Joel Steinberg

Victims
1 child died in his care, Manhattan, 1987; manslaughter. Convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, January 30, 1989; the jury acquitted him of murder in the second degree.
Years active
November 1 to 5, 1987
Location
Manhattan, New York
Method
Manslaughter in the first degree: causing death with intent to cause serious physical injury, including by withholding medical care from a child he had a legal duty to protect
Status
8 1/3 to 25 years and a $5,000 fine (March 24, 1989); affirmed 1991 and by the Court of Appeals (June 11, 1992); parole denied five times; released June 30, 2004, under supervision to 2012

In the first week of November 1987 a child died in Manhattan after a night in which the man responsible for her care did not call for help. The man was Joel Steinberg, a lawyer who lived in Greenwich Village with a woman who shared the household and with two children who had never been legally adopted. Steinberg had taken the girl in as an infant, when his task was to arrange her adoption. The adoption was never completed. Fifteen months after her death a Manhattan jury acquitted him of murder in the second degree and convicted him of manslaughter in the first degree. He was sentenced to the maximum the law allowed, eight and one-third to 25 years.

The case did not end in the courtroom where the jury returned its verdict. Steinberg's appeal went to the New York Court of Appeals, which in June 1992 used it to settle a question that reached beyond his own conviction: whether a parent with no medical training can form the intent to cause serious physical injury simply by withholding medical care. The court said that such a parent can. Steinberg served about two-thirds of his maximum term. The state parole board turned him down five times, and in June 2004 he walked out of a New York state prison under the sentencing law that had governed his case from the start.

The household in Greenwich Village

Steinberg was 47 years old at the time of his trial. He had practiced law in New York, and by the time the case came before a jury he had been disbarred. He and the woman he lived with made their household in Greenwich Village, in lower Manhattan.

Two children lived with them. Neither had been legally adopted. The older child, Lisa, had come to Steinberg as a newborn, when he was meant to arrange her adoption through the courts. That adoption never took place, and no record of a legal adoption could be found when the case came to light. A younger child, a boy, lived in the household as well, also without a completed adoption.

The absence of a lawful adoption did not reduce Steinberg's legal responsibility. The Court of Appeals treated him as the child's parent in every sense that mattered to the criminal law, and it held that a parent owes a child a duty that cannot be handed off to anyone else: the duty to see that the child receives adequate medical care. That duty became the hinge of the case.

November 1 and 2, 1987

The events that led to the charges took place on the evening of November 1, 1987, in the household in Manhattan. The child was gravely injured that evening. No help was summoned through the night.

The next morning, November 2, emergency help was called. Police and paramedics arrived soon afterward, and later that day police arrested both adults in the household. The child never recovered. She died on November 5, 1987, and within hours of her death both adults were arraigned on charges of murder in the second degree.

The investigation was carried out by New York City police and the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, and it moved quickly. On November 6, the day after the death, a Manhattan grand jury indicted Steinberg for murder in the second degree, and he pleaded not guilty. The woman who had lived with him was not indicted. Within weeks the case had drawn national attention.

The indictment and the dropped charges

By the time the case reached a jury, the charges against Steinberg in the child's death were murder in the second degree under the depraved indifference theory, manslaughter in the first degree and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. One of the endangering counts concerned the younger child in the household rather than the girl who died. Taken together, the pleadings carried seven counts beyond murder and manslaughter, and every one of those seven was in the end severed or dismissed.

A Manhattan grand jury acted again on March 21, 1988, returning a separate indictment against Steinberg on other charges. That indictment never went to trial. It was dismissed on the day he was sentenced in the child's death.

The spring of 1988 also ended his legal career. On May 19, 1988, the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court disbarred him, finding that he had lied about his qualifications in order to obtain his license to practice. On June 13 the acting justice who would preside at the trial denied him bail, and he was held without bail from then on.

The charges against the woman who had lived with him took a different course. She had been arrested and arraigned with him in November 1987, but she was never indicted. On October 26, 1988, the day after Steinberg's trial opened, a judge of the Manhattan Criminal Court granted a prosecution motion to dismiss all charges against her. The prosecution told the court that its investigation had shown she could not be held criminally responsible for the child's death. She became a witness for the People, and only Steinberg stood trial.

Her role as a prosecution witness carried a legal consequence that shaped the appeal. Under New York law, a defendant cannot be convicted on the testimony of an accomplice unless other evidence tends to connect the defendant to the crime. Steinberg's lawyers would argue that this corroboration was missing. The trial judge identified several items of independent evidence that supported her account, and the question went all the way to the Court of Appeals.

The trial

The trial opened on October 25, 1988, in State Supreme Court in Manhattan, before an acting justice of that court. A jury of six men and six women heard the case, with six alternates in reserve. Opening statements came that first day, from an assistant district attorney for the People and from Steinberg's trial lawyer for the defense, and three prosecution witnesses, among them a police officer and a paramedic, testified before the court adjourned.

