Media Access,” speaks directly to this issue:
“The trial justice may in his or her sole discretion prohibit the video recording, broadcasting and/or photographing of a participant with a film, videotape, or still camera on the trial justice’s own motion or on the request of a participant in a court proceeding. The trial justice may entirely exclude media coverage of any proceeding or trial over which he or she presides in his or her sole discretion. From any decision by a trial justice excluding the media in whole or in part, or limiting the photographing or recording of a participant in a court proceeding, there shall be no review by the Presiding Justice, Chief Judge of the trial justice’s court, or by the Supreme Court.” Id. at Canon 11. (Emphases added.)
Canon 11 expressly prohibits a review of the trial justice’s decision to prohibit cameras in the courtrooms of this state. Because we decline to find any constitutional implications inherent in the exercise of a trial justice’s discretionary decision to permit media coverage of that court’s proceedings, we need go no further. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 569, 101 S.Ct. 802, 807, 66 L.Ed.2d 740, 748 (1981); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1318, 55 L.Ed.2d 570, 578 (1978); In re Extension of Media Coverage For A Further Experimental Period, 472 A.2d 1232, 1234 (R.I.1984).
VI
Conclusion
Accordingly the defendant’s appeal is denied and dismissed. The judgments of conviction appealed from are affirmed, and the papers in this case may be remanded to the Superior Court.
The defendant did not object to the state's use of a peremptory challenge with respect to the first black juror who was excused, thus it is not an issue for purposes of this appeal.
STATE v. Craig C. PRICE.
Nos. 2001-64-C.A., 94-396-C.A.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
April 18, 2003.
See also, 672 A.2d 893.
Michael Stone, Joseph P. Youngs, III, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.
Robert B. Mann, Providence, for Defendant.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ., and WEISBERGER, C.J. (Ret.).
[OPINION BY WEISBERGER, Chief Justice (Ret.). type=majority]
OPINION
WEISBERGER, Chief Justice (Ret.).
This case comes before us on appeal by Craig C. Price (defendant) from a judgment of the Family Court for the County of Providence that held the defendant guilty of criminal contempt. He appeals from an earlier judgment entered by the Chief Judge of the Family Court holding him to be in civil contempt. He also appeals from the sentence imposed on the criminal contempt charge of twenty-five years imprisonment, of which ten years were to be served and fifteen years were suspended. He challenges a later judgment of the Family Court, which determined that the defendant had violated the terms and conditions of the suspended portions of his criminal contempt sentence. We deny and dismiss the defendant’s appeal and affirm the judgments of the Family Court that we reviewed. We decline to review the validity and propriety of the sentence at this time. The facts and procedural history of this case insofar as pertinent to the appeal are as follows.
Facts and Procedural History
On September 21, 1989, defendant was fifteen years of age. He had been accused of the brutal murder of Joan M. Heaton and her two small daughters in their home on the night of September 4, 1989. He also had been accused of the murder of Rebecca Spencer in her home on the night of July 27, 1987. On September 21, 1989, he appeared before a justice of the Family Court and admitted sufficient facts to be adjudicated delinquent on the four charges of murder, as well as two charges of burglary by virtue of entry into the Heaton and Spencer dwellings. Pursuant to the statutes then in effect, defendant was ordered to be committed to the Rhode Island Training School (Training School) and there to be held until his twenty-first birthday. This was the maximum penalty that the Family Court could impose. The Family Court justice intended to provide for intensive treatment of defendant during his period of commitment in order to diagnose and treat such psychiatric and/or personality disorders that may have contributed to his unprovoked, unusually brutal conduct, and to make it possible for him to be released into the community when his approximately five-year commitment to the Training School ended. To accomplish this, the Family Court justice arranged, in cooperation with the authorities at the Training School, to obtain the services of two outstanding experts in the field of mental health. These experts were Sher-vert Frazier, M.D., who formerly had been the director of the National Institute of Mental Health and chief of psychiatry at McLean Hospital, and Wesley Profit, Ph.D., who was deputy director of the Bridgewater State Hospital in Massachusetts and was also director of forensic services at that institution. These experts were instructed to formulate a diagnostic and treatment plan for defendant. They were retained at state expense and were considered by the justice of the Family Court as the best resource persons to prepare defendant for eventual release into the community.
Arrangements were made with the public defender who represented defendant to present him for a psychiatric examination to begin the diagnostic process. Counsel for defendant had no objection at the outset, but at the second meeting, on November 16, 1989, when the doctors indicated their intention to discuss with defendant his recollection of the events surrounding the subject homicides, defendant said that he would be unable to discuss these matters as a result of having talked to his attorney. He also said that he would be unable to continue to participate in the psychiatric and psychological examinations. Further discussions with defendant and with the attorney disclosed that his withdrawal from the diagnostic and treatment process resulted from fear expressed by his attorney that this psychiatric examination might lead to a civil commitment under the Mental Health Law, G.L.1956 chapter 5 of title 406, that could result in his being placed into a psychiatric facility for commitment beyond his twenty-first birthday.
