Kenji Doihara was one of seven men sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Allied court that sat in Tokyo from 1946 to 1948 to try the leaders of wartime Japan. He was an army officer, never a cabinet minister, and the tribunal treated him as something particular: a man who had spent about eighteen years in China before 1931 and whom the army regarded as its specialist on the country. In the tribunal's account, that knowledge made him the officer best placed to coordinate the seizure of Manchuria in September 1931, to bring the deposed Qing emperor Puyi out of Tianjin to head the new state of Manchukuo, and to press the autonomy schemes that carried Japanese control into North China and Inner Mongolia in 1935.
The court found him guilty of conspiracy to wage aggressive war and of waging aggressive war against China, the United States, the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands and the Soviet Union, the last on two counts. It acquitted him of waging war against France. It also convicted him on a war crimes count for his command of the 7th Area Army from April 1944 to April 1945, when Allied prisoners of war held in Malaya, Sumatra, Java and, for a time, Borneo died, in the judgment's words, "at a terrible rate." He was sentenced to death on November 12, 1948, the sentence was upheld on review twelve days later, and the Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear him. He was executed in Tokyo on December 23, 1948.
Doihara was born on August 8, 1883, in Okayama Prefecture. He made his career in the Imperial Japanese Army and spent most of it in China. He went to Beijing as an assistant to the head of a Japanese special service agency there and began intelligence work in 1913. By the tribunal's later reckoning he passed about eighteen years in the country as an aide to a senior Japanese general, and he came to be regarded inside the army as a China specialist.
On March 17, 1928, Doihara obtained the Emperor's permission to serve as aide to the Japanese adviser of Zhang Zuolin, the warlord who then held Manchuria. He was in Manchuria in June 1928 when Zhang was killed. From March 1929 he was attached to the Army General Staff in Tokyo.
In the summer of 1931 the death of a Japanese army captain named Nakamura in Manchuria became a grievance between Tokyo and the Chinese authorities. The General Staff sent Doihara to investigate. The tribunal found that his real task was different: to gauge the strength, training and communications of the Chinese armies. He reached Mukden, now Shenyang, on August 18, 1931, and took command of the Kwantung Army's Special Service Organization there. Early in September he went back to Tokyo to report.
On the night of September 18, 1931, the Kwantung Army moved against the Chinese garrison in Mukden. The tribunal found that the Cherry Society, a group of radical officers, had instigated the incident, and that the Army General Staff approved the scheme after Colonel Doihara put it before them. It found that he and Seishiro Itagaki, both on the Kwantung Army staff, had important parts in planning it and carrying it out, and that his knowledge of China made him better qualified than any other officer to act as the plan's overall adviser and coordinator.
The Chinese governor of the province refused to cooperate and was jailed. On September 21 the Japanese Army proclaimed Doihara mayor of Mukden. He ran the city through an emergency committee made up mostly of Japanese, and within two days he was acting as the army's political spokesman. As head of the special service office he also fed confidential information on the Chinese to a Self-Government Guiding Board whose purpose was to spread an independence movement through Manchuria. His time as mayor was short: the indictment later dated it from September to October 1931, and a Chinese official eventually relieved him.
Doihara and Itagaki settled on Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing dynasty, as the figurehead for a new state that would unite the three northeastern provinces. Puyi was then living in the Japanese concession at Tianjin, and Doihara knew him already. Itagaki sent Doihara to bring him back.
On November 2, 1931, Doihara told Puyi that Japan would recognize him and conclude a secret alliance with him, and he warned that the Kwantung Army might act independently of the Japanese government if Puyi's return were blocked. The tribunal found that he used threats and intimidation to bring Puyi around and that he arranged disorder in Tianjin on November 8. On November 10 he moved Puyi out of the city, and Puyi reached Yingkou, in Manchuria, on November 13.
Later in the month, the tribunal found, Doihara organized further disorder in the Chinese quarter of Tianjin. The riot broke out on November 26, 1931, and it precipitated the Kwantung Army's advance on Jinzhou the next morning. Manchukuo was proclaimed on March 1, 1932, with Puyi at its head.
Over the winter Doihara ran the special service office at Harbin while the Kwantung Army worked to bring northern Manchuria into the new order. The tribunal named Itagaki and Doihara as leaders of the Japanese group that created the so-called independence movement and found that the movement was sustained by Japanese military power alone.
His main opponent in the north was General Ma Zhanshan, who had been driven from Qiqihar and had set up his capital at Hailun. Doihara opened negotiations with Ma and, at the same time, asked a Chinese general allied with Japan to advance on Harbin. When fighting began on January 26, 1932, Doihara failed to intimidate Ma and his ally General Ding Chao, and the pro-Japanese advance suffered serious reverses. Doihara then pressed the Kwantung Army to come to its aid. The tribunal found that he staged a riot in Harbin to justify the intervention, in which one Japanese and three Korean subjects died. After Ding Chao's defeat on February 5, Ma reopened talks with Doihara, accepted a payment Doihara offered and agreed on February 14, 1932, to serve as governor of Heilongjiang and cooperate with Japan.
