On December 26, 2000, the day after Christmas, Michael McDermott killed seven of his co-workers at Edgewater Technology, the Internet consulting company in Wakefield, Massachusetts, where he had worked since that February. He was 42, a former Navy submarine electrician who lived in Haverhill and had no criminal record. Police arrested him in Wakefield the same day.
He never denied the killings. His trial in Middlesex Superior Court in the spring of 2002 turned on one question: whether he was criminally responsible. His lawyers argued that he was not, because of mental illness, and called psychiatric witnesses who described schizophrenia and delusions. Prosecutors answered that he had planned the murders and that the killings grew out of anger at his employer's agreement to take part of his pay to settle a federal back-tax debt. On April 24, 2002, after nearly 16 hours of deliberation over three days, the jury rejected the insanity defense and convicted him of seven counts of murder in the first degree. Under Massachusetts law the sentence was fixed: seven terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2007 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts left the convictions in place, and the United States Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Every later attempt to reopen it, in the state courts and then in federal court, failed.
McDermott had served six years in the United States Navy, working mainly as an electrician on a nuclear submarine, and was honorably discharged in June 1982. In February 2000 Edgewater hired him as an associate software developer, and that fall he moved to Haverhill, commuting to the office in Wakefield.
Money was at the center of the case the prosecution later built. In December 2000 the company told him that an Internal Revenue Service tax lien of about $5,500 required it to garnish a large share of his pay until the debt was paid, and he would not agree to a payment plan.
The seven people who died that day were Cheryl Troy, Janice Hagerty of Stoneham, Louis Javelle of Nashua, New Hampshire, Jennifer Bragg Capobianco of the Brighton section of Boston, Paul Marceau of Melrose, Rose Manfredi of Lexington, and Craig Wood of Haverhill. All seven were his colleagues.
He was arrested that day and held without bail.
Police searched his residence under a warrant and later examined his computers under a second warrant issued on February 21, 2001. Both warrants, and the brief first entry into the residence that preceded them, became the subject of his appeal.
On Wednesday, December 27, 2000, McDermott was arraigned in Malden District Court on seven counts of murder. He pleaded not guilty.
The garnishment order was a line of inquiry from the first days, but no motive was confirmed then. On February 15, 2001, a Middlesex County grand jury indicted him on seven counts of murder in the first degree and five related charges, and the case moved from the district court to Middlesex Superior Court in Cambridge.
Before trial the defense moved to suppress what the police had taken from the apartment. The motion judge ruled that the first, warrantless entry had not been justified and struck what the officers saw during it from the warrant application, but found that the rest of the affidavit still gave probable cause for most of the items seized. The evidence came in.
McDermott's trial was held in Middlesex Superior Court in Cambridge in April 2002. By then the facts of the day itself were not in dispute. The defense conceded that McDermott had caused the seven deaths and asked the jury to find him not criminally responsible because of mental illness.
The defense case rested on his psychiatric history and his own testimony. Defense psychiatrists told the jury that he suffered from schizophrenia and had been delusional. A defense psychologist testified that on December 26 he was experiencing hallucinations and delusions and did not know right from wrong. Two clinicians who had treated him before December 2000 also testified. The defense experts diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, and both gave the opinion that at the time of the killings a mental disease had deprived him of substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform it to the law. McDermott took the stand and testified for two days. He described a long history of mental illness, and he told the jury that on December 26 he had believed he was on a mission to prevent the Holocaust, and that the people in front of him were Adolf Hitler and his generals.
The prosecution's case was that the account was invented and that he was feigning mental illness. Psychiatrists called by the Commonwealth testified that the story could not be believed. Both testified that he had a depressive disorder and a personality disorder, that neither amounted to a mental disease or defect, and that he was criminally responsible. A co-worker was called in rebuttal.
The motive the prosecution offered was revenge. McDermott, it said, was angry that the company had agreed to take part of his pay to cover the IRS debt.
During the Commonwealth's case one of its psychiatrists made a single passing reference to the September 11 attacks while explaining a symptom the defense said McDermott had. The defense moved for a mistrial. The judge refused, directed the prosecutor to keep the subject out of the rest of the testimony, and offered a curative instruction, which the defense declined.
The jury received the case on Monday, April 22, 2002. It deliberated for nearly 16 hours over three days. On Wednesday, April 24, it returned its verdicts: guilty of murder in the first degree on all seven counts, on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The insanity defense was rejected. The jury also convicted him on the five related charges.
Massachusetts has no death penalty, and a conviction of murder in the first degree carries one sentence. McDermott received seven mandatory terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole, ordered to run consecutively, with a term of two and a half years on the other charges running at the same time.
McDermott's appeal went to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which decided it on April 13, 2007, sitting as a panel of the Chief Justice and three associate justices. New lawyers argued three things: that the suppression motion should have been granted, that the mistrial should have been declared, and that the jury instructions were wrong. They also asked the court to use its special power of review in first-degree murder cases to order a new trial or reduce the verdicts.
