Masaharu Homma commanded the Japanese 14th Army in the Philippines from December 12, 1941, to August 5, 1942. In those eight months his army landed on Luzon, took Manila, and forced the surrender of the American and Filipino forces on the Bataan Peninsula and then on Corregidor. Three and a half years later, after Japan's defeat, he stood before a United States military commission in Manila, charged under the law of war with failing, as commander, to control the members of his command and permitting them to commit war crimes.
The commission found him guilty on February 11, 1946, and sentenced him to death. On the same day the Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear his petitions, resting its decision on the case of another Japanese commander, Tomoyuki Yamashita, decided a week earlier. Two justices dissented. The American commander in the Pacific approved the findings and the sentence on March 20, 1946, and Homma was executed in Los Baños on April 3, 1946. The trial was conducted under rules that admitted affidavits, depositions and hearsay, and the defense had little more than two weeks to prepare.
Homma was born on January 28, 1888, on Sado Island, off the coast of Niigata Prefecture. He graduated from the Army Military Academy in May 1907, in its 19th class, and from the Army War College in December 1915, in its 27th class. His early career ran through staff and intelligence work rather than field command. He served as a military attaché in Britain from 1918, spent about three years in New Delhi from 1922, and returned to London as attaché from 1930 to 1932. He spoke fluent English.
He was promoted to colonel in August 1930. From 1932 he was attached to the General Staff and then headed the army's press section, the office that handled its public information. In August 1933 he took command of the 1st Infantry Regiment, and in August 1935, promoted to major general, he took over the 32nd Infantry Brigade. Between December 1936 and July 1937 he was again attached to the General Staff and traveled to Europe in the suite of Prince Chichibu. In July 1937 he became chief of the General Staff's 2nd Bureau.
Promotion to lieutenant general came in July 1938, with command of the 27th Division. In December 1940 he was given command of the Taiwan Army. In November 1941, weeks before the war with the United States and Britain began, he was named commander of the 14th Army and ordered to take the Philippines.
He expected the campaign to take no more than fifty days. The 14th Army's order file of November 1941, now held by the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, records the instruction Homma issued for a rapid operation aimed at Manila.
Japanese troops first came ashore on northern Luzon on December 10, 1941. The main landings followed at Lingayen Gulf on December 22 and at Lamon Bay on December 24. Manila fell quickly, as Homma's plan intended. The American and Filipino forces, however, withdrew onto the Bataan Peninsula and the island fortress of Corregidor at the mouth of Manila Bay, and the campaign stretched to nearly five months.
Through February 1942 food and medicine ran short among the defenders as the Japanese blockade tightened. Homma's army moved into position for a final offensive on Bataan at the end of March and opened it on April 3, 1942. The American forces on Bataan surrendered on April 9. Corregidor and the remaining harbor defenses of Manila Bay surrendered on May 6, 1942, when the American commander in the Philippines surrendered to Homma.
The prisoners taken on Bataan were moved north under guard to Camp O'Donnell in April 1942. What happened to them on that movement, and in the camps that followed, became the core of the case against Homma.
On August 5, 1942, Homma was relieved of command of the 14th Army. He was attached to the General Staff, placed in the reserve, and made chairman of the Philippine Association in Japan. Of the army commanders who had led the southern operations of 1941 and 1942, he was the only one placed in the reserve. He spent the rest of the war in retirement.
On September 11, 1945, the American commander in occupied Japan ordered the arrest of forty men suspected of war crimes. Homma was on the list. He surrendered to the American authorities within days. In October 1945 his honorary rank of lieutenant general was suspended.
On December 5, 1945, the American command issued regulations for the trial of war criminals in the Pacific, and the next day a military commission was ordered to try Homma. On December 12 he was flown from Japan to Manila.
The charge was served on December 17, 1945. It was, in the words of the later Supreme Court dissent, substantially identical to the charge on which Yamashita had been tried in Manila. It alleged that Homma, as commander, had failed to discharge his duty to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit war crimes.