The People's case ran for nine weeks and called 39 witnesses. A pediatrician testified in the first week of November, and a medical expert for the prosecution followed later in the month. On November 21 one juror was excused, and with the agreement of both sides an alternate took the empty seat. The woman who had shared the household took the stand on December 1, 1988, and testified for about a week. Among the exhibits the jury saw was a videotape that police had made of her after the arrests, an exhibit the defense would later name as a ground of appeal.

The prosecution rested on December 19. The defense at once moved to dismiss the murder, manslaughter and endangering counts that concerned the girl, and the judge denied the motion. He said he was inclined to dismiss the endangering count that concerned the younger child; the prosecution did not object, and he indicated that the dismissal would come at the end of the trial. The defense opened its case the next day with two police officers whose testimony disputed parts of the prosecution witness's account, and it later called a medical expert of its own. The court recessed for the holidays and sat again on January 3, 1989. The defense rested on January 13, and the two sides gave their closing arguments on January 19 and 20.

The prosecution's task turned on intent. The murder count was brought under the depraved indifference theory, which turns on the defendant's indifference to human life rather than on an intent to injure. The manslaughter count required proof that he intended to cause serious physical injury and caused her death. The two theories offered the jury two different ways of understanding the same night, and the gap between them would decide both the verdict and the sentence.

The case went to the jury on January 23, 1989. Deliberations ran for eight days. During them the jury sent a note to the judge asking, in substance, whether a finding of intent could rest on serious injury that occurred without any apparent intent to injure. Steinberg's lawyers asked the judge to answer with a single word, "no." The judge gave a fuller supplemental charge instead. He explained again that the People bore the burden of proof, that intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances, and that a jury may infer intent from the natural and probable consequences of a person's acts.

The verdict

On January 30, 1989, at the end of a trial of thirteen weeks, the jury returned its verdict. On the count of murder in the second degree it found Steinberg not guilty. On the count of manslaughter in the first degree it found him guilty.

The acquittal on the murder count mattered for the sentence. Manslaughter in the first degree carried a maximum indeterminate sentence of eight and one-third to 25 years, so the verdict fixed a ceiling on the term Steinberg could receive. The district attorney's office announced that it would ask for that maximum. Sentencing was first set for March 8.

Sentence

Steinberg was sentenced on March 24, 1989, in State Supreme Court in Manhattan, before the acting justice who had presided at the trial. Before sentence was passed he addressed the court and asked for leniency.

The judge imposed the maximum the law allowed: an indeterminate term of eight years and four months to 25 years, with a $5,000 fine. The separate indictment returned in March 1988 was dismissed the same day. Steinberg was held in a New York City jail while he awaited sentence and was then committed to the custody of the New York State prison system.

The appeals

Steinberg's lawyers had signaled an appeal within days of the verdict. They pointed to two rulings in particular: the judge's instructions to the jury on intent, and his decision to let the jury see the videotape of the prosecution witness. The first appeal went to the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court, which in 1991 affirmed the conviction in a decision reported at 170 A.D.2d 50.

The Appellate Division's opinion was a long one. Over several pages it worked through the trial record and concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the manslaughter verdict. When the case reached the next level, the higher court saw "no need to replicate the Appellate Division's extensive analysis of the record" on that point and cited it instead, choosing only to highlight the parts of the case that showed the evidence was enough.

The defense took the case to the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, which decided it on June 11, 1992. The opinion was written by one of the court's associate judges, four other judges joined it, and one judge took no part. The court framed the appeal in its first sentence as one that "centers on his contention that only a person with medical expertise can form the requisite intent to cause serious physical injury to a child by failing to obtain medical care." It concluded that this contention, "as well as the several others defendant advances, lack merit," and that the Appellate Division order sustaining the conviction should be affirmed. The court's order was a single line: "Order affirmed."

The main argument concerned the mental element of manslaughter. Steinberg contended that only a person with medical expertise could form an intent to cause serious physical injury by failing to obtain medical care, because only such a person would know what the failure would bring about. The court rejected the argument. It held that parents have a legal duty to provide medical care to their children, so that an omission can support criminal liability under Penal Law section 15.05. It also drew a line between intent and knowledge. A person need not know precisely what medical consequences will follow in order to intend them, and the court held that "even a person without specialized medical knowledge can have the intent to cause serious physical injury by withholding medical care." Whether Steinberg had in fact formed that intent was a question of fact for the jury, not one of law for the court.

The court next held that the evidence was legally sufficient. It applied the settled test: the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the People, and the question is whether there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found every element of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured that way, the court held, a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that it was Steinberg who caused the child's injuries. It held as well that the failure to obtain medical care "can also support a first degree manslaughter charge." Intent, it said, may be inferred from conduct and from the surrounding circumstances. Steinberg's eventual agreement to call for help the next morning did not defeat a finding that he had intended serious physical injury during the night, although the court noted that it might bear on whether he intended death, a question the jury did not have to reach on the manslaughter count.

