John Jason McLaughlin

Victims
2 teenagers killed in Cold Spring, Minnesota, September 24, 2003. Convicted in 2005, for acts at 15, of first- and second-degree murder; mental illness defense rejected
Years active
September 24, 2003
Location
Cold Spring and St. Cloud, Minnesota
Method
Murder in the first degree (premeditated) and murder in the second degree (intentional), Minnesota law.
Status
Life plus a consecutive 144 months, imposed 2005; affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court on January 11, 2007

John Jason McLaughlin, who went by Jason, was 15 years old on Wednesday, September 24, 2003, when two teenagers died in Cold Spring, Minnesota. One died that morning. The other lived for sixteen more days. McLaughlin gave himself up the same morning and acknowledged what he had done. The question that occupied the courts for the next three years was not whether he had caused the two deaths but whether a boy whom three defense experts diagnosed as schizophrenic could be held criminally responsible for them.

He could, a Minnesota judge ruled in July 2005. Sitting without a jury, the judge found McLaughlin guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, of second-degree intentional murder and of a further felony count, and then rejected his defense of mental illness. In August 2005 McLaughlin, by then 17, was sentenced to life in prison, with a second term of 144 months to follow it. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the sentences in 2007 and declined to decide whether the state's test of legal insanity could fairly be applied to a teenager.

Cold Spring is a city of about 4,000 people in Stearns County, in central Minnesota. In the fall of 2003 McLaughlin was 15. Little of his life before that autumn entered the court record. What the courts later learned about his inner life came from the experts who examined him after his arrest and from his own statements to investigators, all of them made after the event.

September 24, 2003

The deaths came in the course of a single morning. By the account the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted, McLaughlin had planned for several days to harm one particular person, and the second death came out of the same act rather than out of a separate choice. That distinction shaped everything that followed. The death he intended was charged and proved as premeditated murder in the first degree. The other was charged and proved as intentional murder in the second degree.

Aaron was the first to die. He was pronounced dead that morning.

Seth died sixteen days after the events of September 24.

McLaughlin surrendered the same morning.

Charges in juvenile court

Two days later, on Friday, September 26, 2003, McLaughlin was charged with murder in Minnesota juvenile court. Second-degree murder was among the counts. The hearing was closed to the public because he was a juvenile, and the agency prosecuting him declined to discuss the case for the same reason.

That agency was not the county attorney's office. The Minnesota Attorney General's Office took the prosecution at the request of Stearns County, and on the same day it filed papers asking that McLaughlin be prosecuted as an adult.

The state prevailed. About six months after the deaths, the Stearns County Juvenile Court certified McLaughlin to stand trial as an adult. He challenged that order in the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed it, and the case moved to the adult system for good. Each side had brought in its own mental health expert to examine him for the certification hearing, and the court had appointed an examiner of its own. Those evaluations, made in the months after his arrest, became the first layer of a record that would decide the case.

McLaughlin was tried as an adult in Stearns County District Court, on charges that by then included murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and a further felony count. The case was heard not by a Stearns County judge but by a district judge from Clay County, on the state's western border, who was assigned to preside.

Before trial the court also ordered a combined evaluation under the Minnesota court rule that governs both competency to stand trial and a claimed mental illness defense. Two examiners carried it out on the court's behalf: a psychiatrist, who addressed whether McLaughlin was competent, and a forensic psychologist, who addressed whether he met the legal standard for a mental illness defense. Their findings would weigh as heavily as anything the parties' own experts said.

The trial

McLaughlin waived his right to a jury, and the trial that took place in 2005 was a bench trial divided into two parts. In the first, the court decided whether the state had proved the charged offenses. In the second, it decided whether McLaughlin should nonetheless be excused from criminal liability because of mental illness.

The shape of the trial was negotiated. The parties agreed that in the first phase McLaughlin would stipulate to his guilt of second-degree murder in the first death, and would then try to prove his mental illness defense in the second. There was no stipulation on the first-degree count. On that charge the state had to prove premeditation, and it did.

The first phase ended in July 2005 with guilty findings on all three counts: the first-degree premeditated murder of the intended victim, the second-degree intentional murder of the other, and the further felony count.

The second phase was where the case was fought. Six mental health experts testified over six days. Three were called by the defense, and all three diagnosed schizophrenia; the defense argued that McLaughlin had been in the grip of paranoid schizophrenia and had not known that what he was doing was morally wrong. The state's expert diagnosed a major depressive disorder and, likely, an emerging personality disorder. Two further experts, examining McLaughlin on the court's behalf, diagnosed a depressive disorder in remission and an emerging personality disorder, conclusions in line with the state's.