After these events, defendant was brought before the justice of the Family Court, who prescribed the course of treatment on several occasions. On each of these occasions, the justice ordered him to cooperate in the psychiatric evaluation and sought to persuade him that it would be in defendant’s best interests to do so. He assured defendant that it was not his intention to use the psychiatric treatment program to detain defendant beyond his twenty-first birthday. As an additional step, the justice appointed a guardian ad litem to advise defendant concerning the advantages of psychiatric treatment. The justice also sought to obtain intercession of defendant’s parents to this end. Although the Family Court justice spoke in terms of defendant’s best interests in a manner consistent with the parens patriae function of the Family Court, in the course of defendant’s appearances, he admonished defendant that he had no Fifth Amendment right to refuse psychiatric consultation and that he was ordering defendant to participate in the evaluation and treatment program. During a review of defendant’s case on February 15, 1990, the justice was advised that treatment could not occur without a full assessment by the two experts of defendant’s recollections of the crimes that he had committed and his mental reactions to the reasons why he was at the Training School. Counsel for the state emphatically requested that the court “make whatever order it feels appropriate to accomplish this and obtain his cooperation in the examination.” At that point, an assistant public defender argued to the court that the state would try to use such information in a later proceeding to commit defendant past his twenty-first birthday. The colloquy clearly indicated that defense counsel was referring to a civil mental health commitment. Doctor Profit, at the hearing, expressed his opinion that it was essential for defendant to get on with the healing process. He further expressed the opinion that if defendant did not receive treatment and was released into the community, there would be a danger of repeating crimes similar to those to which he had admitted his guilt.
In response to a report of the doctor’s opinion, the justice said that he did not know of any Fifth Amendment right that defendant had at this time. He added that if defendant should sit at the Training School for five years and do nothing, then at the end of the five years, he would more likely be subject to civil commitment than if he cooperated now in his treatment. It was at this juncture that he appointed a guardian ad litem and sought the aid of defendant’s parents.
Two months later, on April 18, 1990, representatives of the Division of Juvenile Correctional Services (DJCS) reported that defendant was still refusing to participate in the court-ordered evaluation. On April 26, 1990, the guardian ad litem presented his report. This report disclosed that after two meetings with defendant, the guardian ad litem was unable to persuade defendant to participate in the evaluation and treatment program. The reason was defendant’s concern that information given to the therapists would be used by the state to seek an involuntary civil commitment to a mental health facility beyond his twenty-first birthday. The guardian ad litem concluded his report with the following:
“[I]n [defendant’s] analysis and based upon remarks attributable to the prosecutor regarding civil commitment, in-spite [sic] of my recommendation to him that he cooperate, Craig believes his cooperation and participation in this evaluative and treatment process is not in his best interest and, thus, he will decline to participate in such a process at this point in time.”
After this report, the justice asserted unequivocally in the presence of defendant that he “would order him to cooperate” and further suggested that Dr. Profit’s opinion was that his mental condition would deteriorate during his stay at the Training School without outside help or the help of his expert therapists.
On May 15, 1990, representatives of the DJCS again reported that defendant did not want to answer any questions by anyone and had no interest in treatment at that time. On October 23, 1990, the Family Court justice again was informed by DJCS representatives that defendant would not participate in the evaluation process because of his concern relating to possible civil commitment. The report indicated that defendant had no interest in treatment and wanted simply to forget about his crimes, complete his stay at the Training School, and leave. However, Dr. Profit also filed a report at the request of the DJCS that set forth an extremely foreboding prognosis in the event that defendant should continue to refuse to participate in evaluation and treatment:
“First, there can be no doubt that Craig Price is a murderer of the serial type. At this point as you well know, Craig, on advice of counsel, is unwilling to discuss his state of mind at the time of the murders. I suspect from all that I have seen and know of these murders that Craig was in a psychotic rage at the time of these events and that he should probably be classified as a serial murderer, disorganized type. At this point and without great cooperation and assistance from Craig, it cannot be determined what are the psychodynamic underpinnings of Craig’s behavior. Without an accurate formulation as to why these things occurred, it is virtually certain that Craig Price will not be able to demonstrate significant improvement or get well on his own. Without the assistance of a skilled therapist through the long and arduous process of examination of his thoughts and fantasies about what happened and his understanding of his reasoning or lack of same for engaging in this behavior, it is unlikely that Craig Price will be significantly different (and therefore at less risk of repeating this behavior) upon his release than he was on the day of his commitment to your facility.
“Secondly, the mere passage of time is unlikely to produce a change for the better in Craig Price and there is no reason whatsoever to suspect that the passage of time alone can take the place of an aggressive treatment program for this individual.
“Thirdly, Craig Price’s unwillingness to discuss the circumstances surrounding his behavior and his tendency to minimize and deny the importance of that behavior, including the view that these murders occurred in the service of efforts on his part to rob the adult victims, are but further examples of psy-chopathological symptomatology at work.
“Finally, it is my opinion that Craig Price suffers from a substantial disorder of thought, mood, orientation, perception, and memory which grossly impairs his judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality and ability to meet the ordinary demands of life. In short, it is my view that Craig Price suffers from a major mental illness for which treatment is required. While that treatment can now be rendered at your facility, there may come a time when Craig Price will require treatment in a more secure forensic psychiatric setting.