Forty-seven specifications set out the particular acts on which the charge rested. They covered the treatment of American and Filipino prisoners of war after the surrender of Bataan and in the prison camps, and the bombing of Manila after it had been declared an open city. A supplemental charge alleged that on May 6, 1942, in Manila Bay, Homma had refused quarter to the American and allied forces, the law-of-war offense of declining to accept a surrender. With the supplement, the case stood on forty-eight specifications.
The theory of the case was not that Homma had personally ordered the crimes. It was that he had commanded the troops who committed them, had a duty under the law of war to control them, and had failed in that duty.
The commission convened on December 19, 1945. Defense counsel were sworn, and Homma was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the charge and to every specification. The defense at once asked for thirty days to prepare. The commission denied the motion.
He was defended by American Army officers. The commission was made up of five generals, four American and one Filipino.
When the commission reconvened on January 3, 1946, the defense challenged its jurisdiction and moved to dismiss, and both were refused. A further request for a short postponement was refused, and the trial began that day.
The commission sat under the regulations of December 5, 1945, and those regulations shaped the trial as much as any witness did. They allowed the commission to receive hearsay and documentary evidence on terms at least as broad as those applied in the Yamashita trial. One provision made any purported confession or statement of the accused admissible without proof that it had been given voluntarily, leaving the commission to judge only whether it was true. Another allowed evidence that other members of a unit had been convicted of an offense involving concerted action to be taken as prima facie proof that the accused was guilty of the same offense. A third gave the findings of a group trial full faith and credit in later trials of individuals charged through membership in that group, and placed on the accused the burden of proving any mitigating circumstances once membership was shown.
At the opening of the trial the defense moved to dismiss on the ground that the commander who had ordered the trial and selected the commission was the same commander Homma had defeated in 1942. The commission rejected the motion. A defense objection to the use of affidavits and depositions in place of witnesses who could be cross-examined was overruled.
The trial ran in Manila from January 3 to February 11, 1946. The prosecution case rested heavily on sworn statements, depositions and affidavits gathered in the United States and the Philippines, supplemented by the testimony of former prisoners. Its argument was that Homma had known, or must have known, what his troops were doing. It placed his headquarters close to the route on which the Bataan prisoners had been moved, and one former American prisoner testified that he had seen Homma along that route. He was the first witness at the trial to connect Homma in person to the movement of the prisoners. The defense answered that the account was implausible. No evidence was put forward that Homma had known of the abuses in advance. On the supplemental charge, witnesses told the commission that the bombardment of Corregidor had gone on for twenty-four hours after a white flag was raised over the island.
The defense case was built around the structure and limits of his command. Officers of his staff testified that he had ordered the proper treatment of prisoners. After an inspection, they said, he had removed a camp commandant and ordered conditions improved. A staff officer described repeated requests from Homma to his superiors for food and medicine, of which only a fraction arrived.
Homma testified in his own defense in the first week of February 1946. He described the planning and turning points of the campaign. He told the commission that he could not choose or dismiss his own staff officers, that his army had been short of supplies throughout, and that he had ordered more than a hundred courts-martial of his own soldiers for offenses during the campaign. He said he had been driven along the route of the prisoner movement and had seen nothing of the kind described to the commission. He accepted that as commander he bore moral responsibility for what his troops had done. He maintained that he had neither ordered the crimes nor known of them until he heard the testimony of the survivors at his trial.
In closing, the defense argued that the case was in truth an indictment of the Japanese Army's system and that Homma should be judged by the standards of that army. The prosecution argued that his position and the nearness of his headquarters to the events made him responsible for them.
The commission announced its judgment on February 11, 1946. "Upon secret written ballot, two-thirds or more of the members concurring, the Commission finds you guilty," it told him. It found him guilty of the charge, and by the same two-thirds vote it sentenced him to death.
Homma's defense had not waited for the verdict to go to the courts. While the trial was under way it asked the Supreme Court of the Philippines for writs of habeas corpus and prohibition, and that court denied them without argument on January 23, 1946. The defense then turned to the Supreme Court of the United States, seeking leave to file the same writs against the Secretary of War and asking the Court to review the Philippine ruling on certiorari.
