On June 25, 1906, in Manhattan, Harry Kendall Thaw killed Stanford White. There was never any question about who had done it. He was arrested that day, arraigned the next morning, and held for trial on a charge of murder. The question that occupied the courts of New York for the better part of a decade was a different one: whether Thaw had been sane when he did it, and whether he was sane afterward.
Two juries heard the case. The first, in the spring of 1907, could not agree and was discharged. The second, in February 1908, returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Thaw never served a day of any sentence, because there was none. He was committed instead to the Matteawan State Hospital for the Criminally Insane, and from there he launched a campaign of habeas corpus petitions, appeals, an escape across the Canadian border, an extradition fight that reached the Supreme Court of the United States, and finally a jury trial on his own sanity that he won in 1915. A later criminal charge in New York led to a second commitment, this time in Pennsylvania, from which he was released in 1924. He died in Miami Beach in February 1947.
Thaw was born in Pittsburgh at the start of the 1870s. He was thirty-five in the summer of 1906. His wife, an actress, became one of the central witnesses at both of his trials.
After his arraignment he was held in the city jail in Manhattan while the case went before a New York County grand jury, which indicted him for murder. The district attorney of New York County took charge of the prosecution personally, with an assistant at his side. For the defense, a team of six lawyers was retained, led by a well-known trial advocate from California.
The first trial opened on January 23, 1907, in the Criminal Court building in lower Manhattan.
The People's case was short, because the act itself was not in question; the prosecution called the coroner and a small number of other witnesses and rested.
The defense did not dispute the act. It argued that Thaw had been insane at the moment of the killing, and it built that argument around the testimony of his wife. She told the jury about her earlier acquaintance with the dead man and about what she had told Thaw of it before their marriage. The defense presented his reaction to that account as the origin of his mental state.
The prosecution answered with an attempt to impeach her. In rebuttal, the district attorney offered a photographic copy of an affidavit that she had supposedly signed some years earlier, which gave a very different account of her life with Thaw. On cross-examination she denied giving the information it contained. The prosecution then called the lawyer who had drafted the affidavit, along with his stenographer, to testify about how it had been made. The presiding justice excluded that testimony, ruling that it was extrinsic evidence offered to impeach a witness on a collateral matter.
The case went to the jury in April. After about forty-seven hours of deliberation the jurors were still divided, and on April 12, 1907, they were discharged without a verdict. The split was seven for a conviction of murder in the first degree and five for acquittal on the ground of insanity. A hung jury is not an acquittal, and the indictment stood. The district attorney moved to try the case again.
The second trial began in January 1908, almost a year after the first. The same prosecutors appeared for the People. The defense had a new lead counsel, a former assistant district attorney in Brooklyn.
He changed the theory of the case. Instead of the novel and loosely defined mental condition that the first defense team had put forward, the new defense offered a conventional plea of insanity and supported it with testimony about Thaw's behavior from childhood into adult life.
The change shifted the weight of the trial onto the People. The law presumed Thaw sane, but once the defense had put in evidence that he was not, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had been sane when he acted.
The trial lasted less than a month. The jury deliberated for about twelve hours and, on February 1, 1908, returned its verdict: not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial justice acted at once. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant acquitted on that ground could be held if his release was considered dangerous, and the justice ordered Thaw committed to the Matteawan State Hospital for the Criminally Insane at Beacon, in the Hudson Valley. The order recited that he had been acquitted on the ground of insanity and that his discharge was deemed dangerous to public safety.
The verdict ended the murder prosecution for good. The case of Harry Thaw was only beginning.
Thaw's lawyers went first at the commitment order itself. They appealed it as a violation of due process, arguing that a man acquitted of a crime could not be confined without a separate hearing on whether he was insane. Fourteen months after the verdict, the Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected that argument in People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler. Its reasoning turned on the defense's own strategy: if the defendant had pleaded insanity and the plea had prevailed, it followed that his insanity had been litigated at the trial. The Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, affirmed in 1909. The decision also upheld the constitutionality of Section 454 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which the committed defendant, not the state, carried the burden of proving that he was no longer insane.
At the same time, the writs of habeas corpus began. The first was filed within days of the commitment. When it was denied, an appeal was taken, and before that appeal was decided a second writ was filed. Each one asked for a fresh hearing on whether Thaw was sane at that moment, and several asked for a jury and challenged the commitment statute on constitutional grounds. The pattern repeated for years.
