Nur-Pashi Kulayev was the only member of the armed group that seized School No. 1 in Beslan, in the Russian republic of North Ossetia, on September 1, 2004, to be taken alive. The siege lasted until September 3. When it ended, the Supreme Court of North Ossetia later found, 317 hostages, one resident of the town, two emergency rescue workers and ten servicemen of the Federal Security Service (FSB) were dead, and 728 hostages had been injured. More than 180 of the dead were children. Kulayev, a Chechen carpenter born in 1980, was detained on the last day of the siege and handed to investigators.
He was tried alone. Over a year of hearings in Vladikavkaz, the republic's capital, he admitted that he had been part of the group but insisted that he had been brought along by his older brother, that he had not known what the group meant to do, and that he had harmed no one. The court rejected each of those claims. On May 26, 2006, at the end of a verdict that took eight court days to read, it convicted him on every count, among them terrorism and the murder of two or more persons, and sentenced him to life imprisonment in a special-regime colony. The court said that he deserved death. Russia's moratorium on executions meant that life was the heaviest sentence it could actually impose.
The trial became something larger than the case against one man. Several hundred survivors and bereaved relatives took part as recognized victims, and many of them used the proceedings to press questions about the officials who had managed the crisis. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on December 26, 2006. Kulayev has been serving the life term since, and in 2021 he still denied his guilt.
On the morning of September 1, 2004, School No. 1 in Beslan held its traditional ceremony for the first day of the school year. The town had a population of about 35,000. An armed group took more than 1,100 of the people gathered there hostage, about 800 of them children, and held them in the school for more than fifty hours. On September 3 the siege ended in explosions and the storming of the school by Russian forces.
Kulayev was detained that day and handed over to investigators. He was the only one of the hostage-takers taken alive. At his trial he said that he had joined the group only on August 31, 2004, the day before the school was seized, and that he had not known its target. In court he said the group had numbered 32. The trial court identified nineteen members of the group by name, Kulayev among them, and referred to thirteen others who were never identified.
The Prosecutor General's Office opened a criminal case into the seizure of the school. Between October and December 2004 investigators questioned large numbers of former hostages and relatives of the dead and formally recognized them as victims in the proceedings; by the time the trial opened, several hundred people held that status. On January 19, 2005, the case against Kulayev was separated from the main investigation and became a case of its own. The main investigation, which concerned the organizers of the attack and other aspects of the events, continued separately.
The prosecution at trial was led in person by a deputy prosecutor general who also headed the investigation team. From the start, survivors and relatives argued that the investigation had been incomplete. In September 2005 they asked for him to be removed, saying that copies of many expert reports had been withheld from them, that facts and statements that did not fit the indictment had been set aside, and that the role of officials in the deaths of the hostages had never been clarified. That request was dismissed.
The trial opened before the Supreme Court of North Ossetia in Vladikavkaz on May 17, 2005. Kulayev was charged under six articles of the Russian Criminal Code: aggravated murder, terrorism, hostage-taking, banditry (membership of an armed criminal gang), attempts on the lives of law-enforcement personnel and one further offense. Finding a lawyer to defend him was difficult. Lawyers approached for the case declined it, and the court appointed a defense counsel.
The reading of the indictment took two days. On May 19 he was asked whether he wished to plead guilty to any of the charges, terrorism and murder among them. He answered "No." The trial went on for nearly a year.
Kulayev's defense rested on his own testimony that he had been brought to the group and had not taken part in the killings.
He denied harming or threatening anyone during the siege.
The court also had before it the statements he had given during the preliminary investigation, and these would weigh against him in the end.
Over 230 victims gave evidence in court, and statements made by others during the investigation were read out. Most of the former hostages who testified said they had not seen Kulayev in the gymnasium where most of the hostages were held, although several said they had seen him there, in a corridor of the school between September 1 and 3, or in the canteen during the final stage of the storming. Their estimates of the size of the group ranged from thirty to seventy.
The survivors and bereaved families of Beslan made full use of their standing as victims, which also allowed them to seek civil damages within the trial. Over the course of the proceedings they lodged several hundred applications, some with the trial court and some with district courts in Vladikavkaz, where the main investigation was still being conducted. Many of the hearings turned less on Kulayev than on the officials who had run the operational headquarters during the crisis. A good many of the former hostages told the court plainly that they did not intend to claim damages from the man in the dock, because in their view the state's officials had to answer for the deaths and injuries.