The Supreme Court decided both matters on February 11, 1946, the day of the verdict, in a one-sentence order. The motion for leave to file the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition was denied, and the petition for certiorari was denied, on the authority of the Yamashita decision. The Court gave no other reasons. Its holding in plain terms was that Homma's case raised nothing that the Yamashita decision had not already settled, and that the military commission trying him had lawful authority to do so.
Two justices dissented in separate opinions, each joining the other. The first set out the facts of Homma's command and his long absence from active service and objected to the speed of the proceedings and to the regulations that allowed coerced confessions and the findings of earlier mass trials to be used against him. The second adopted the dissents in the Yamashita case and added reasons particular to Homma. The provisions on confessions, on prima facie proof from the convictions of others, and on full faith and credit for group findings, it argued, went beyond anything in the Yamashita record and were enough by themselves to vitiate the entire proceeding. It pointed to the denial of time to prepare and noted that serious questions about the constitution of the commission had been raised that had not been before the Court in Yamashita's case. It would have granted leave to file and decided the case on the merits.
Homma's petitions were decided entirely on the authority of the Yamashita case, so the holding of that case is the law on which his own rests. In the Yamashita decision of February 4, 1946, the Court held that the military commission had been lawfully created by a competent military commander under the authority Congress had given for military commissions, and that the power to try offenses against the law of war did not end when the fighting stopped. It lasted, the Court said, at least until peace was officially recognized by treaty or proclamation.
The Court held that the charge against Yamashita stated a violation of the law of war. The law of war, it said, imposed on a commander an affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to prevent atrocities by the troops under his command, and a failure in that duty could make him personally responsible. It held that the Articles of War did not govern the trial of an enemy combatant by military commission, so that those articles did not restrict the commission's procedure, and that the notice provision of the 1929 Geneva Convention applied only to proceedings against prisoners of war for offenses committed while they were prisoners. Finally, it held that the courts could ask only whether the commission had lawful authority over the accused and the offense; the commission's rulings on evidence and its findings of fact were for the military reviewing authorities, not the courts.
Those holdings disposed of each ground on which Homma's counsel had relied. Because the charge against him was substantially identical to Yamashita's, the Court treated his case as already decided.
The findings and sentence then went to the American commander in the Pacific, who approved them on March 20, 1946, and ordered the sentence carried out.
Homma was moved to Los Baños, south of Manila, to await execution. He was executed there on April 3, 1946.
The commission's judgment did not rest on any finding that Homma ordered the crimes charged. The prosecution's case on his knowledge was circumstantial, built on the position of his headquarters and one witness's account of seeing him on the route, and it was answered by his own testimony and that of his staff. Homma accepted moral responsibility as commander and denied both ordering and knowing of the crimes until his trial.
The fairness of the proceedings was disputed at the time, and the dispute is part of the record of the case itself. The two Supreme Court dissents found the evidence rules, the time allowed the defense and the constitution of the commission open to serious question. The defense had moved to dismiss because the commander who ordered the trial and selected its members was the opponent Homma had defeated in 1942; the motion was denied.
January 28, 1888: Born on Sado Island, Niigata Prefecture.
May 1907: Graduates from the Army Military Academy.
December 1915: Graduates from the Army War College.
1930 to 1932: Military attaché in London.
July 1938: Promoted to lieutenant general; commands the 27th Division.
December 1940: Commands the Taiwan Army.
November 1941: Named commander of the 14th Army.
December 10 to 24, 1941: The 14th Army lands on Luzon.
April 9, 1942: The American forces on Bataan surrender.
May 6, 1942: Corregidor surrenders.
August 5, 1942: Relieved of command and placed in the reserve.
September 11, 1945: His arrest is ordered in occupied Japan.
December 12, 1945: Transferred from Japan to Manila.
December 17, 1945: The charge is served.
December 19, 1945: Arraigned; pleads not guilty.
January 3, 1946: Trial opens in Manila.
January 23, 1946: The Supreme Court of the Philippines denies his petitions.
February 11, 1946: Found guilty and sentenced to death; the US Supreme Court denies his petitions.
March 20, 1946: The findings and sentence are approved on review.
April 3, 1946: Executed in Los Baños.