The defense experts did not speak with one voice. The first, a forensic psychiatrist retained to assess both his competency and his defense, diagnosed a severe thought disorder, schizophrenia of the paranoid and disorganized type, together with cognitive impairments, and concluded that as a direct result of his illness he had not known the nature of his act or its wrongfulness. The second, a psychiatrist who had treated McLaughlin while he was held after his arrest, diagnosed schizophrenia, predominantly paranoid, testified that his symptoms eased once medication began, and offered no opinion at all on the legal test. The third, a forensic psychologist first retained for the certification hearing, had diagnosed a psychotic disorder not otherwise specified at that stage and later concluded that McLaughlin was a paranoid schizophrenic. He told the court that the illness had compromised McLaughlin's judgment and reduced his impulse control, and that but for it the deaths would not have happened. On the question the law actually asked, he concluded that McLaughlin had been aware of the nature of his act, its outcome and its moral wrongness.

The state's expert, a forensic psychologist, had first examined McLaughlin for certification and had then found an emerging psychotic illness that did not meet the criteria for schizophrenia. When she evaluated him again about nineteen months later, after he had been off antipsychotic medication for some four months, she found him much improved, which she said she would not expect in a person with a psychotic disorder. She testified that he was malingering some of the symptoms other experts had recorded and concluded that he had known the nature of his acts and known that they were legally and morally wrong. The court's psychiatrist rejected the schizophrenia diagnosis, pointing to McLaughlin's steady improvement after medication stopped, to the absence of psychotic behavior during the observation period of the court's evaluation and to hallucinations that did not match the usual experience of schizophrenic patients, and thought malingering likely. The court's psychologist agreed with that diagnosis and concluded that he had known both the nature of his acts and their legal and moral wrongfulness.

A diagnosis was only the beginning of the question. Minnesota's test does not ask whether a defendant was mentally ill. It asks whether, because of mental illness, he failed to know the nature of his act or failed to know that it was wrong. On that narrower question the defense evidence thinned. Of the three experts who diagnosed schizophrenia, only one concluded that McLaughlin did not know right from wrong and so met the legal standard.

The judge ruled against him on July 26, 2005. The court found that McLaughlin had been cognitively aware that what he did to the two victims was morally wrong, and it declined to excuse him from criminal responsibility. The experts, the court wrote, disagreed about the nature of his mental impairment, if any, and only one had found an illness severe enough to meet the standard; the court gave that opinion no weight against the undisputed evidence of his conduct that September and of his statement to investigators that morning. The ruling meant that he would go to prison rather than to a state hospital.

Sentence

The sentencing hearing was set for August 30, 2005, in St. Cloud.

The first-degree conviction carried a mandatory life sentence, and under the law then in force that sentence meant a minimum of 30 years in prison before release could be considered. For the second-degree conviction, the state's sentencing guidelines called for about twelve and a half years. What remained for the court was whether that second term would run alongside the life sentence or after it.

The court imposed life in prison for the premeditated murder and a consecutive term of 144 months for the second-degree murder. McLaughlin was 17.

At the time of the offenses, Minnesota's sentencing guidelines made consecutive terms permissive, and not a departure, for a defendant convicted of more than one current felony against a person. The court said it had considered concurrent sentences. It weighed the mitigating factors it found, among them McLaughlin's age and his mental health, against the aggravating ones, concluded that the two sets in a sense balanced each other, and held that consecutive terms would be proportional to the sentences given for similar conduct.

The appeal

McLaughlin took his case to the Minnesota Supreme Court and raised three issues.

The first and most ambitious was constitutional. He relied on Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 decision of the United States Supreme Court that barred the death penalty for offenders under 18 at the time of their crimes and spoke of their diminished culpability. Applying Minnesota's insanity test to an adolescent, McLaughlin argued, violated due process under the Minnesota Constitution. An amicus brief supported that position: the one the American Medical Association and other groups had filed in Roper itself, which McLaughlin cited for research showing that the adolescent brain is less developed than the adult brain in the regions governing impulse control, risk assessment and moral reasoning. A teenager, he argued, might understand what he was doing and know that it was wrong and still be unable to control his behavior. He asked the court to replace the old rule for adolescents with one of three alternative tests, among them a test that would recognize a young person's vulnerability to an irresistible impulse.

