On the first night of the unrest in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, in August 1991, a crowd of twenty or thirty people surrounded Yankel Rosenbaum, an Orthodox Jewish visitor from Australia, and attacked him. He died of his injuries within hours. Lemrick Nelson Jr., who was 16, was arrested that night.
What followed took twelve years and three trials, and none of them ended with a court finding that Nelson caused the death. A Brooklyn jury acquitted him of second-degree murder in October 1992. Federal prosecutors then charged him with violating the victim's civil rights, and a federal jury convicted him in 1997. An appeals court threw out that verdict in 2002 because of the way the trial judge had chosen the jury. At the retrial in 2003 the defense conceded that Nelson had been the attacker and argued only that he had not acted because of the victim's religion. The jury convicted him of the civil rights charge and, in the same verdict, found that his actions had not caused the death. He was sentenced to ten years, most of which he had already served, and he left federal custody in June 2004.
The disturbances began that evening, after a car in a religious leader's motorcade struck two Black children and killed one of them, and they lasted three nights. The man the crowd surrounded on the first of those nights was a visitor to the city who had no part in the accident. As many as 29 people may have taken part in the attack on him. Only two were ever brought to court for it: Nelson, and an older man who was later charged with inciting the crowd.
New York City police officers arrested Nelson the same night. The case against him rested from the start on three things: the injured man's identification of him before he died, physical evidence taken from Nelson when he was detained, and a confession he gave to detectives afterward. Although he was a juvenile, he was charged as an adult with second-degree murder and tried in New York State Supreme Court in Brooklyn.
The trial lasted six weeks, and the defense attacked every part of that case. It argued that the identification had been prompted by police, that the confession had been coerced, and that officers had framed a Black teenager to close the case. On October 29, 1992, the jury acquitted Nelson of second-degree murder and of the related felony charges. He was the only person tried in a state court for the death.
The federal charge was not murder. It was a civil rights offense: using force against a person because of his religion and because he was using a public street. The government had to prove that motive as an element of the crime. A separate question asked whether the violation resulted in death. Without that finding the maximum sentence was ten years; with it, the law allowed life.
In August 1994 a federal grand jury in Brooklyn indicted Nelson. The indictment was sealed at first while the courts decided whether he would be tried as a juvenile or as an adult, a question that turned a closed proceeding with a five-year limit into a public trial with a possible life term. The district judge first ruled for juvenile treatment; the Justice Department appealed, and in March 1996 the same judge ruled that Nelson would be tried as an adult. By then the older man had been charged alongside him, accused of inciting the crowd that carried out the attack.
The two men were tried together in federal court in Brooklyn in early 1997. Nelson denied the attack. In February 1997 the jury found both guilty of violating the victim's civil rights, Nelson on the attack itself and the older man on inciting the crowd. At the end of March 1998 the judge sentenced Nelson to 19 and a half years in prison, to be followed by five years of supervision. His codefendant received 21 years and 10 months.
Both men appealed, and among their arguments was a challenge to the civil rights law itself. On January 7, 2002, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the statute and said the evidence that Nelson had carried out the attack was overwhelming. But it vacated both convictions, two to one, because of the way the jury had been chosen.
The trouble lay in the trial judge's effort to seat a jury that included both Black and Jewish members. One prospective juror, a Jewish man, said he was not sure he could be fair. The defense asked that he be excused, and the judge refused, then won the defense's agreement to seat him by offering, in exchange, an additional Black juror. When a Black juror later dropped out, the judge passed over the first alternate, removed a white juror and filled the two places with a Black juror and the Jewish juror who had doubted his own fairness. Because the defendants had agreed only in return for a juror chosen by race, the court held, their consent was not valid, and they had never truly given up their right to an impartial jury. It ordered a new trial.
In April 2002 the codefendant pleaded guilty to inciting the crowd, and his sentence was cut to about 11 years. Prosecutors discussed a plea with Nelson as well, but he chose to go to trial again, and he stayed in federal custody while the retrial was prepared.
The retrial opened in federal court in Brooklyn at the end of April 2003, before a different judge. This time the defense began with a concession. For the first time in nearly twelve years, Nelson's lawyers told a jury that he had been the attacker. They argued that the attack had nothing to do with the victim's religion and that he had been drinking and was swept up in a crowd after the accident. Because proof that he acted because the victim was Jewish was a required element of the charge, that argument could still have won an acquittal.
The prosecution set out to show the opposite. Detectives who arrested him testified that he had shown no signs of being drunk, and the detective who took his confession testified that Nelson had referred to the victim throughout only by his religion. The judge ruled that defense questions about whether the death might have been prevented after the attack were not relevant to the charge.
On May 14, 2003, after six days of deliberation, the jury returned a split verdict. It found Nelson guilty of violating the victim's civil rights, and it found that his actions had not caused the death. That second finding took a life sentence off the table and left a maximum of ten years.
Sentence was passed in August 2003, twelve years to the day after the death. The judge found that the death had been a natural and foreseeable consequence of what Nelson did, but the statute capped the term, and he imposed the maximum of ten years, with three years of supervised release that began with nine months in a halfway house in New Jersey. Nelson had already served nearly a decade.
He was freed from federal custody at the beginning of June 2004 to begin that supervised release. In September 2010 he was living in New Jersey and was still serving his term of supervision.
Whether Nelson was the attacker was the central dispute of his first two trials. At the state trial in 1992 his lawyers argued that the identification and the confession could not be trusted and that he had been framed, and the jury acquitted him of murder. At the 1997 federal trial he again denied the attack. At the 2003 retrial the defense conceded it.
His motive remained contested to the end. The defense said that he acted while drunk and swept up in a crowd, not because the victim was Jewish. The 2003 jury, by convicting him of the civil rights charge, found that he had acted because of the victim's religion.
The last open question is causation. The 2003 jury found that his actions did not cause the death. The sentencing judge found the death a natural and foreseeable consequence of the attack, but that finding could not raise the sentence above the ten-year maximum. No court has convicted Nelson of causing the death, and the state jury acquitted him of murder.
August 19, 1991: Unrest begins in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, after a motorcade car kills a Black child. That night an Australian Jewish visitor is attacked by a crowd and dies within hours. Lemrick Nelson Jr., 16, is arrested.
October 29, 1992: A Brooklyn jury acquits Nelson of second-degree murder and related charges.
August 1994: A federal grand jury in Brooklyn indicts Nelson for violating the victim's civil rights; the indictment is sealed pending a ruling on whether he will be tried as an adult.
March 1996: The district court rules that Nelson will be tried as an adult.
February 1997: A federal jury convicts Nelson and an older codefendant of civil rights violations.
March 1998: Nelson is sentenced to 19 and a half years.
January 7, 2002: The Second Circuit, two to one, upholds the statute and vacates both convictions over jury selection.
April 2002: The codefendant pleads guilty to inciting the crowd.
Late April 2003: The retrial opens; the defense concedes that Nelson was the attacker.
May 14, 2003: The jury convicts Nelson of violating the victim's civil rights and finds that his actions did not cause the death.
August 2003: Nelson is sentenced to 10 years, the statutory maximum, and 3 years' supervised release.
Early June 2004: Nelson is freed to a halfway house in New Jersey.
September 2010: Nelson is living in New Jersey, still under supervision.