Iwane Matsui was a retired Japanese general recalled to command in the summer of 1937, and the army he led captured the Chinese capital, Nanjing, on December 13 of that year. Eleven years later the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, sitting in Tokyo, found that he had known what his troops were doing in the city and had done nothing effective to stop it. The tribunal acquitted him of conspiracy and of waging aggressive war, the charges at the center of the trial, and held him guilty on one count alone: Count 55, which charged a deliberate and reckless disregard of the legal duty to prevent breaches of the laws of war. On November 12, 1948, the tribunal sentenced him to death. He was executed in Tokyo on December 23, 1948.
He was the only one of the seven men condemned at Tokyo who was not convicted of any crime against peace. The tribunal did not find that he ordered the crimes of his army. It found that he knew of them and failed in his duty to stop them.
Matsui was born in 1878 in Aichi Prefecture, in central Japan, and served in the Imperial Japanese Army for most of his adult life. He fought in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905. In the years that followed he commanded the 29th Regiment, headed the army's special services agency at Harbin in Manchuria, commanded the 35th Brigade, ran the Second Bureau of the General Staff and commanded the 11th Division.
The tribunal summed up that career in its opening line on him: he "was a senior Officer in the Japanese Army and attained the rank of General in 1933." It added that he had wide experience, including service with the Kwantung Army, Japan's garrison force in Manchuria, and on the General Staff. In 1935 he was placed on the retired list.
The judges also considered his place in the circle of officers and politicians whom the prosecution accused of conspiring, from 1928 onward, to secure Japanese domination of East Asia. His close association with men the tribunal found to be conspirators, it said, suggested that he knew their aims. But it would go no further than that. The evidence before it did not justify a finding that he was a conspirator himself.
Fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces spread to Shanghai in August 1937. Matsui, by then two years into retirement, was recalled to active duty and given command of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, a command he took up from August 13, 1937. He was later made Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army, a larger command that took in both the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the Tenth Army.
The tribunal traced his intentions back to Tokyo. Before he left for China, he asked for five divisions for the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, and he had already studied the country around Shanghai and Nanjing. He was thinking, the judgment said, of pushing on to Nanjing once Shanghai had been taken. On October 8, 1937, he issued a public statement as commander that set out the army's mission as protecting Japanese residents and interests in China and punishing the Nanjing government.
After the fighting around Shanghai, the forces under his command moved on Nanjing, then the seat of the Chinese government. In an order issued as the advance went on, he treated the city's capture as an international event, because Nanjing was the capital of China. The city was captured on December 13, 1937. Matsui remained in a rear area during the first days of the occupation. On December 17 he made a ceremonial entry into the city, and on December 18 he held a religious service for the dead and issued a public statement. He stayed in Nanjing for between five and seven days.
The tribunal set its own figure on what happened in the city and its surroundings in that period. Later estimates, it found, indicated that the total of civilians and prisoners of war murdered in Nanjing and its vicinity during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation was "over 200,000." The crimes, the judgment found, went on for at least six weeks after the city was taken, and for at least four weeks after Matsui and his staff had entered it.
The question for the tribunal was not whether those crimes had been committed. It found that they had. The question was what Matsui knew of them and what he did.
On knowledge, the judges were in no doubt. They found that he knew what was happening in the city, and they pointed to several channels. He saw some of it for himself during his days in Nanjing. He received reports from his own staff. Information reached him from the Kempeitai, the army's military police, and from consular officials. Daily reports of misconduct went to the Japanese diplomatic representatives in the city, who passed them on to Tokyo. Matsui himself admitted that he had been told of some misconduct by his troops, and he admitted hearing of the protests made by foreign residents.
On what he did, the record was thin. Before the city fell, he had issued orders requiring proper conduct from his troops, and he issued further orders in the same vein afterward. The tribunal found that these orders had no effect, "as he must have known." It found that he did nothing, or nothing effective, to curb the conduct of the men under his command.
The Japanese government recalled Matsui from China, together with about 80 of his officers, and he returned to Japan on March 5, 1938. His successor in command, another officer who would later stand beside him in the dock at Tokyo, was appointed on February 14, 1938.
Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender on September 2, 1945, and the Allied occupation followed. On November 17, 1945, the Japanese government was ordered to arrest eleven major suspects and deliver them to custody in Tokyo, to be held for trial by an international tribunal. Matsui was one of the eleven.