“I would suggest therefore that you continue to pursue with Craig Price the need for him to engage in meaningful treatment and that you continue to make available to him the opportunity to meet with a therapist to discuss these matters. You should not under any circumstance adopt or accept his view that he is not in need of treatment nor should you take his refusal to be anything other than a manifestation of the pathology underlying the behavior which caused him to be sentenced to your facility. Craig Price, despite his outward appearances and despite his sometimes charming personality, is an individual who is in dire need, in my opinion, of the best and most intensive treatment that can be made available. Even with that, it may very well be that Craig Price will not be in a position where he can be safely placed in the community for a significant period of time into the foreseeable future and beyond.”
Nevertheless, defendant continued to refuse to carry out the ordered evaluation and therapeutic process. Hearings on October 25, 1990, and on October 24, 1991, disclosed that defendant continued to refuse to participate in psychiatric evaluation. The same determination was reported at a hearing on October 22, 1992, whereupon the Family Court justice specifically asked defendant whether he was aware that there was a court order requiring that he undergo a psychological examination. The defendant responded to that question with an affirmative reply. During ensuing months, there was no change in defendant’s attitude. The defendant still refused to accept any form of treatment. On October 20, 1993, after defendant had attained the age of twenty years, he was presented before a different Family Court justice. The hearing took place on October 21,1993. Counsel for the state reported to this justice the long history of lack of cooperation and included in the statement that a third justice of the Family Court had also urged defendant to cooperate. In response to this report, the Family Court justice, after hearing, made the following comment:
“Mr. Price, you have been ordered to cooperate with counseling. It’s in the past, been ordered on many occasions in the past, and you have refused to do so. I remind you that it remains an order of this Court that you do submit to those evaluations and cooperate, and if you don’t, this Court could find you in contempt upon proper motion to that effect, but that remains an ongoing order of this Court. The Court will make that an order. I will again reissue that order again at this time that Mr. Price submit to the evaluation in- accordance with the previous orders of this Court.”
In spite of this order, defendant continued his refusal to participate in the evaluation and therapeutic process until a representative of the Attorney General sought a hearing before the Chief Judge of the Family Court. This representative set forth that court orders had been issued requiring compliance with the therapeutic evaluation program on February 15, 1990, April 26, 1990, October 25, 1990, October 24, 1991, October 22, 1992, and October 19, 1998. The state urged the Chief Judge to hold defendant in contempt. The court asked for memoranda, and a hearing date was set for June 27,1994, after the parties’ memoranda had been filed. It was now less than four months from defendant’s twenty-first birthday. An extensive hearing was conducted at which counsel for the state and counsel for defendant presented various arguments. The Chief Judge held that this proceeding was one for civil contempt and not criminal contempt. He found defendant in civil contempt of the court’s order and ordered him to be held at the Adult Correctional Institutions (where he was serving a sentence imposed by the Superior Court) until such time as he would purge himself of contempt by cooperating with the evaluation process. The outer limit of the sentence was for a period of one year, but could be terminated at any time by defendant’s compliance with the previous orders. The defendant did move, on July 1, 1994, that he be purged of contempt because he was now willing to comply with the order of the court to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation. In late August and early September 1994, he met with Richard Barnum, M.D., who was retained by the court as a forensic psychiatrist. (The earlier-appointed experts were no longer available.) Doctor Barnum reported after these meetings that defendant had lied to him concerning the events of the homicide. Consequently, the Chief Judge determined that defendant had not cooperated with the examination, even though he participated. Therefore, the Chief Judge denied the motion to purge on June 8,1995.
Thereafter, the state moved to hold defendant in criminal contempt. The Chief Judge of the District Court was assigned to the Family Court to preside over the criminal contempt proceedings. A jury was empanelled, and after a four-day trial, the jury which had been empanelled under the authority of the Family Court found defendant guilty of criminal contempt. Approximately two months after the rendition of the verdict, the trial judge imposed the sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment, of which ten years were to be served and the fifteen-year balance was suspended with a probationary period of the same duration.
In support of his appeal, defendant has raised eight issues and numerous sub-issues. These issues will be considered in the order of their significance to this opinion.
Further facts will be provided as may be necessary in order to deal with the issues raised by defendant.
I
The Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Central to defendant’s contention that he should not have been adjudged in contempt is the argument that he refused to participate and cooperate in psychiatric and psychological evaluations based upon his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Although defendant, through his counsel, adverted to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, he clearly stated that his refusal to participate in the diagnostic and treatment process was based upon his fear (and that of his counsel) that the psychological evaluation might result in his being civilly committed under the Mental Health Law. Both Dr. Profit and Dr. Frazier had informed the court that such treatment was absolutely essential prior to defendant’s release into the community.
As earlier set forth in this opinion, the guardian ad litem unequivocally stated, in his report to the Family Court, that defendant feared that his participation in this evaluation and treatment process might result in civil commitment. At no point did defendant or his attorney set forth any cogent reason to fear criminal prosecution as a result of his discussions of his crimes with the psychiatric and psychological forensic experts.