On corroboration, the court held that the testimony of the prosecution witness who had shared the household was adequately corroborated under Criminal Procedure Law section 60.22(1). The corroborating evidence, it wrote, "need only 'tend to connect' the defendant to the crime; it need not establish all the elements of the offense." The trial judge had identified several such items of independent evidence, and a jury was entitled to credit them.

On the jury note, the court held that the trial judge had acted within his discretion. A court must "respond meaningfully" to a jury's inquiry, and a bare "no" might have obscured the jury's ability to infer intent from the natural and probable consequences of the defendant's acts. The supplemental charge was a proper answer. The court found the remaining contentions, to the extent they had been preserved, to be without merit. With that ruling the conviction became final.

Parole

The sentence was indeterminate, and in New York an indeterminate term carries two different release dates. The first is the end of the minimum. A prisoner who completes the minimum period becomes eligible to appear before the Board of Parole for discretionary release, which the board may grant or refuse as it judges the case. For Steinberg that threshold came after eight years and four months. The board heard his case for the first time in the mid-1990s and denied release. It denied him again at later hearings, five times in all.

The second date does not depend on the board at all. A prisoner may earn time allowances for good behavior, known as good time, off the maximum term, and for an indeterminate sentence the allowance can reach one-third of that maximum. Section 70.40 of the Penal Law provides that a prisoner whose good time equals the unserved portion of his maximum term "shall, if he or she so requests, be conditionally released." Conditional release is a statutory release that the Board of Parole has no discretion to grant or deny. Every person released this way stays under the supervision of the state corrections and community supervision authority for a period equal to the unserved portion of the maximum.

On a 25-year maximum, the arithmetic was plain. Two-thirds of the term would be served in the summer of 2004, and the remaining third would run as supervision in the community. Steinberg served his sentence in New York state prisons. In September 2003 he was 62 years old and expected to be released the following June.

Release

Steinberg left prison on Wednesday, June 30, 2004. The board that had turned him down five times did not release him; the law did. Because he had kept good behavior in custody, the state was required to parole him once he had served two-thirds of his 25-year term. He had served nearly 17 years, and he returned to New York City.

His release carried conditions. He was placed under the supervision of a parole officer, with regular reporting required until 2012. The terms also included community service, counseling, anger-management classes and a curfew.

Steinberg denied responsibility for the child's death throughout. His appeals did not contest that the child had died in his care; they argued that the law did not allow a jury to find the required intent from his failure to seek medical help, that the testimony against him had not been corroborated and that the judge's answer to the jury's note had been wrong. The Court of Appeals rejected each argument. The conviction for manslaughter in the first degree stands; the jury's acquittal on the murder count stands with it.

Timeline

November 1, 1987: The child in Steinberg's care is gravely injured in the household in Manhattan; no help is summoned through the night.

November 2, 1987: Emergency help is called in the morning; police arrest Steinberg and the woman who lived with him later that day.

November 5, 1987: The child dies; both adults are arraigned on charges of murder in the second degree.

November 6, 1987: A Manhattan grand jury indicts Steinberg for murder in the second degree; he pleads not guilty. The woman is not indicted.

March 21, 1988: A separate Manhattan indictment on other charges is returned against him.

May 19, 1988: The Appellate Division disbars him.

June 13, 1988: The trial judge denies bail.

October 25, 1988: Trial opens in State Supreme Court, Manhattan, with opening statements.

October 26, 1988: A Manhattan Criminal Court judge dismisses all charges against the woman on the prosecution's motion; she becomes a prosecution witness.

November 21, 1988: A juror is excused and replaced by an alternate.

December 1, 1988: The woman who lived with him begins about a week of testimony for the prosecution.

December 19, 1988: The prosecution rests after 39 witnesses; the defense motion to dismiss the counts concerning the girl is denied.

December 20, 1988: The defense opens its case.

January 13, 1989: The defense rests.

January 19 and 20, 1989: Closing arguments.

January 23, 1989: The case goes to the jury.

January 30, 1989: Not guilty of murder in the second degree; guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.

March 24, 1989: Sentenced to 8 1/3 to 25 years and a $5,000 fine; the separate 1988 indictment is dismissed.

1991: The Appellate Division affirms the conviction (170 A.D.2d 50).

June 11, 1992: The New York Court of Appeals affirms (79 N.Y.2d 673).

Mid-1990s to 2003: The New York State Board of Parole denies release five times.

September 2003: Release is expected the following June.

June 30, 2004: Released after nearly 17 years, on serving two-thirds of the maximum term, under parole supervision until 2012.