The state answered that the claim came too late. McLaughlin had raised a due process challenge to the statute in the trial court, but that challenge rested on vagueness, a different argument from the brain development claim he now pressed. McLaughlin conceded that the new claim was being raised for the first time and asked the court to hear it anyway, in the interests of justice and in light of the recent research.

The court did not reach the merits. It held the claim procedurally barred because it was raised for the first time on appeal. No factual record had been made on the question in the trial court, the argument rested on technical matters that had never been put to the trial judge, and the amicus brief could not stand in for the missing record. A single brief from an unrelated case, the court reasoned, was not aimed at the particular question McLaughlin raised, and it would not serve the interests of justice to consider striking down the rule on that record. M'Naghten, the court noted, had been the legal test of insanity in Minnesota since 1868. The court added that any change to the Minnesota test would have to come from the legislature.

The second issue arose from the trial itself. During the mental illness phase the defense had asked for a continuance so that it could call yet another expert, and the trial judge had refused. The witness McLaughlin wanted was the examiner the court had appointed during the certification proceedings. That examiner had told the defense he would be out of the country during the mental illness phase, and no subpoena was sought. The defense moved for the continuance three days after the state rested in that phase, after the state's expert and one of the court's examiners suggested that a leading question in one of the examiner's interviews might have cued McLaughlin to report an unusual symptom. The trial judge found the testimony cumulative and doubted that it was proper rebuttal. The Supreme Court found no error: one more expert, it concluded, would not have significantly affected the outcome of a phase in which six had already testified. The suggestion about the interview had not been especially significant against so broad a record, the defense had cross-examined both experts on it, and the opinion that the deaths would not have happened but for the illness was already in evidence and bore little on the M'Naghten question.

The third issue was the sentence. McLaughlin argued that the 144-month term should have run at the same time as the life sentence, and that the trial court had given too little weight to his youth and his mental illness, among other factors. The Supreme Court reviewed the sentences imposed in comparable cases and upheld the consecutive terms. Youth and mental illness, it observed, had been present in many cases in which it had upheld comparable sentences. Under Minnesota law a mental impairment mitigates a sentence only when it is extreme enough to deprive a defendant of control over his actions, and the record here did not show that: three experts had diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia, three a depressive disorder and an emerging personality disorder, and there was no consensus that McLaughlin frequently suffered delusions or acted in wholly irrational ways. The trial court had found that his impairment was not an extreme mental illness, and the Supreme Court held that finding supported by the record as a whole. None of the mitigating factors he pressed, alone or together, showed an abuse of discretion, and the consecutive terms matched those the court had consistently affirmed for homicides with more than one victim.

The court, sitting en banc, affirmed both murder convictions and the sentences in an opinion filed on January 11, 2007.

Context: the Minnesota test the court applied

The standard that decided the second phase of the trial is Minnesota's statute on criminal responsibility. A person with a mental illness or cognitive impairment may not be excused from criminal liability except on proof that, at the time of the act, the person was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong. The provision's statutory history in Minnesota begins with the Revised Laws of 1905, and the courts know the test as the M'Naghten rule.

The test is cognitive. It turns on what the defendant knew, not on how ill he was, which is how a case in which three experts agreed on schizophrenia could still end in conviction. In McLaughlin's appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to reshape that test for adolescents on the record before it and left any change to the legislature.

McLaughlin's mental state was the one contested matter at trial. Three experts diagnosed schizophrenia; the state's expert and the two who examined him for the court did not, and two of those three testified that he was malingering some symptoms; one expert concluded that he met the legal test of insanity. The court's finding that he knew his conduct was morally wrong governs, and the Minnesota Supreme Court left it undisturbed.

Timeline

September 24, 2003: Two teenagers are fatally harmed in Cold Spring, Minnesota; one dies the same morning; McLaughlin, 15, surrenders the same morning.

September 26, 2003: McLaughlin is charged with murder in juvenile court; the Attorney General's Office, prosecuting at Stearns County's request, files to prosecute him as an adult.

Sixteen days after September 24, 2003: The second victim dies.

About six months after September 24, 2003: The Stearns County Juvenile Court certifies McLaughlin to stand trial as an adult; the Minnesota Court of Appeals later affirms the certification.

2005: Bench trial in Stearns County District Court, with a district judge from Clay County presiding.

July 2005: Guilty findings of first-degree premeditated murder, second-degree intentional murder and a further felony count.

July 26, 2005: After six days of expert testimony, the court rejects the mental illness defense.

August 30, 2005: Sentencing hearing set in St. Cloud; life in prison plus a consecutive 144 months is imposed.

January 11, 2007: The Minnesota Supreme Court affirms the convictions and sentences.