It should be noted that the Family Court had exhausted its penal powers when it sentenced defendant to incarceration at the Training School until his twenty-first birthday. This was the maximum punishment that could be imposed on defendant as a juvenile. This incarceration was based upon his admission of sufficient facts to hold him delinquent for four charges of murder and two counts of burglary. If subsequent interrogation indicated that he had committed additional crimes, no further penalty could be imposed upon him by the Family Court. Thus, as a practical matter, he could not have incriminated himself further. His only apprehension was the possibility of civil commitment under the Mental Health Law. Both he and his counsel were quite candid on this point.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986), held that the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to psychiatric interviews that might lead to civil commitment. Even though the Illinois commitment of a person as sexually dangerous was similar in many respects to penal incarceration, the Court, in an opinion by then-justice Rehnquist, quoted with approval an observation by the Illinois Supreme Court that applying the privilege against self-incrimination to such psychiatric interviews and evaluations would completely thwart the therapeutic purpose that was central to the Illinois scheme of providing psychiatric care as needed for sexually dangerous individuals. Id. at 367, 106 S.Ct. at 2991, 92 L.Ed.2d at 303. The United States Supreme Court quoted Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 331 (1979), for the proposition that
“The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.” Allen, 478 U.S. at 373, 106 S.Ct. at 2994, 92 L.Ed.2d at 307.
The Court went on to comment that the Illinois “decision to supplement its parens patriae concerns with measures to protect the welfare and safety of other citizens [did] not render the [a]ct punitive.” Id. A fortiori, defendant’s apprehension or that of his counsel that he might be subject to commitment under the Rhode Island Mental Health Law would not give rise to a reasonable claim or even a colorable claim of reliance upon the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Moreover, in Allen v. Illinois, the Court also rejected a claim of privilege based upon the due process clause, specifically rejecting the petitioner’s reliance on the principles enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Allen, 478 U.S. at 374-75, 106 S.Ct. at 2994-95, 92 L.Ed.2d at 308.
The defendant in the case at bar was at no time in danger of any further criminal penalties for the crimes for which he had been incarcerated or for any other crimes that may have been committed attendant to those charges. His only concern was in respect to a possible civil commitment under the Mental Health Law. Such a mental health certification to a state hospital or psychiatric inpatient facility would be far less punitive in design than the Illinois sexually dangerous commitment considered by the Supreme Court in Allen. Consequently, the purported invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination was entirely without basis in either law or in fact.
The defendant also argues that pursuant to State v. Paquette, 117 R.I. 638, 369 A.2d 1096 (1977), it was essential that he be instructed about immunity. Paquette dealt with our statute which grants transactional immunity. It had no application to the case at bar, in which no immunity, either use or transactional, was either applicable or necessary. The tribunal had completely exhausted its penal power by incarcerating defendant until his twenty-first birthday. It was repeatedly pointed out by justices of the Family Court that defendant had no privilege against self-incrimination. If it could be argued that Justice DePetrillo was less than emphatic in admonishing defendant about the absence of a privilege and the danger of contempt if he did not cooperate with the psychiatrist, certainly Justice Suttell was definite and unequivocal in his admonition in this respect. Ultimately, the Chief Judge of the Family Court held defendant in civil contempt for having defied numerous court orders over a period of about five years. The Chief Judge incarcerated defendant but allowed him to terminate his incarceration at any time by participating and cooperating with the psychiatric and evaluation treatment process. Nevertheless, in spite of this clear indication of the absence of a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, defendant, during his last months of incarceration by the Family Court, did not cooperate with the examination. The forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Richard Barnum, reported that defendant had lied concerning the events of his four homicides in that his relation of the circumstances differed markedly from the agreed facts that he had admitted before the Family Court. In sum, defendant defied numerous Family Court orders over approximately five years of incarceration without a colorable claim of a privilege against self-incrimination. This was done solely for the purpose of avoiding a possible civil commitment to which the privilege was not applicable.
Consequently, defendant’s reliance upon the privilege in refusing steadfastly to obey the numerous orders of the Family Court was misplaced. His reliance upon the advice of counsel was also misplaced for reasons which we shall outline below.
II
The Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
The trial judge denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on numerous grounds. Among these grounds, the trial judge held that defendant was not justified in defying the orders of the Family Court on the basis of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for reasons that were set forth above. The trial judge was clearly correct in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds. The defendant also argues that the Family Court, during the five-year period of defendant’s incarceration, never clearly and unequivocally ordered defendant to participate and cooperate in the psychiatric evaluation and treatment process. The trial judge rejected this argument.