At the hearings, the alienists Thaw retained testified that he was sane, and the alienists employed by Matteawan testified that he was not. In almost every instance the judge sided with the hospital. The defense took the losses up to the Appellate Division, to the Court of Appeals and, at times, to the U.S. Supreme Court on writs of error.
One appeal to the Court of Appeals succeeded, and the case was sent back for a new hearing. At its close in 1909, the court found that the insanity from which Thaw suffered on June 25, 1906, "at the time he committed the homicide, was of the kind known as chronic, delusive insanity or paranoia." He was once again held to be legally insane and returned to Matteawan.
The proceedings did not stop there. Over the next four years Thaw's lawyers filed one writ after another, and each was refused.
Six years and six writs after the commitment, Thaw left the hospital without permission. In 1913 he was arrested in Coaticook, Quebec, and held as a fugitive from justice.
New York had a problem. The state issued a warrant charging him with conspiracy to escape, but that was not an offense for which Canada would extradite. The New York County district attorney who had prosecuted both murder trials had himself appointed a deputy attorney general of New York State for the single purpose of bringing Thaw back. The defense, meanwhile, asked if Thaw was insane, as the state had insisted for five years, how could he form the criminal intent that a conspiracy required?
Thaw's Canadian lawyers filed a writ of habeas corpus for his release. As long as it was pending, the immigration authorities, who were ready to deport him the moment he was freed, could not act. When the lawyers saw that the writ might succeed, they applied to discontinue it with the right to renew it later, keeping him in a Quebec jail and out of the immigration officers' reach. The Canadian court refused to allow the New York prosecutor to appear in the case.
The New York prosecutor and the Crown prosecutor then went to Quebec City together. They asked the provincial attorney general to quash, summarily, the commitment of Thaw as a fugitive from justice, so that nothing would stand between him and deportation proceedings. The local chief of police submitted a writ to the court asking for the prisoner's release.
The provincial attorney general of Quebec pressed for an end to the stalemate and asked the court to decide the pending writ. The court discharged Thaw from the fugitive commitment, which opened the way to deportation. His lawyers carried the matter to a Canadian Board of Inquiry, where Thaw testified the day after his discharge. The board denied his request. His lawyers appealed the board's decision to the federal government in Ottawa, where the Minister of Justice was also acting as Minister of the Interior, and, in Montreal, obtained a further writ of habeas corpus and prohibition.
Neither step held. In September 1913 the minister ordered Thaw deported. The government announced that his appeal had been rejected, that the board's findings were upheld and that he was to be deported at once, and it took the position that the writ issued in Montreal did not bar the immigration authorities from acting. Officers took him from the immigration detention quarters at Coaticook and put him across the border into the United States. Thaw's lawyers let it be known that, if a state court or governor granted New York's demand for his extradition, they would carry the fight to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Thaw came into custody next in New Hampshire, in Coos County. A grand jury in Manhattan indicted him, and New York sent a formal demand for his return. The indictment charged that while he was committed to Matteawan under the court's order, he had conspired with others to procure his escape and had escaped, to the obstruction of justice and of the due administration of the laws. Under Sections 580 and 583 of the New York Penal Law, an agreement to commit any act for the perversion or obstruction of justice was a misdemeanor if an overt act was done to carry it out.
His lawyers had moved even before New Hampshire's governor acted. They filed a writ in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire to stop the extradition, and the federal court declined to rule on it until the governor had decided New York's request. The governor signed the extradition warrant, and Thaw was arrested under it. His lawyers then pressed their petition for habeas corpus in the district court, together with a request for bail. The federal judge withheld a ruling on bail until he had a report from the New Hampshire Lunacy Commission, and he took the view that a demand to extradite a man who might lack the mental capacity to commit any crime raised a question for the Supreme Court. The district court then entered a final order discharging Thaw. The sheriff of Coos County, who held him under the governor's warrant, appealed.
The district attorney who had prosecuted both murder trials appeared in Washington among counsel for the sheriff. Thaw's side argued that New York could not have it both ways. The state had kept him in Matteawan as dangerously insane; it could not now treat him as sane enough to form the intent for a conspiracy. An indictment that showed on its face that the accused was an adjudged lunatic, they said, failed to charge a crime within the meaning of the Constitution.
His counsel pressed the point from several directions. An inmate who was able to walk out of an asylum, they argued, committed no crime by doing so, and a conspiracy to do the same thing could be no worse. If Thaw had been insane when he left, he could not be guilty of anything; if he had been sane, he was entitled to his discharge. They also attacked the technical sufficiency of the indictment and suggested that the commitment proceedings of 1908 had been flawed.
