Joseph R. Miller was convicted in Peoria County, Illinois, of murdering three women in 1993, and by April 2003 his death sentence for those killings had been commuted to natural life without parole. The Illinois Supreme Court put the case in a few plain lines. In the late 1970s, it wrote, he had murdered two women. In April 1993 he was released from prison. Five months later he killed three more women.
A jury in the circuit court of Peoria County convicted him of six counts of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to death. The sentence was affirmed on direct appeal in 1996, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case in 1997. While his post-conviction appeal was before the Illinois Supreme Court, the Governor commuted the death sentence to natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release. The state's highest court then rejected the rest of his claims in an opinion filed in December 2002 and modified in April 2003.
The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in People v. Miller, No. 89408, names him in its caption as Joseph R. Miller. Justice Thomas delivered it for the court. It does not give his date or place of birth, and it says little about his life before the crimes. The court's account of his record is short. It states that in the late 1970s he murdered two women, and it records that he was released from prison in April 1993.
The opinion does not name the two women killed in the 1970s or say where they lived. It does not give the dates of their deaths, the court that handled that case, or the length of the sentence he served for it.
According to the court, Miller killed three more women about five months after his release. The opinion does not name them, give their ages, or describe how they died, and it gives no dates for the killings beyond that span of months. The case was tried in the circuit court of Peoria County.
The evidence against him, as the court described it in 2002, came in two main forms. One was his own statements. The court referred to "defendant's own incriminating statements" as part of the proof. The other was DNA evidence, which the court said "conclusively linked him to the crime." On that record the court called the evidence "not closely balanced" and the proof of guilt "overwhelming."
Two prosecution witnesses tied him to a car that investigators believed the killer had used. In the court's words, their testimony "placed defendant in the car believed to have been used by the murderer." The opinion does not describe the car or explain how it came into the investigation.
The murder counts were brought under section 9-1(a) of the Illinois Criminal Code. Before trial, the state offered him a sentence of life imprisonment in exchange for a guilty plea. He turned it down and went to trial.
Years later he argued that his trial lawyer had failed him at that point. He claimed that counsel never told him that natural life imprisonment was the most lenient sentence he could receive if he were convicted.
The jury found him guilty on all six counts of first-degree murder. It then found Miller eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(3), because he had killed more than one person. It found no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a death sentence, and the trial court sentenced him to death.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Miller's convictions and death sentence in People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, decided in 1996. He then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case. That court denied certiorari on March 31, 1997, in Miller v. Illinois, 520 U.S. 1157.
Miller had already started a second line of challenge before the direct appeal ended. On December 29, 1995, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief on his own, without a lawyer.
His petition made several claims. The first was the plea claim: that his lawyer had been ineffective in the negotiations over the state's offer of life imprisonment. The second concerned the two witnesses who had placed him in the car. He argued that his lawyer should have cross-examined them about whether they hoped for or had been promised leniency in their own cases. He also argued that the prosecution had violated its duty, under Brady v. Maryland, to disclose any such deal to the defense.
A lawyer appointed to represent him then filed an amended petition. It kept the original claims and added a new one: that trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing.
To support the new claim, the amended petition relied on reports from two experts. Dr. Fred Berlin, of Johns Hopkins, concluded that Miller had a psychiatric disorder that impaired his volitional capabilities, meaning his capacity to control his own conduct. Dr. Michael Gelbort, a clinical psychologist, concluded that he suffered from neuropsychological impairment and dysfunction reflecting brain dysfunction or damage.
The state moved to dismiss the petition. It argued that some claims were waived and that none made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights had been violated. The circuit court agreed. It found no showing that his lawyer's performance had fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness, and it dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Miller appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
While that appeal was pending, the Governor of Illinois commuted Miller's death sentence. The new sentence was natural life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release. The court's opinion records the commutation but does not give its date.
The commutation changed what was left to decide. Two of his claims were aimed only at the sentence. With the death sentence gone, the court held that both the mitigation claim and the plea claim were moot.
That left the claim about the two witnesses who had tied him to the car. The court rejected it. The suggestion that they had received or expected leniency was, the court found, speculative. Even if a deal had existed and had been put before the jury, the court held that Miller could not show a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. Their testimony had been helpful to the prosecution, the court said, because it tied him to the vehicle likely used by the killer. But there was, in its words, "plenty of evidence to convict defendant even without their testimony," including his own statements and the DNA evidence.
The court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County. Its opinion was filed on December 19, 2002, and was modified when the court denied rehearing on April 1, 2003.
The April 2003 ruling left the six murder convictions and the commuted sentence of natural life without parole in place. The prison where he was held at that time was not named in the ruling.
Late 1970s: According to the Illinois Supreme Court, Miller murders two women.
April 1993: He is released from prison.
About five months later, in 1993: He kills three more women, according to the court.
Later: A jury in the circuit court of Peoria County convicts him of six counts of first-degree murder; he is sentenced to death after rejecting a pretrial offer of life imprisonment in exchange for a guilty plea.
December 29, 1995: He files a post-conviction petition on his own.
1996: The Illinois Supreme Court affirms his convictions and death sentence in People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167.
March 31, 1997: The U.S. Supreme Court denies review (Miller v. Illinois, 520 U.S. 1157).
After that: Appointed counsel files an amended petition adding a claim about mitigating evidence; the circuit court dismisses the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and he appeals.
During the appeal: The Governor commutes his death sentence to natural life imprisonment without parole or mandatory supervised release.
December 19, 2002: The Illinois Supreme Court files its opinion affirming the dismissal.
April 1, 2003: The opinion is modified on denial of rehearing; the judgment stands.