David Koresh never stood trial, and no court ever found him guilty of anything. He was the leader of the Branch Davidians, a religious community that lived on a property called Mount Carmel, about ten miles outside Waco, Texas, and on the morning of February 28, 1993, he was the man named in a federal arrest warrant. Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms came to Mount Carmel that morning to serve it, together with a warrant to examine the property. Within two hours four of them were dead, along with six members of the community, and a standoff began that lasted fifty-one days. It ended on April 19, 1993. Koresh died that day in McLennan County, one of 76 members of the community who died there on April 19.
The four agents were Conway LeBleu, Todd McKeehan, Robert Williams and Steven Willis. No jury was ever asked whether Koresh was responsible for their deaths. A federal jury in San Antonio did consider the case against eleven of his followers in 1994 and acquitted every one of them of murder and of conspiracy to murder federal officers; five were convicted of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. The attribution to Koresh comes from the government's own reviews. In August 1996 two committees of the U.S. House of Representatives concluded that "the ultimate responsibility for the deaths of the Davidians and the four Federal law enforcement agents lies with Koresh." In July 2000 the special counsel appointed by the Attorney General wrote that "the tragedy at Waco rests with certain Branch Davidians and their leader David Koresh." The same reviews were sharply critical of the federal agencies, and the case remains one in which the official findings, the jury's verdicts and the survivors' accounts do not fully agree.
He was born Vernon Wayne Howell in Houston in 1959. By his own later account his childhood was lonely. He did poorly in school and left high school without finishing. What he had instead was music and scripture. By the age of twelve he had committed long passages of the Bible to memory, and as a young man he went to Hollywood hoping to make a career as a rock musician. It did not work out.
At twenty he turned to the Seventh-day Adventist Church and was expelled from the congregation, which considered him a bad influence on its young people. In 1981 he went to Waco and joined the Branch Davidians, an offshoot of the Adventist tradition. The Davidian movement had been settled in the Waco area since 1935, and at its height it had counted more than 1,400 members. When Howell arrived, its leader was Lois Roden, a woman in her late sixties whom the community regarded as a prophetess. He became close to her, and the two traveled together to Israel.
After Lois Roden's death the community divided. A struggle for the leadership began between Howell and her son, and Howell, who by then had a following of his own, left Mount Carmel for a time with his supporters and settled in East Texas. In late 1987 he returned to the property with seven men, and the confrontation that followed with his rival led to criminal charges. Howell and the seven men were tried for attempted murder in 1988. The jury acquitted all seven of his companions. On Howell himself it could not agree, and the judge declared a mistrial. By the end of the decade he led the community at Mount Carmel, and he led it for the rest of his life.
In 1990 Howell legally changed his name to David Koresh. On the court paper he gave his reason as "for publicity and business purposes." To his followers the name carried a different meaning. He said it reflected his belief that he was the head of the biblical House of David, and Koresh is the Hebrew form of Cyrus, the Persian king who allowed the Jewish exiles in Babylon to return to Israel. He called himself the final prophet, though he did not directly claim to be Jesus, and his followers came to regard him as the Lamb of God. A witness later told congressional investigators that his followers "would protect him to the death."
His teaching centered on the end of the world. He led daily Bible studies and told his followers that they would be taken up into heaven after an apocalyptic confrontation with outsiders, whom he called "the beast" and "the enemies." Under his leadership, the government later told the courts, the community prepared for that confrontation. By early 1993 he was living at Mount Carmel with a community of men, women and children, and he still left the property regularly. Witnesses told Congress that he went out at least once a week through January and February 1993, and on January 29 he left the property on business.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms opened a formal investigation of Koresh on June 9, 1992, after a package delivered to the property drew the attention of the authorities. Within a week the bureau had classified the case as "sensitive" and "significant." Agents began watching the property, and an undercover agent came to know Koresh and joined him for Bible study. The case rested on the federal arms laws. The affidavit that supported the warrants alleged a violation of a single statute, 26 U.S.C. Section 5845(f); the related offenses are set out in Section 5861. The House committees later concluded that the bureau had probable cause for both warrants, while also finding that the affidavit "contained an incredible number of false statements."
The decision to serve the warrants with a large, planned entry was made, the House committees found, more than two months before the undercover work and surveillance began, and the committees noted how often Koresh had left the property in the weeks before. The operation was first set for March 1. It was moved to Sunday, February 28, partly because a local newspaper had begun publishing a series about Koresh the day before. More than seventy agents took part.
By then the element of surprise was already gone. A television cameraman who had lost his way to the property on the morning of February 28 warned a member of the community that a raid was coming. At about 8 o'clock that morning the undercover agent was inside, at a Bible study with Koresh. In the agent's account, Koresh took a telephone call, went out, and came back shaking. He said that neither the ATF nor the National Guard would ever get him, and then: "They're coming, Robert. The time had come." The agent left the property between 9:15 and 9:20. The House committees later found that the raid commanders "either knew or should have known that the Davidians had become aware of the impending raid," and that they went ahead regardless.
The confrontation began as the agents arrived and lasted close to two hours, until a truce was announced late that morning.
Four agents of the bureau died, and sixteen others were wounded. Five members of the community died that morning, and a sixth died later the same day.