Doihara was promoted to major general on April 11, 1932, and was assigned to the headquarters of the Kwantung Army on October 16, 1933.
The Kwantung Army's Special Service Organization, which Doihara had led at Mukden and Harbin, regulated the opium and narcotics trade in the territory Japan captured. The tribunal found that the organization became so deeply involved in the illicit traffic that it was abolished in December 1934. It found that Doihara was one of the organization's foremost officers and that his connection with the drug traffic had been fully shown.
By 1935 Japanese policy had turned south of the Great Wall. After a clash at Zhangbei in Chahar province, Doihara, then attached to the Kwantung Army, was appointed to negotiate with the Chinese general Qin Dechun. The settlement they reached on June 27, 1935, became known as the Qin-Doihara Agreement. It required the Chinese 29th Army to withdraw from the Zhangbei area and banned both Kuomintang activity and anti-Japanese organizations in Chahar. The tribunal found it a major restriction on Chinese sovereignty over the province.
Doihara moved on to Inner Mongolia, where he met the governor of Chahar and the Mongol leader Prince De that autumn. The tribunal found that the Inner Mongolian government that emerged was supported and controlled by the Kwantung Army.
In September 1935 General Jiro Minami, commanding the Kwantung Army, sent Doihara to Beiping with orders to create an autonomous regime in North China. The tribunal found that the "anti-Communism" banner given to the movement belonged to a Kwantung Army propaganda plan meant to turn the people of North China against the central government, and that Doihara was among the officers who wanted it added.
Doihara first tried to persuade the retired general Wu Peifu to head a North China autonomous government and failed. He then tried General Song Zheyuan and failed again. He moved to demands, and with another officer he added demands for special economic concessions for Japan. The tribunal found it proved that in November 1935 Doihara turned to threats of force and an ultimatum, with Kwantung Army units massed at Shanhaiguan to back him. Late that month the East Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government was set up under Yin Rugeng, with its capital at Tongzhou; China protested, without effect. The Hebei-Chahar Political Council was created under the same pressure from Doihara. At the end of 1935 he reported to Minami that the two regimes would more or less obey the Kwantung Army. The tribunal singled out Minami, Yoshijiro Umezu, Itagaki and Doihara as the men behind the North China independence movement.
When full-scale war with China began in 1937, Doihara took a field command. In August 1937, in command of the 14th Division, he took part in the drive along the Beiping-Hankou railway. From then on, the tribunal found, he served as a general officer in the field, and he took part in the aggressive wars Japan waged against China, the Soviet Union and the other countries it attacked from 1941 to 1945, France excepted.
In 1938 and 1939 Japan fought two border wars against the Soviet Union. During the first, at Lake Khasan in the summer of 1938, Doihara was a lieutenant general on the General Staff, which held overall control of the fighting. In the second, at Nomonhan on the Khalkhin Gol river from May to September 1939, units of the army he commanded took part. The indictment listed him as commander of the 5th Army in Manchuria from 1938 to 1940.
In July 1938 Japanese policy in China took another turn. A conference of five cabinet ministers in Tokyo created a Special Commission on Chinese Affairs to devise strategy against China and to set up a new Chinese central government. The commission was formed on July 29 under Doihara and two older men; the tribunal noted that he was the youngest commissioner and the only one on active service. He ran its business from an office in Shanghai known as the Doihara Agency.
Doihara first worked to recruit two retired figures, the statesman Tang Shaoyi and Wu Peifu, to form a government opposed to Chiang Kai-shek. The plan, called the Wu Project, was to be paid for from surplus maritime customs revenue in occupied China. Tang was assassinated and the talks with Wu failed. The Doihara Agency then helped develop a scheme to bring Wang Jingwei to Central China, and the tribunal found that Doihara was in control of the plans.
The indictment's list of Doihara's later posts traced his rise to the top of the army. He was a member of the Supreme War Council from 1940 to 1943 and inspector general of army aviation in 1941, and he was promoted to full general in April 1941. In 1943 he took command of the Eastern Army in Japan. In April 1944 he went to Singapore as commander of the 7th Area Army, whose territory took in Malaya, Sumatra, Java and, for part of the time, Borneo. He held that command until April 1945, when he became inspector general of military training.
The 7th Area Army held large numbers of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees. On part of the charge concerning them, the tribunal found the evidence conflicting and made no finding against him. On the rest it was clear. It held him responsible, as a matter of his own policy, for the conditions in which the prisoners under his command were kept, and it found that deaths among them occurred "at a terrible rate." The defense argued that Japan's collapsing position and severed communications left him no better choice; the tribunal rejected the argument. Because his offense lay in a policy for which he was responsible rather than in a failure to prevent the crimes of others, the court placed it under Count 54 rather than Count 55.
Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, and the Allied occupation began arresting the men it suspected of war crimes. On January 19, 1946, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers established the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, with judges from eleven nations.
