Jason Young was convicted of first-degree murder in Wake County Superior Court on March 5, 2012, for the death of his wife, Michelle Fisher Young, in Raleigh, North Carolina, on November 3, 2006. He has always denied killing her. The case against him was circumstantial from the first day to the last, and it took more than five years, an indictment more than three years after the death, a first trial that ended with the jury leaning toward acquittal, and a second trial that went the other way before a verdict stood. Even then it did not settle. In 2014 the North Carolina Court of Appeals threw out the conviction and ordered a third trial. In 2015 the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed that order, and the conviction has held through every challenge since.
What turned the case between the two trials was not a new witness to the night itself but a piece of civil litigation. More than two years after the death, he declined to answer a wrongful death and slayer action brought against him by his wife's estate, and the civil court entered judgments against him by default. The first jury never heard about that. The second did. Whether it should have became the central legal question of the appeals, and the answer the state's highest court gave in August 2015 is the reason Young is serving life without parole and not awaiting a third jury.
By November 2006 the couple had been married for slightly more than three years and lived in Raleigh with their young daughter. The evidence the jury heard, as the Supreme Court of North Carolina later summarized it, described a marriage under strain: frequent arguments, some of them in public, and, in the weeks before the death, his relationships with other women. She did not seek a divorce.
On the evening of November 2, Young left Raleigh on a business trip for a sales call the next morning in southwestern Virginia, and late that night he checked into a hotel in Hillsville, Virginia. His account was that he spent the night asleep in his room. On the afternoon of November 3, a relative went to the couple's Raleigh home and found his wife dead. Their child was in the house. The death was investigated as a homicide from that day.
Young learned of the death that afternoon while driving to Brevard, in western North Carolina, and returned to Raleigh. Friends advised him to see a lawyer before talking to the police, and he took that advice. On counsel's instructions he never answered investigators' questions.
The Wake County Sheriff's Office led the investigation, with the State Bureau of Investigation and the FBI taking part over the following years. Investigators tested his account against the hotel's own records and against a service station witness who would later testify that she had seen him in North Carolina during the night he said he spent in Virginia. For three years no one was charged. The case was built slowly, from records, witnesses and the history of the marriage, without a statement from the one person investigators most wanted to hear from.
The decisive legal development came first in civil court. In October 2008 the executrix of his wife's estate sued him for wrongful death and asked the court to declare, under Chapter 31A of the North Carolina General Statutes, that he was a slayer barred from profiting by the death. The complaint alleged that he had murdered her. Young filed no answer. In December 2008 the court entered a judgment by default declaring that he had willfully and unlawfully killed his wife and was a slayer under the statute, and in March 2009 a default judgment in the wrongful death claim awarded the estate more than fifteen million dollars. A separate custody complaint filed against him made the same allegation.
On December 14, 2009, a Wake County grand jury indicted Young for first-degree murder, and sheriff's deputies arrested him the same day in Brevard, where he had been living since the death. He was 35. Prosecutors did not seek the death penalty.
The first trial opened at the May 31, 2011, session of Wake County Superior Court. The State's case was that he had used the Virginia hotel as an alibi and returned to Raleigh during the night. Then Young did something unusual: he took the stand. He told the jury that he had been a less than perfect husband but that he loved his wife, and he denied killing her, denied being there when she was killed and denied knowing who had. He gave a detailed account of his night at the hotel and said he had discussed his alibi with no one but his lawyers until that day. The jury never heard about the civil judgments.
It could not agree. The jurors stood eight to four for acquittal, and on June 27, 2011, the trial judge declared a mistrial.
The State tried him again at the January 17, 2012, session of the same court, before the same judge. This time Young did not testify. The State played the jury the video of his first-trial testimony and set out to test it, point by point, against the hotel records and the service station evidence.
The most important new evidence was the civil record. Over defense objection, the State called the Wake County Clerk of Superior Court, who explained what a wrongful death action and a slayer declaration are, read the complaint's allegation that Young had murdered his wife, and told the jury that he had never answered and that the court had entered default judgments declaring him the slayer and awarding the estate more than fifteen million dollars. The jury also heard about the custody complaint. The trial judge instructed the jurors that allegations are deemed admitted when no answer is filed, whether they are true or not, and that a civil judgment is not a determination by any court that a defendant has committed a crime.
On March 5, 2012, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. In a case in which the State has not sought death, that verdict carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole under North Carolina law, and the trial judge imposed it that day.