We set forth earlier that the order of Family Court Justice Suttell was direct, clear, and emphatic. Certainly the holding by the Chief Judge of the Family Court that defendant was in civil contempt for failing to obey the previous orders would eliminate any possible doubt about the clarity and mandatory quality of the court’s order that defendant must comply with psychiatric examination and treatment. No warning or admonition could be more crystal clear than the findings and holding of the Chief Judge of the Family Court that defendant’s refusal to comply was contemptuous. In adjudging defendant guilty of civil contempt, the Chief Judge of the Family Court still gave him the opportunity to purge himself of contempt by complying. The defendant refused to do so. Therefore, the trial judge in the criminal contempt procedure properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal based on the argument that the Family Court had not given defendant notice of the necessity of his compliance to avoid contempt. Cases such as United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) are completely inapplicable.
The defendant also argues that he could not have been held in contempt as a matter of law since throughout his period of disobedience to the orders of the Family Court he had been explicitly relying on the advice of counsel. Many courts have rejected the defense of advice of counsel to a charge of criminal contempt. In United States v. Remini 967 F.2d 754, 755 (2nd Cir.1992), the defendant had refused to testify at the trial of a case entitled United States v. Thomas Gambino held in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York before Judge Wein-stein. Remini raised a defense based upon his privilege against self-incrimination. Id. This defense was rejected on the ground that immunity had been afforded to him. Id. He was held in civil contempt and thereafter he was indicted for criminal contempt for failing to testify. Id. at 755-56. He then asserted the defense that he had acted on the advice of counsel. Id. at 756. The District Court rejected this defense and did not allow it to be presented in the course of the trial. Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Feinberg, stated that it was the “established law of [that] [C]ircuit that ‘advice of counsel is not a defense to the act of contempt, although it may be considered in mitigation of punishment.’ United States v. Goldfarb, 167 F.2d 735, 735 (2d Cir.1948) (per curiam). Accord United States v. Underwood, 880 F.2d 612, 618-19 (1st Cir.1989)[.]” Remini, 967 F.2d at 757.
In United States v. Armstrong, 781 F.2d 700 (9th Cir.1986), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also rejected a proposed defense that the conduct of the defendants was not willful because of the good-faith reliance upon the advice of counsel not to testify. The Court of Appeals considered this issue as one of law and therefore reviewed the rejection of the defense by the District Court de novo. Id. at 706. The Court commented as follows:
“Appellants misinterpret the nature of the ‘good faith’ defense to a charge of criminal contempt. Although a defendant’s good faith belief that he is complying with the order of the court may prevent a finding of willfulness, good faith reliance on the advice of counsel to disobey a court order will not. See United States v. Snyder, 428 F.2d 520, 522-23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903, 91 S.Ct. 139, 27 L.Ed.2d 139 (1970) * * Armstrong, 781 F.2d at 706.
The rationale for these rejections of advice of counsel as a defense has been set forth in Lawrence N. Gray’s Criminal and Civil Contempt: Some Sense of a Hodgepodge, 72 St. John’s L.Rev. 337 (1998):
“In establishing intent, it is sufficient to find that a refusal to obey was the product of rational choice. The fact that the rational choice is predicated on the advice of counsel is irrelevant. * * * “While cooperation with one’s lawyer is important and should be encouraged, ‘an attorney may not exculpate his client of contempt by advising him to disobey an order of the court because the judge is wrong.’ The responsibility of complying or not complying with a court order rests solely with the person commanded. Viewed cynically, a defense to contempt based on advice of counsel is an invitation to every sophisticated scoundrel to seek an attorney who will give advice that he or she need not obey the order and thus be safe in the expectation that there will be immunity from the consequences of the disobedience.” Id. at 370-71 (citing United States v. Monteleone, 804 F.2d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir.1986)).
Consequently, the trial judge was correct in refusing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal based upon the argument that defendant had relied upon the advice of counsel.
We have considered defendant’s other arguments in support of his claim that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and find these arguments unpersuasive.
Ill
The Batson Claim Relating to the State’s Use of a Peremptory Challenge
During the selection of the jury, counsel for the state exercised a peremptory challenge to an African-American juror. Counsel for the defense objected to this challenge based upon the principles enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The defense argued that this challenge was based upon racial discrimination. We recently defined the obligation of a trial justice when faced with a Batson issue:
“ ‘Under the Batson rule, when confronted with an objection to a challenge of a prospective juror made on. the [issue] of race, the trial justice must first determine whether there is a prima facie showing that the challenge was motivated by race.’ State v. Price, 706 A.2d 929, 935 (R.I.1998). ‘Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate its race-neutral reason(s) for challenging that particular juror.’ Id. ‘The trial [justice] is then left to determine whether the defendant has carried his or her burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.’ Id. ‘[T]he decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.’ State v. Holley, 604 A.2d 772, 778 (R.I.1992) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 409 (1991)). ‘[T]he trial justice’s evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind is accorded great deference.’ Id.” State v. Lopez, 721 A.2d 837, 838-39 (R.I.1998) (per curiam).
We earlier had stated in State v. Holley, 604 A.2d 772, 778 (R.I.1992) that a challenge of even a single juror may be sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination. The experienced trial judge in this case required the prosecution to articulate its race-neutral reasons for challenging that particular juror. The prosecution did so with the following comment:
“MR. YOUNG: Serving on juries is difficult, to say the least, and myself and Mr. Stone struck Mr. M. We talked about it. It was a juror we would have strucken irregardless of his race, and it certainly was not because of his race in any event. I was also struck by the question that Mr. Mann posed at the end, which I objected to and was sustained, and that bothered me because a seed was planted in this young man’s mind that they might be susceptible to retribution. Certainly that wasn’t what Mr. Mann had in mind with that question which was objected to and sustained.