In late 2005 and January 2006 the victims asked the court to summon members of that headquarters, senior civilian and FSB officers who had been in Beslan, members of the North Ossetian parliamentary commission investigating the siege, and the people who had negotiated with the hostage-takers. The court agreed to hear several North Ossetian officials who had sat on the headquarters and, in January 2006, granted requests to question some senior FSB officers and others involved in negotiations. It refused to call other officials and the members of the parliamentary commission, and it refused to add that commission's findings to the case file. In December 2005 hearings were postponed twice; senior officials who had been summoned did not appear.
Others did come. Between November 2005 and February 2006 the court questioned the head of the North Ossetian FSB, who had led the operational headquarters, the president of the republic, the commander of the 58th Army, the republic's ministers of the interior, emergencies, health and education, the director of the center that had organized medical aid, and a senior pediatric surgeon who had tried to open contact with the hostage-takers. Most of the soldiers of the army and the internal troops who had been deployed in Beslan did not come to court, and the statements they had given to investigators were read out instead.
In January 2006 the victims asked for the judge and the prosecution to be removed, citing the incomplete investigation, the repeated rejection of their complaints and the decision to split the case into several sets of proceedings. In February 2006 they asked again for the prosecutor's removal and for independent experts to examine the preparation of the attack, the composition and powers of the headquarters, the cause of the first explosions, the force used during the storming and the late arrival of firefighters. Each of those requests was dismissed, as were their applications for copies of documents in the case file.
Between May 2005 and February 2006 the court held sixty-one hearings, and the trial record grew to four volumes of about 2,000 pages. In his closing submissions in February 2006 the prosecutor asked the court to sentence Kulayev to death. The victims argued in their own submissions that the trial had failed to explain many of the key events and that the officials responsible should themselves be prosecuted.
The presiding judge began reading the verdict on May 16, 2006. The reading lasted until May 26. The judgment ran to 319 pages. It summarized the evidence of witnesses and victims and drew on expert reports, death certificates and other material.
The guilty findings came at the very start. On the first day of the reading the court ruled that Kulayev had committed a terrorist act, murder and attempted murder and had been a member of an illegal armed group, and it found that the attack had been planned by two leaders of the Chechen separatist movement to force Russia to withdraw its troops from Chechnya. In the end it found him guilty on all counts. Its findings on the toll were exact: 317 hostages, one Beslan civilian and two workers of the emergency situations ministry had been killed, and 728 hostages injured, 151 of them seriously, 530 moderately seriously and 102 slightly. Ten FSB servicemen had been killed and fifty-five servicemen of the army and law-enforcement bodies wounded. The group's actions had also caused significant damage to the school and to private property in the town. The court held that the deaths of sixteen male hostages killed by the group on the first day had been caused in part by Kulayev's actions, found that he had caused injury to hostages and to government troops, and assessed the material damage at 34 million rubles, about $1.3 million at the time. On the evidence of witnesses, it rejected his claim that he had been forced to take part and his claim that he had neither threatened nor harmed the captives. It dismissed his plea of not guilty as unfounded, holding that it was refuted both by the witnesses and by his own statements during the preliminary investigation. What the court did not do disappointed many of the victims: it issued no separate ruling addressed to the security forces, the step they had hoped would answer why the attack had happened and who bore responsibility for its outcome.
The sentence was built count by count. For banditry the court imposed 14 years and a fine of 500,000 rubles, and for the further offense 7 years. For attempted murder and attempted hostage-taking it imposed 15 years each. For terrorism it imposed life imprisonment. For the murder of two or more persons and for the attempt on the lives of law-enforcement officers, the court found the death penalty appropriate. Because of the moratorium, it substituted life imprisonment, and it combined the counts into a single sentence: life imprisonment, to be served in a special-regime penal colony.
When the judge asked whether he understood the verdict, Kulayev nodded; asked again, he called the case against him made-up fairy tales. The defense, which had argued that no evidence tied him to the crimes charged, announced that it would appeal.
Russia still had the death penalty in its Criminal Code, but executions had been suspended under a moratorium dating to 1996, when the country joined the Council of Europe. When the trial opened in May 2005, the maximum sentence Kulayev could in practice receive was life imprisonment.
The prosecution nevertheless asked for death, arguing for an exception to the moratorium. The trial court took a middle course: it declared that two of the counts merited death, then substituted life imprisonment because of the moratorium. On December 26, 2006, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a separate ruling addressed to the deputy prosecutor general who had argued the case, finding that his request for the death penalty had been contrary to the applicable legislation and amounted to urging the trial court to adopt a manifestly unlawful decision. Kulayev became the 661st person in Russia to be sentenced to life imprisonment.