Young appealed. On April 1, 2014, a unanimous three-judge panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial. It held that the civil complaint, the default judgments and the custody complaint should not have been admitted, for two reasons: section 1-149 of the General Statutes bars a civil pleading from being used against its maker in a criminal case as proof of a fact alleged or admitted in it, and the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence. The civil record, the panel found, had been used to prove the very fact he was deemed to have admitted in the civil action, that he killed his wife, and the instructions had not explicitly forbidden the jury from treating it that way. The panel rejected his other arguments. The State asked the Supreme Court of North Carolina to review the decision, and that court agreed.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina heard argument on May 19, 2015, and on August 21, 2015, it reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case. No third trial followed. The ruling turned first on what the defense had and had not done at trial. Young's lawyers had objected to the civil evidence under Rule 403 but not under section 1-149, and the Court of Appeals had reached the statutory question anyway on the theory that the statute was a mandatory command a trial judge must obey on his own. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the statute does not make civil pleadings and judgments inadmissible in every criminal case; it bars their use to prove the facts alleged or admitted in them, and a trial court must decide whether the evidence is relevant for some other purpose. Because Young had not raised the statute at trial, he had waived it for appeal.
On the Rule 403 objection he had preserved, the court held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion. The evidence had real probative value for another purpose: his choice to let a large default judgment be entered against him, rather than defend himself and expose his account of November 2 and 3 to scrutiny, bore on the credibility of the alibi he later gave the first jury. The court acknowledged a significant risk of unfair prejudice, heightened because the judge presiding over the criminal trial had himself entered the civil slayer finding, but it noted that the trial judge had given careful instructions on his own initiative and that the defense had never asked for a limiting instruction. The court sent the case back to the Court of Appeals to decide the issues it had left open, including a motion for appropriate relief Young had filed there.
That motion argued that his trial lawyers had failed him by taking no steps before trial to keep out the civil evidence and by limiting the issues he could raise on appeal. Because the claim depended on facts outside the trial record, the Court of Appeals in 2016 ordered the Superior Court to hold an evidentiary hearing and report its findings, and held the appeal in abeyance. A different Superior Court judge heard the motion in Raleigh on June 15, 2017, and on August 29, 2017, denied it, finding that the errors of counsel were not sufficiently prejudicial to support the relief Young sought.
On November 20, 2018, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, found no error in the 2012 judgment and affirmed the 2017 order. It decided the two questions left over from the first appeal against him. It held that the prosecutor's disclosure to the jury that the trial judge himself had entered the civil slayer judgment, while improper, did not deprive Young of a fair trial, and that the State's circumstantial evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury. On the ineffective assistance claim, it upheld the finding that Young had not shown the prejudice the law requires. It also dismissed, without prejudice to raising the issues in the trial court, a further motion for appropriate relief he had filed in the Supreme Court.
As of that November 2018 opinion, Jason Young was serving life imprisonment without parole in the North Carolina prison system.
Young has never admitted the killing. He told the first jury that he spent the night at the Virginia hotel and had nothing to do with his wife's death. The conviction rests on circumstantial evidence: the state of the marriage, the hotel's records, his own first-trial account, the service station witness and his default in the civil cases. The defense maintained throughout that no physical evidence tied him to the crime, and the service station witness's identification was challenged at trial. The first jury voted eight to four to acquit on much of the same evidence, and the appeals courts divided on whether the civil evidence the second jury heard was fairly admitted, a question the Supreme Court of North Carolina resolved against him in 2015. That court did not decide whether it would itself have admitted the evidence; it held only that the trial judge's decision to do so was within his discretion.
November 2, 2006: He leaves Raleigh on a business trip and checks into a hotel in Hillsville, Virginia.
November 3, 2006: His wife is found dead in Raleigh.
October 2008: Her estate files a wrongful death and slayer action against him.
December 2008: The civil court declares him a slayer by default.
March 2009: A default judgment awards the estate more than fifteen million dollars.
December 14, 2009: Indicted by a Wake County grand jury and arrested in Brevard.
May 31, 2011: First trial opens in Wake County Superior Court; he testifies.
June 27, 2011: Mistrial after the jury deadlocks eight to four for acquittal.
January 17, 2012: Retrial session opens.
March 5, 2012: Convicted of first-degree murder; sentenced to life without parole.
April 1, 2014: The Court of Appeals vacates the conviction and orders a new trial.
August 21, 2015: The Supreme Court of North Carolina reverses and remands; the conviction stands.
2016: The Court of Appeals orders a hearing on his motion for appropriate relief.
August 29, 2017: Superior Court denies the motion after a June 15 hearing.
November 20, 2018: The Court of Appeals finds no error and affirms.