“I was struck by his answer that he listens to his boss. I, frankly, don’t think his age and his abilities would make him a good juror. That’s from the State’s point of view for us to strike. It was not categorically because of his race.”
After the prosecutor’s explanation, the burden was upon defendant to establish that the challenge was based upon the race of the juror and not for race-neutral reasons. A colloquy occurred between counsel for the state and counsel for the defense in which defendant’s counsel argued that there was no real reason to challenge this potential juror because of his age or his possible fear that his findings as a juror might cause him to be looked upon with disapproval by his neighbors and friends. The trial judge considered the comments of both counsel and noted our comments in Lopez, supra, which had been derived from Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).
In accordance with his obligation, the trial judge considered all the factors, including the fact that there were two other African Americans on the jury, and determined that the explanation of the prosecutor and his race-neutral basis for challenge was credible. As we said in Lopez, 721 A.2d at 838-39, “‘[tjhere will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.’ * * * ‘[Tjhe trial justice’s evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind is accorded great deference” ’ and is reviewed for clear error.
It should be borne in mind that a peremptory challenge need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause. Consequently, the reasons set forth by the attorney who made the challenge always are subject to disagreement about their weight and persuasiveness. However, under the deferential standard of review established by our own Court in conformity to the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, we cannot say that the trial justice was clearly wrong in accepting the explanation of counsel for the state and finding that defendant had failed to prove that the challenge was racially motivated.
Consequently, defendant’s argument on this issue does not prevail.
IV
The Claim of Double Jeopardy
The defendant argued to the trial justice that the adjudication of civil contempt by the Chief Judge of the Family Court on June 27,1994, constituted a criminal penalty and therefore precluded his being tried for the charge of criminal contempt pursuant to a later complaint brought by the state. This requires a determination concerning whether the adjudication of civil contempt by the Chief Judge of the Family Court was in fact a criminal rather than a civil determination. There is no question that the line is often blurred between civil and criminal contempt. Generally, an important distinction between civil and criminal contempt is that the purpose of criminal contempt is punitive and designed to vindicate the dignity of the court, while civil contempt is not punitive but coercive and designed to bring about compliance with an order of the court. It is very clear from the terms of the adjudication in civil contempt by the Chief Judge of the Family Court that he was attempting to use the contempt power to coerce the defendant into participating in and cooperating with the psychological and evaluation treatment program. Although he imposed a sentence of one year, he left the key to the jail in defendant’s pocket by allowing him to purge himself of this civil contempt at any time by participating and cooperating in the psychiatric review process. Consequently, the adjudication by the Chief Judge of the Family Court was a classic example of civil contempt. Not only was it designated by the Chief Judge of the Family Court as civil contempt, but it conformed with all the attributes of civil contempt as opposed to criminal contempt. See International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827-28, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2557, 129 L.Ed.2d 642, 651-52 (1994) (characterizing civil contempt as “coercive and avoidable through obedience” and giving paradigmatic examples); see also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498, 55 L.Ed. 797, 806 (1911), and 4 Charles E. Torda, Wharton’s Criminal Law, § 604 at 338-42 (1996).
The ban on double jeopardy as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not preclude imposing a criminal penalty after a civil penalty has been imposed. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that imposing a civil sanction does not preclude imposing a criminal penalty for the same act. In United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), the Court held that imposing property forfeiture sanctions did not constitute a bar to criminal proceedings. The forfeiture proceedings were held to be remedial and not punitive. The Court reversed holdings by both the Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal that held to the contrary. The Court commented that “[i]t is well settled that ‘Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission.’ ” Id. at 292, 116 S.Ct. at 2149, 135 L.Ed.2d at 571. See also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) (per curiam).
The trial justice did not err in rejecting the motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
V
The Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Statute of Limitations, Speedy Trial, and Laches
The defendant argues that his pretrial motion to dismiss based on the delay in charging him with criminal contempt should have been granted. He pointed out that the felony complaint was filed on August 4, 1994, charging defendant with criminal contempt on various dates between November 16, 1989, and July 6, 1994. He argued that the first order of the Family Court requiring participation in psychiatric evaluation and treatment was issued September 21, 1989, more than three years before the criminal complaint was filed.
However, defendant overlooks the fact that the Family Court issued numerous orders subsequent to the September 21, 1989 order. It has been held that “[t]he statute of limitations for an offense begins to run when the crime is complete[d].” United States v. Rouleau, 894 F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir.1990). The Family Court ordered defendant to participate in the psychiatric evaluations on October 22, 1992, and October 19, 1993. Thereafter, the state moved before the Chief Judge to hold defendant in civil contempt. The Chief Judge entered an order finding defendant in civil contempt with the option of purging himself at any time by complying with the previous orders. This proceeding took place on June 27, 1994, with the finding that defendant was in civil contempt for violating numerous orders of the Family Court that he participate in psychiatric evaluation and treatment. As recently as June 8, 1995, the Chief Judge denied defendant’s motion to purge himself of civil contempt on the ground that he lied to Dr. Barnum about the events surrounding the four homicides in that he contradicted the statements made when he was admitting facts sufficient to hold him as a delinquent.