The Supreme Court heard argument on December 11, 1914, and decided Drew v. Thaw on December 21, 1914. The Court reversed the discharge. The Court's opinion held that a state could make it a crime to conspire to do something that an individual was free to do, and that the withdrawal, by connivance, of a man from an asylum to which he had been committed as Thaw had been plainly tended to obstruct the administration of the law. Thaw had been a party to that alleged crime in New York and had then left the state, which made him a fugitive from justice whatever his motive.
The Court disposed of the remaining objections briefly. The technical sufficiency of the indictment, it held, was not open to review on habeas corpus, and it said it was far from suggesting any defect in the proceedings that had committed Thaw to Matteawan. Everything the Constitution required for surrender was present: the identity of the man, his flight from the demanding state, a proper demand, an indictment by a grand jury, and a reasonable possibility that a crime had been committed.
The Court treated the insanity question as one for New York. Its opinion quoted the New York statute on criminal responsibility, under which an act done by a person of unsound mind was not a crime only if he was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act or not to know that it was wrong. Whether Thaw met that test at the moment of the conspiracy, the Court said, was for the New York courts and a New York jury. The Constitution required surrender on a proper demand and allowed no inquiry into motives, and habeas corpus could not be used to substitute another tribunal's judgment for the trial the Constitution provided. The Court regarded it "as too clear for lengthy discussion that Thaw should be delivered up at once."
By the middle of January 1915 Thaw was back in Manhattan, charged with conspiracy to escape from Matteawan. He argued that he was sane, that he had therefore been held at Matteawan illegally, and that he had every right to leave.
The judge instructed the jury that Thaw's sanity was not an issue in the case. The jury acquitted him anyway, in March 1915, and the judge ordered him returned to Matteawan.
Another writ followed at once, and this time the Court of Appeals granted Thaw what he had sought since 1908: a hearing on whether he was sane. On June 22, 1915, a jury in the Supreme Court in Manhattan began hearing the evidence. When the case went to them, the jurors took fifty minutes to find that he was sane. Thaw left the court free for the first time since the summer of 1906.
In 1917 a New York grand jury indicted Thaw on charges unconnected with the 1906 killing; he was committed by a court in Pennsylvania that year, found sane by a Pennsylvania jury in 1924, and the New York charges were dismissed on the district attorney's recommendation in December 1924, without trial.
Thaw was free for the rest of his life. Two years after his release he published a memoir, The Traitor. He died in Miami Beach, Florida, in February 1947, at the age of seventy-six.
Thaw was never convicted of the killing. The first jury divided seven to five and was discharged; the second acquitted him on the ground of insanity. In law he was found not responsible, and that verdict was never disturbed.
The courts reached opposite conclusions about his sanity at different times. A court in 1909 found that he had suffered from chronic, delusive insanity or paranoia when he killed; a jury in 1915 found him sane. Neither finding was a verdict of guilt.
The conspiracy indictment of 1913 ended in an acquittal in 1915.
1870s: Born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
June 25, 1906: Kills the victim in Manhattan; arrested and arraigned the next morning.
January 23, 1907: First trial for murder opens in Manhattan.
April 12, 1907: Jury, divided seven to five, is discharged without a verdict.
January 1908: Second trial opens.
February 1, 1908: Jury returns "not guilty by reason of insanity"; committed to Matteawan State Hospital.
1909: Appellate Division and Court of Appeals uphold the commitment in People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler; a later hearing finds "chronic, delusive insanity or paranoia."
1913: Leaves Matteawan; arrested in Coaticook, Quebec; Board of Inquiry rules against him; deported to the United States in September.
1913 to 1914: Held in Coos County, New Hampshire; indicted in Manhattan for conspiracy; federal district court discharges him on habeas corpus.
December 21, 1914: U.S. Supreme Court reverses in Drew v. Thaw and orders him delivered to New York.
March 1915: Acquitted of conspiracy in Manhattan; returned to Matteawan.
June 22, 1915: Sanity hearing before a jury opens; the jury finds him sane and he is released.
1917 to 1924: Indicted on unrelated charges in New York; committed in Pennsylvania; found sane by a Pennsylvania jury in 1924; the New York charges dismissed in December 1924.
February 1947: Dies in Miami Beach, Florida.