Prosecution interrogators questioned him on March 8, 1946, before the trial opened, and the transcript of that interrogation was later received by the tribunal as a court exhibit. China had its own claim on him: the Chinese government named him on its second list of major war criminals. When the Supreme Commander reported to Washington on July 31, 1946, on the status of the men on the Chinese lists, Matsui was in custody in Tokyo and on trial before the tribunal.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established by a special proclamation of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on January 19, 1946, with members nominated by the Allied powers.
The indictment was lodged with the tribunal on April 29, 1946. It charged 28 accused on 55 counts, arranged in three groups: crimes against peace, in Counts 1 to 36; murder and conspiracy to murder, in Counts 37 to 52; and conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity, in Counts 53 to 55.
Matsui was named across all three groups. Count 1 charged all the defendants with a conspiracy, between January 1, 1928, and September 2, 1945, to secure Japanese domination of East Asia and the Pacific through wars of aggression. Count 27 charged the waging of aggressive war against the Republic of China from September 18, 1931. Counts 29, 31 and 32 charged aggressive war against the United States, the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands from December 7, 1941. Counts 35 and 36 charged aggressive war against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1938 and against the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939.
Count 45 named twelve defendants, Matsui among them, in a charge of murder at Nanjing from December 12, 1937, and succeeding days.
The last two counts were the ones that would decide his case. Count 54 charged that the defendants named in it "ordered, authorized and permitted" the commission of breaches of the laws and customs of war. Count 55 charged that the defendants, "being by virtue of their respective offices responsible for securing the observance" of the conventions, assurances and laws and customs of war in respect of prisoners of war and civilians in Japan's power, "deliberately and recklessly disregarded their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches thereof, and thereby violated the laws of war."
As drafted, Counts 54 and 55 named nineteen defendants for the period from December 7, 1941. Matsui was not among them. He was added through a separate paragraph in each count dealing with the Republic of China, where the offenses were charged as beginning on September 18, 1931, and seven further defendants, Matsui one of them, were named as responsible.
Every accused, Matsui included, pleaded not guilty on May 6, 1946. The prosecution opened its case on June 3, 1946, and the reception of evidence ended on February 10, 1948, followed by summations that included individual summations against and for him.
Matsui's defense turned on two points the judgment set out and answered. The first was his own conduct as commander: he had issued orders requiring his troops to behave properly, before the city fell and again afterward. The second was illness. He pleaded that he had been sick during the period in question.
He gave his own account in an affidavit dated October 14, 1947, received in evidence. Not everything his defense offered was admitted: a copy of his October 8, 1937, statement as commander at Shanghai, tendered as a defense document, was rejected.
Count 55 was a charge of omission, and the tribunal set out in its chapter on the law what such a charge required. Responsibility for prisoners of war and civilian internees rested, in the first place, with the government that held them. But the duty also fell on individuals, among them "Military or Naval Officers in command of formations having prisoners in their possession." Army and navy commanders, the tribunal said, could by order secure proper treatment and prevent ill-treatment.
Such men were not to be held responsible if a proper system was in place and working. They were responsible if they had knowledge that crimes were being committed and failed to act, or if they were at fault in failing to acquire that knowledge. A person who "had, or should, but for negligence or supineness, have had such knowledge" was not excused by his inaction. A commander who learned of crimes and took no adequate steps to prevent them in the future would be responsible for the crimes that followed.
The tribunal also narrowed the counts before it reached the individual verdicts. It declined to rule on the murder counts. On Counts 39 to 52 it held that no good purpose would be served by dealing with those offenses as counts for murder, since they depended on the unlawfulness of the wars, which was already before the court under the counts of waging war; it described Counts 45 to 50 as obscurely stated and found it unnecessary to decide them. Count 45, the Nanjing count, therefore produced no verdict. The tribunal confined itself, for every accused, to Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55.
The judgment was read in open court from November 4 to November 12, 1948. Its Chapter X gave the verdict on each accused, with the reasons the Charter required.
On the war counts, Matsui was acquitted. His service in China in 1937 and 1938 could not, in itself, be regarded as the waging of an aggressive war. To convict him under Count 27, the prosecution had been obliged to tender evidence justifying the inference that he knew of the criminal character of that war, and it had not done so. The conspiracy charge failed for want of proof that he was a conspirator.
On Count 55, the judges held against him. They found that he knew what was happening in Nanjing, that his orders had no effect and that he must have known it. They rejected the plea of illness: his illness was not sufficient to prevent him from conducting the military operations of his command or from visiting the city for days while the crimes were going on. He had "the power as he had the duty to control his troops" and to protect the inhabitants of the city. "He must be held criminally responsible for his failure to discharge this duty."