Thus, defendant’s course of contumacious conduct had continued up to a point when he had been held in civil contempt and beyond. The fact that the Family Court had exercised great restraint and patience over a long period of time did not affect the validity of its recent orders requiring defendant’s cooperation right up to the time that he was held in civil contempt. There was no violation of the statute of limitations of G.L.1956 § 12-12-17.
The argument in respect to laches is unpersuasive. The state had been urging that defendant be held in contempt each time defendant was brought before the court on the numerous occasions when he declined to comply with the court’s order. Certainly, the state made every effort to proceed against defendant, and the proceeding before the Chief Judge on civil contempt resulted only from one of the state’s last efforts to bring the court’s contempt power to bear. The state had moved to adjudge defendant in contempt as early as December 4,1989. Neither the state nor the Family Court did anything to lull defendant into a sense of security that he would not be subjected to the court’s contempt power or held accountable for noncompliance with the orders of the court. See Adam v. Adam, 624 A.2d 1093, 1096 (R.I.1993); O’Reilly v. Town of Glocester, 621 A.2d 697, 702 (R.I.1993).
There is no indication that defendant was denied due process because he had ample notice over the period of five years that the Family Court insisted on his compliance. The finding of civil contempt brought the Family Court’s determination to the attention of defendant in the most dramatic manner conceivable.
The trial judge did not err in denying the motion to dismiss on the grounds of statute of limitations, delay, and denial of due process.
VI
Defendant’s Challenge to the Finding of Civil Contempt
The defendant has argued pro forma that the court erred in finding him guilty of civil contempt. He incorporates by reference the arguments in support of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the criminal contempt charge. He suggests that this issue is largely moot except for its impact on the other components of this appeal.
For the reasons given to support our sustaining the trial judge’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal on the criminal contempt charge, we also reject defendant’s contention that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the civil contempt charge.
VII
The Challenge to Jury Instructions
The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in the instructions given to the jury in declining not to give a Fifth Amendment instruction, and declining to instruct the jury that defendant could rely on advice of counsel. We respectfully disagree with defendant’s contentions on these grounds because they raised issues of law and not of fact. As we have noted above in the opinion, there was no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to this case. Similarly, we noted that defendant had no right to disobey an order of the court merely because his attorney advised him to do so. Therefore, these issues could not have justified a jury finding that defendant was absolved of his obligation to obey the court orders. It is the function of the court to decide issues of law. The jurors are the judges of the facts. See Chapin v. Stone, 77 A. 826 (R.I.1910) (per curiam). Issues of law should not be presented to the jury for its decision. See Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1055 n. 6 (R.I.1998).
The defendant also suggests that the trial judge erred in declining to instruct that he had a right to rely on the actions of the Family Court if they indicated to him that he need not comply with the orders of the court. The trial judge did instruct the jury that a “defendant has a right to rely on the actions of the state.” He further admonished the jury that the Family Court was an arm of the state. He went on to tell the jury that if it found that defendant had relied on the Family Court, it could take this evidence into consideration in determining defendant’s guilt or innocence. We are of the opinion that this instruction was sufficient to submit this issue of fact for consideration to the jury.
The defendant also challenges the instruction relating to vagueness, the instructions on the meaning of contempt, and the instruction on reexamining their views.
As required, we have examined the court’s instructions in their entirety. State v. Perry, 770 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I.2001) and State v. Tooher, 542 A.2d 1084, 1088 (R.I.1988). In considering the instructions of the court in their entirety, we are of the opinion that they covered the factual issues to be submitted. The court defined the nature of contempt and set forth every element necessary to a finding of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged). Counsel for defendant has challenged phrases and portions of sentences in the course of this lengthy charge to the jury. We are of the opinion that these challenges are without merit. We have often stated that a trial justice may give instructions in his or her own words as long as those instructions adequately meet the requirements of the law. The trial justice need not accept the suggested language of a defendant as long as his or her charge gives an adequate expression to the required definitions and propositions of law applicable to the case. Tooher, 542 A.2d at 1088. As an illustration of this principle, the challenge to the instruction on the reexamining of views by jurors is instructive. The court instructed the jury as follows:
“Approach the questions with common sense and with honesty. Address yourselves to the issues forthrightly and courageously. You should neither be stubborn nor should you bend to the whims or desires of any other person. In other words, if you have an abiding conviction one way or the other, you should not sway from that conviction until you have been reasonably persuaded or convinced that you were wrong.”
In objecting to this instruction, counsel for defendant seems to confuse this instruction with an instruction on reasonable doubt. This was clearly not the focus of this instruction. We are of the opinion that no juror would have construed this instruction on considering the opinion of his or her fellow jurors as diminishing in any way the burden of proof on which the trial judge gave a full instruction which has not been challenged by defendant.