The indictment, lodged on April 29, 1946, contained 55 counts against 28 accused, Doihara among them under the spelling Dohihara, and covered the years from 1928 to Japan's surrender. Ten counts decided his case. Count 1 charged that the accused "participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan" to secure Japanese domination of East Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans by wars of aggression. Count 27 charged that they "waged a war of aggression" against the Republic of China; Counts 29, 31 and 32, waging it against the United States, the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands from December 7, 1941; and Count 33, against France. Counts 35 and 36 covered the wars against the Soviet Union at Lake Khasan in 1938 and against the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Union at Khalkhin Gol in 1939. Count 54 charged that they "ordered, authorized and permitted" breaches of the laws and customs of war, and Count 55 that they "deliberately and recklessly disregarded their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance" of those laws. On May 6, 1946, Doihara pleaded not guilty.
The trial ran until April 1948. Two of the accused died before judgment and a third was found unfit to be tried, leaving twenty-five, Doihara among them, to hear the verdicts.
The tribunal found Doihara guilty of conspiracy under Count 1 and of waging aggressive war under Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 35 and 36. It found him not guilty under Count 33: the decision to make war on France in February 1945 was taken by the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, he was not a party to it, and the evidence did not show that he took part in that war. It found him guilty under Count 54 and made no finding under Count 55.
The sentences were pronounced on November 12, 1948. Seven of the accused were sentenced to death: Doihara, Koki Hirota, Itagaki, Heitaro Kimura, Iwane Matsui, Akira Muto and Hideki Tojo. Sixteen were sentenced to life imprisonment, one to twenty years and one to seven years.
Under the tribunal's charter the Supreme Commander had power to alter the sentences. On November 24, 1948, with representatives of the Allied Council for Japan present, the verdicts were upheld.
Doihara, Hirota and other men convicted at Tokyo then turned to the Supreme Court of the United States. On December 20, 1948, the Court held that the tribunal had been set up by the Supreme Commander as the agent of the Allied Powers and was not a tribunal of the United States. American courts, it ruled, had "no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on these petitioners," and "for this reason the motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied."
Kenji Doihara was executed in Tokyo on December 23, 1948, three days after that ruling. The six other men sentenced to death with him were executed the same day.
The tribunal itself drew the line between what was proved against Doihara and what was not. On part of the charge concerning the prisoners of the 7th Area Army it found the evidence conflicting and made no finding. It acquitted him on Count 33, the war against France, and made no finding on Count 55.
The defense contested several of the China findings. It argued that the Qin-Doihara Agreement had been reached without pressure, that the North China autonomy movement had been spontaneous, and, on the prisoners, that wartime conditions made better treatment impossible. The court rejected each argument. Doihara told the court he had been in Tokyo while the Wang Jingwei scheme was being arranged; the court found him in control of the plans regardless.
Responsibility for Puyi's removal from Tianjin was disputed. The tribunal found that Itagaki sent Doihara to fetch him. Itagaki's own testimony at Tokyo presented the operation as a risk Doihara took on his own initiative rather than a deliberate plan of the Japanese government.
August 8, 1883: Born in Okayama Prefecture, Japan.
1913: Begins intelligence work in China.
March 17, 1928: Receives permission to serve as aide to the Japanese adviser of Zhang Zuolin.
March 1929: Attached to the Army General Staff.
August 18, 1931: Reaches Mukden and takes command of the Kwantung Army's Special Service Organization.
September 18, 1931: The Mukden Incident; the tribunal later finds he helped plan and coordinate it.
September 21, 1931: Proclaimed mayor of Mukden by the Japanese Army.
November 10 to 13, 1931: Moves Puyi from Tianjin to Yingkou.
November 26, 1931: Disorder in Tianjin's Chinese quarter, which the tribunal finds he organized.
January to February 1932: Directs the Harbin special service office; Ma Zhanshan agrees on February 14 to cooperate with Japan.
March 1, 1932: Manchukuo proclaimed.
April 11, 1932: Promoted to major general.
October 16, 1933: Assigned to Kwantung Army headquarters.
June 27, 1935: Qin-Doihara Agreement on Chahar.
September to December 1935: Presses North China autonomy; East Hebei regime and Hebei-Chahar Political Council formed.
August 1937: Commands the 14th Division on the Beiping-Hankou railway.
July 29, 1938: Special Commission on Chinese Affairs formed under him; the Doihara Agency operates from Shanghai.
1938 to 1940: Commands the 5th Army in Manchuria.
April 1941: Promoted to full general.
April 1944 to April 1945: Commands the 7th Area Army at Singapore.
April 1945: Becomes inspector general of military training.
September 2, 1945: Japan surrenders.
April 29, 1946: Indictment lodged before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
May 6, 1946: Pleads not guilty.
November 12, 1948: Sentenced to death; guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36 and 54, not guilty on Count 33, no finding on Count 55.
November 24, 1948: Verdicts upheld on review.
December 20, 1948: The U.S. Supreme Court denies the motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
December 23, 1948: Executed in Tokyo.