On the search, the court went further than the motion judge had. It held that the first entry into the apartment was justified as an emergency, since the officers had reasonable grounds to look for other victims and kept their check brief, so what they saw should never have been struck from the affidavit. It found a sufficient link between the crimes and the home to support the warrant, and it rejected the claim that the category of papers reflecting McDermott's mental state was too broad, because it was limited in time and subject. A warrant for records, the court held, allows the seizure of computers and disks that may hold those records, much as it allows the opening of a closed container; it joined the courts that had taken that approach, while noting that not every court had. It did not decide whether the second warrant was required. It held the Internet category sufficiently particular because it was tied to named subjects, and read the mental-state category, which carried no time limit, with common sense as reaching only what bore on criminal responsibility within a reasonable period. Taking the computers away for examination was permissible; the search terms produced only a cursory look at less than one percent of the files, and material the examiners came upon in plain view was properly admitted.
The court found no abuse of discretion in the refusal of a mistrial. The reference had come once, did not compare McDermott to the attacks, and was offered to explain a symptom his own defense claimed; the judge had acted to stop it from happening again, and McDermott had turned down the instruction he was offered. The jury, the court concluded, was unlikely to have been swayed.
Two complaints about the instructions failed. The court refused to require jurors to agree unanimously on which of the factors listed in its earlier decisions supported a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty, and it noted that the murder convictions would stand in any event on the separate finding of deliberate premeditation. McDermott also argued that the judge should have told the jury about involuntary intoxication from a prescription medication. He had not asked for that instruction at trial, and the court held that the evidence did not support it: nothing showed that he was compelled to take the drug or that he took it as prescribed, and his own psychiatric witness had testified that he raised the dose without his doctor's approval.
Reviewing the whole case under that special power, the court found no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the verdicts. The judgments were affirmed.
The convictions stood. McDermott then asked the Supreme Court of the United States to review the case, and on October 9, 2007, that court declined to hear it.
The case returned to the trial court on September 29, 2008, when McDermott moved for a new trial and asked for public funds to hire a psychiatric expert. His new argument was that his lawyers should have built the defense around the medication itself, as the cause of the hallucinations he described. The trial court denied the motion on July 24, 2009. Because the convictions were for first-degree murder, he needed leave from the Supreme Judicial Court to appeal that ruling, and his petition for leave was denied on November 18, 2009.
That same November he petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for a writ of habeas corpus. He raised two grounds: that his trial lawyer had been ineffective for failing to investigate and present the medication defense and for failing to request the involuntary intoxication instruction, and that the denial of funds for an expert in the new-trial proceedings had violated due process.
A magistrate judge recommended denial on October 25, 2011. The trial record, she found, showed that defense counsel had known of the medication theory and had questioned his own psychiatric expert about it, and that the expert would not testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the drug had caused the hallucinations or the killings. Given that, it was a reasonable choice to present an insanity defense in which the medication was one part rather than to rest the case on the drug alone. The instruction claim failed because the Supreme Judicial Court had already decided, as a matter of state law, that the evidence did not support such an instruction, and a lawyer is not ineffective for declining a futile request. On the funding claim, no decision of the Supreme Court had extended the right to psychiatric help at trial to state post-conviction proceedings.
On November 10, 2011, the district judge adopted the recommendation, dismissed the petition with prejudice, and denied a certificate of appealability, finding no substantial basis for an appeal. At the time he was serving his sentences in a Massachusetts state prison.
The motive rests on the prosecution's case. Investigators raised the tax garnishment as a possible motive within a day of the killings, but in the first days they described it as a line of inquiry, not a confirmed motive. At trial it became the Commonwealth's account of why McDermott acted.
McDermott's mental state was the contested question of the trial. Psychiatric witnesses for the defense testified that he suffered from schizophrenia and did not know right from wrong; witnesses for the Commonwealth testified that his account was not believable and that he was feigning. The jury rejected the defense of lack of criminal responsibility on every count, and no court that later reviewed the case disturbed that verdict.
February 2000: McDermott joins Edgewater Technology in Wakefield, Massachusetts.
December 14, 2000: He is told at work of an IRS lien requiring Edgewater to garnish part of his wages, with deductions to begin after the holidays.
December 26, 2000: Seven co-workers are killed in Wakefield; McDermott is arrested the same day and held without bail. His apartment is searched under a warrant that night.
December 27, 2000: Arraigned in Malden District Court on seven counts of murder; pleads not guilty.
February 15, 2001: Indicted by a Middlesex County grand jury.
February 21, 2001: A second warrant is issued for his computers and disks.
April 2002: Trial in Middlesex Superior Court, Cambridge; McDermott testifies for two days in support of an insanity defense.
April 22, 2002: The jury begins deliberating.
April 24, 2002: Convicted of seven counts of murder in the first degree; sentenced to seven consecutive terms of life without parole.
April 13, 2007: The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirms the judgments.
October 9, 2007: The U.S. Supreme Court declines to hear the case.
July 24, 2009: The trial court denies his motion for a new trial.
November 18, 2009: Leave to appeal that denial is refused.
October 25, 2011: A federal magistrate judge recommends denial of his habeas petition.
November 10, 2011: The U.S. District Court dismisses the petition and denies a certificate of appealability.