Having considered all defendant’s challenges to the trial judge’s charge, we conclude that they are without merit and disclose no prejudicial error.
VIII
Violation Proceeding
The defendant argues that he moved to dismiss the violation proceeding on the ground that defendant could not be found to be a violator of a sentence he was not yet serving. When defendant was sentenced for criminal contempt, he was already serving another sentence for extortion. The criminal contempt sentence was made consecutive to the extortion sentence. We have held in State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 340 (R.I.1997), that when a defendant “has been sentenced to a term that includes any period of probation” and is thereafter found “to have committed any act that constitutes a violation of the implied condition of good behavior,” he may be punished for any violation of that implied condition from the moment the sentence has been imposed until the expiration of the total term of the sentence. The implied condition of good behavior is immediately effective upon the imposition of the sentence. Id. It does not accrue only upon expiration of a previous sentence to which the subject sentence is consecutive.
In Dantzler, 690 A.2d at 339, the defendant had pleaded nolo contendere to a robbery charge and received a twenty-five year sentence with eighteen years to serve, seven years suspended, and seven years of probation. The sentencing judge informed the defendant that his probationary period would “commence upon his release.” Id. After the sentence was imposed, but before his release, the defendant escaped from custody and committed a sexual assault while at large. Id. He was presented as a violator of the probation previously imposed on his earlier robbery charges. He argued that he could not be violated on the earlier-imposed probation because he had not yet completed serving the sentence of incarceration and therefore his period of probation had not begun. Id. After citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions, we held that the defendant may be punished for any act that constitutes a violation of the obligation of good behavior that comes into existence at the very moment the sentence is imposed. Id. at 340-42. Consequently, defendant in the case at bar was properly subjected to punishment for a criminal act that occurred after the sentence was imposed even though that sentence was made consecutive to another period of imprisonment that defendant was already serving. The defendant does not challenge the grounds for his revocation of probation but only the timeliness of its imposition.
The trial judge did not err in declining to dismiss the violation proceeding.
IX
Excessive Sentence
The defendant argues that the sentence imposed upon his conviction for criminal contempt was excessive. He recognizes that this Court has generally declined to review either the validity, legality, or excessiveness of a sentence on direct appeal. State v. Collins, 679 A.2d 862, 867 (R.I.1996); State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311, 324-25 (R.I.1995); State v. Brigham, 638 A.2d 1043, 1046-47 (R.I.1994). We have repeatedly held that the proper procedure for reviewing a sentence imposed in the Superior Court would be by a motion to reduce this sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. McVeigh, 660 A.2d 269, 276 (R.I.1995).
The defendant, however, refers us to language in our opinion in State v. Price, 672 A.2d 893, 898 (R.I.1996), in which we declared that we would review a sentence in respect to the punishment of contempt for abuse of discretion. There is no question that this would be our standard of review when the issue was properly presented to us. The defendant also cites our review of sentences of life imprisonment without parole as in State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316 (R.I.1990). This review of life sentences without parole on direct appeal is required of us by statute. G.L.1956 § 12-19.2-5. However, in all other contexts, we have steadfastly maintained the requirement that a defendant first seek relief from the Superior Court before we would consider reviewing the sentence for validity or excessiveness.
We recognize that this sentence was not imposed by the Superior Court, but by a judge of the Family Court appointed on special assignment. However, Rule 37 of the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings adopts the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Superior Court in the conduct of criminal cases involving adults charged with crimes within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Therefore, we are of the opinion that Rule 35 would be applicable to this case. Pursuant to this rule, defendant may file a motion to reduce sentence with the Family Court. If defendant is aggrieved after a justice of the Family Court has issued a judgment based on that motion, this Court will review that judgment on appeal. At that time, the standard of review set forth in Price, 672 A.2d at 898, will apply.
Consequently, we decline to review the sentence imposed by the Family Court for excessiveness, without prejudice to defendant’s pursuing his remedy in the Family Court pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, which has been adopted by the Family Court for cases of this nature.
X
Other Issues
We have considered all other issues raised by the defendant and conclude that they are without merit.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the appeal of the defendant is denied and dismissed, and the judgments of the Family Court that we reviewed are hereby affirmed. The papers in the case may be remanded to the Family Court for such further proceedings as the defendant may choose to initiate consistent with this opinion.
At his hearing on September 21, 1989, defendant admitted that he had committed all four murders and agreed with the findings of the medical examiner that the murders of Jennifer Heaton, Melissa Heaton, and Joan Heaton all had been done by multiple stab wounds and blunt-force trauma. He further admitted to the murder of Rebecca Spencer, which resulted from multiple stab wounds. In effect, defendant exhibited an unusual homicidal fuiy in the manner of killing his victims.
In the course of the voir dire, it had been disclosed that Mr. M. had a relative and a friend who had been sentenced to the Adult Correctional Institutions. Defense counsel had asked Mr. M. whether, if he voted for acquittal, he had considered that the state "might look unkindly upon your friends and relatives."