Both sides went to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Kulayev's defense appealed the conviction and asked for the punishment to be reduced. Prosecutors said they would not appeal. Most of the recognized victims accepted the verdict and lodged no appeal, but some of them did, though not to challenge the life term. In July 2006 they asked to see the entire case file and to take copies, apparently without result, and in detailed complaints of August 30 and September 8, 2006, they argued that the trial court had failed to investigate the authorities' failure to prevent the attack, the decisions of the operational headquarters, the circumstances of the first explosions in the gymnasium and the lawfulness of the force used by the security forces, and that it had denied them full access to the case material.
The Supreme Court heard the cassation appeal on December 26, 2006. Four victims, the defense lawyer and the prosecutor addressed the court. It slightly amended the legal characterization of one of the offenses but otherwise dismissed the complaints on both sides, holding that the questions raised by the victims had no bearing on how Kulayev's own actions should be classified and that they had been given full access to the case documents once the investigation was complete. The life sentence entered into legal force that day. Kulayev was not brought to the hearing.
The victims then sought supervisory review, asking for the verdict to be set aside and the case sent back for a new trial. In October 2007 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected that complaint and left the life sentence in place.
Kulayev's absence from the December 2006 hearing led a leading victims' organization to question publicly whether he was still alive and to ask for proof. In January 2007 the Federal Penitentiary Service denied that he had died and said that he remained in pretrial custody awaiting transfer to a colony for prisoners serving life sentences.
He has served the life sentence in Russia since. In September 2021 he asked the office of the human rights ombudsman of North Ossetia to review his case.
Kulayev's central claims, that he was coerced into joining the group, that he did not know its target and that he harmed no one, were tested at trial and rejected by the Supreme Court of North Ossetia on the evidence of witnesses. The conviction is final. He has never accepted it.
His status as the only surviving hostage-taker is itself the official finding rather than a settled fact for everyone involved. Rumors that other members of the group escaped or were secretly detained circulated after the siege, and some survivors and relatives came to regard Kulayev as a scapegoat whose trial left the conduct of officials unexamined.
The wider handling of the crisis remains disputed. A North Ossetian parliamentary commission and a joint commission of the Federal Assembly reached conclusions that differed on key questions, including the cause of the first explosions and the force used during the storming, and two members of the federal commission refused to sign its report. On April 13, 2017, the European Court of Human Rights, in Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, a case brought by survivors and relatives of the dead, held that Russia had violated the right to life by failing in its obligation to prevent the threat to life, by failing to conduct an effective investigation, and, by five votes to two, by the way it planned and carried out the storming. The Court noted that much of the testimony about the force used in the storming had been gathered at Kulayev's trial, and that witness statements obtained there contradicted the main investigation's account of when heavy force had first been used. It drew as well on what officials had said at his trial about the operational headquarters: its head had told the court that the body had seven members, while five members questioned in the same proceedings said they had not taken part in its meetings or been told of its plans. Of the four criminal investigations opened after the siege, the Court recorded, three had been completed, his own among them; the main one, into the organizers and the other aspects of the events, was still pending. Information gathered at his trial had been at least partly taken into that main investigation, and in December 2007 its investigator, acting on victims' applications based on that information, agreed to question a number of senior officials about the steps taken in August 2004 to prevent the attack. His own conviction was not before it, but the Court observed that the evidence gathered at his trial, although the trial was not concerned with the actions of state agents, had allowed the victims and the public to draw a more complete picture of the events, including the roles of officials.
1980: Nur-Pashi Kulayev is born.
August 31, 2004: By his own account at trial, he joins the armed group.
September 1, 2004: The group seizes School No. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, taking more than 1,100 people hostage.
September 3, 2004: The siege ends; Kulayev is detained and handed to investigators.
October to December 2004: Hostages and relatives are questioned and recognized as victims.
January 19, 2005: His case is separated from the main investigation.
May 17, 2005: His trial opens before the Supreme Court of North Ossetia in Vladikavkaz.
May 19, 2005: Asked whether he will plead guilty to any charge, he answers "No."
July and August 2005: Survivors question him in court; he denies harming anyone.
December 2005: Hearings are postponed twice; summoned officials do not appear.
February 2006: The prosecution asks for the death penalty; the sixty-first and last hearing before the verdict is held.
May 16, 2006: The judge begins reading the verdict.
May 26, 2006: Kulayev is convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment in a special-regime colony.
August 30 and September 8, 2006: The victims file detailed appeal complaints.
December 26, 2006: The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upholds the conviction with one amendment; the sentence enters legal force.
January 2007: The Federal Penitentiary Service denies reports of his death.
October 2007: The Presidium of the Supreme Court rejects the victims' supervisory complaint.
April 13, 2017: The European Court of Human Rights rules in Tagayeva and Others v. Russia.
September 2021: Kulayev asks the North Ossetian human rights ombudsman for a review of his case.