The verdict closed in a single sentence: "The Tribunal holds the accused MATSUI guilty under Count 55 and not guilty under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36 and 54."
The sentences were read on November 12, 1948, the last day of the judgment, and were not made part of the judgment itself. Seven of the accused were sentenced to death, Matsui among them; sixteen were sentenced to life imprisonment, one to twenty years and one to seven years.
Matsui stood apart from the other six men sentenced to death. Each of them had been convicted of crimes against peace as well as war crimes. He had been acquitted of every charge of conspiracy and aggressive war, and the sentence rested on Count 55 alone.
The judgment was a majority judgment, and five members filed opinions of their own.
The member from India dissented in full. He rejected the legal basis of the trial, described the Charter as ex post facto law, disputed the facts and concluded that each of the accused should have been found not guilty and acquitted. That conclusion covered Matsui as it covered every other defendant.
The member from the Netherlands filed a partial dissent. He argued that life imprisonment was the right punishment for crimes against peace and death the right punishment for conventional war crimes. On that reasoning he joined in the death sentence on Matsui, whose conviction was for conventional war crimes. His opinion ran to separate parts on responsibility for omission, the ground on which Matsui was convicted, and on the verdicts in individual cases.
The president of the tribunal, the member from Australia, recorded no dissent but suggested that life imprisonment might have been preferable to death for those sentenced to death. The member from France criticized the procedure by which a drafting committee of seven judges had prepared the findings of fact, objected to the joint trial of all the accused, and entered no specific dissent. The member from the Philippines disagreed with some of the majority's legal conclusions and thought that a few of the penalties were too lenient.
The Charter gave the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the power to review the sentences. On November 24, 1948, he announced that he could find nothing in the conduct of the trial to justify intervening in the judgments, and he directed the Commanding General of the Eighth Army "to execute the sentences as pronounced by the tribunal." The Allied Council for Japan met under his chairmanship and upheld the verdicts the same day.
Matsui was executed in Tokyo on December 23, 1948, with the six other men sentenced to death by the tribunal.
Matsui's personal guilt was decided on one count only, and the verdict itself drew the line between what was proved and what was not. The tribunal did not find that he ordered or authorized the crimes at Nanjing: it acquitted him under Count 54, the count that charged ordering, authorizing and permitting. It found instead that he knew of the crimes and failed to discharge his duty to stop them.
The charge of murder at Nanjing in Count 45 was never decided. The tribunal declined to rule on the murder counts and gave no verdict on it for Matsui or any other defendant.
The judges were not unanimous. The member from India would have acquitted him on every count. The member from the Netherlands, who would have acquitted five other men, agreed with both his conviction and his sentence.
1878: Born in Aichi Prefecture, Japan.
1904 to 1905: Serves in the Russo-Japanese War.
1933: Attains the rank of General.
1935: Placed on the retired list.
August 13, 1937: Takes command of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force after recall to active duty.
October 8, 1937: Issues a public statement as commander at Shanghai.
1937: Made Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army.
December 13, 1937: Nanjing captured by forces under his command.
December 17, 1937: Makes a ceremonial entry into Nanjing.
December 18, 1937: Holds a religious service for the dead and issues a statement.
February 14, 1938: His successor is appointed to the command.
March 5, 1938: Returns to Japan after his recall.
September 2, 1945: Japan surrenders.
November 17, 1945: Japanese government ordered to arrest him and ten other suspects for trial by an international tribunal.
January 19, 1946: International Military Tribunal for the Far East established in Tokyo.
March 8, 1946: Interrogated before trial.
April 29, 1946: Indictment lodged; named in Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 45, 54 and 55.
May 6, 1946: Pleads not guilty.
June 3, 1946: Prosecution opens its case.
July 31, 1946: Reported in custody in Tokyo and on trial, as a man on the Chinese government's second list of major war criminals.
October 14, 1947: Date of the affidavit giving his account to the tribunal.
February 10, 1948: Reception of evidence ends.
February 11 to April 16, 1948: Summations, including individual summations for and against him.
November 4 to 12, 1948: Judgment read; guilty under Count 55, not guilty under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36 and 54.
November 12, 1948: Sentenced to death.
November 24, 1948: The Supreme Commander directs that the sentences be carried out as pronounced.
December 23, 1948: Executed in Tokyo.