Who began the exchange became one of the central disputes of the case. The government's position, set out in its briefs, was that the deaths of the four agents were caused from inside the building. The House committees concluded in 1996 that the Davidians had opened the exchange as the agents began to enter, while adding that the question "cannot decisively be resolved." Survivors have maintained that the agents began it. No court and no official review found that Koresh personally caused any of the four deaths; the findings against him were findings of responsibility as the community's leader.
Within hours of the truce, the Federal Bureau of Investigation took over as the lead agency, and for the next fifty-one days its negotiators talked with Koresh and his deputies by telephone. Children began to leave in the first days. Ten were sent out on March 1, and nineteen in all left during the early part of the standoff. On March 2 Koresh promised to come out once a recorded sermon of his had been broadcast. The sermon was aired, but afterward he said that God had told him to wait. On March 3 the FBI dropped murder charges against two elderly women who had left the building.
Koresh spent hours on the line with negotiators; on March 4 alone the talks ran eleven hours, nearly eight of them with him. He sent letters out of the building during the standoff, and when pressed to bring his people out he answered that his God said wait. Some adults did leave. On March 19, after legal papers and letters from his lawyers were delivered, Koresh said he was ready to "face the music," and two men, Brad Branch and Kevin Whitecliff, walked out. More left over the following days, and on March 23 Livingstone Fagan became the last person to come out before the end. In all, Koresh allowed eleven followers to leave, and each was arrested and held as a material witness. On March 28 he told negotiators that he had no intention of dying and was waiting for word from God. On March 29 and 30 his defense lawyer met him at the door of the building, over the objections of federal prosecutors and the Texas Rangers, and later told the FBI commander that he was frustrated in his efforts to negotiate a surrender.
In April he was writing. On April 16 he told negotiators that he had completed a manuscript on the First Seal. The Attorney General approved an FBI plan to bring the standoff to an end, and it was carried out on April 19. Nine people left the building that day. Seventy-six members of the community, children among them, died, and David Koresh was one of them.
Four months after the standoff ended, a federal grand jury in the Western District of Texas returned a superseding indictment against twelve surviving Branch Davidians. Count 1 charged a conspiracy to murder federal officers, under 18 U.S.C. Section 1117. Count 2 charged the murder of federal officers, under Sections 1111 and 1114. Count 3 charged an offense under Section 924(c)(1), the federal statute that adds a mandatory prison term when an offender uses or carries certain items during a crime of violence; ten defendants faced it. Further counts were narrower. Graeme Craddock was charged under 26 U.S.C. Section 5861(d) and with conspiring to violate it, and Paul Fatta, who had bought supplies and equipment for the community over two years and was away on February 28, was charged under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(o) and with conspiring to violate it. Fatta had been a fugitive for a time before he surrendered to the Texas Rangers.
The government's theory placed Koresh at the center. In its later filings it described his teaching about a final confrontation, the stockpiling of arms under his leadership and his warning to his followers on the morning of the raid. The evidence it presented against the individual defendants dealt with what each man had done that morning and during the standoff, including testimony from other residents about what some of them had said afterward.
The trial was held in San Antonio and lasted five weeks. The defense argued that the Davidians had a right to defend themselves against the agents who came onto the property. The government's case was that the agents had been killed unlawfully. On Saturday, February 26, 1994, almost a year to the day after the raid, the jury returned its verdicts.
It acquitted all eleven defendants of murder and of conspiracy to murder federal officers. Five men, Renos Avraam, Brad Branch, Jaime Castillo, Livingstone Fagan and Kevin Whitecliff, were convicted of voluntary manslaughter, the lesser offense included in Count 2, and of the Section 924(c)(1) count. Graeme Craddock was convicted on Count 3 and on the destructive-device count, and Paul Fatta on the two counts under Section 922(o). Four defendants were acquitted of every count against them. The manslaughter offense carried a maximum of ten years.
The verdicts were difficult to reconcile, and the trial judge at first said that the Section 924(c)(1) convictions would be set aside because they conflicted with the acquittals on the conspiracy count. Two days later he reversed himself. At sentencing on June 16 and 17, 1994, he made his own findings about the kind of items the defendants had actually or constructively possessed, and found that the property had been "not only a figurative but a literal fortress." Those findings triggered the statute's 30-year mandatory term. Avraam, Branch, Castillo and Whitecliff each received 40 years, made up of 30 years on Count 3 and 10 years for manslaughter, followed by five years of supervised release. Fagan also received 40 years. Craddock received 20 years, and Fatta 15 years with three years of supervised release. The court fined the defendants and ordered restitution of $637,607.49 to the ATF and $494,080 to the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided the appeals on August 2, 1996, and denied rehearing on September 25. It affirmed the convictions on every count. It rejected the argument that the Section 924(c)(1) convictions could not stand once the jury had acquitted on the conspiracy, holding that only the fact of the predicate offense was needed. It rejected the claim that the jury should have been instructed on self-defense on the manslaughter count. It also held that the question of what kind of item had been used was a sentencing factor for the judge, not an element for the jury. But it vacated the sentences on Count 3 and sent the case back, because under the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States the district court had to make new findings on "active employment" of the items. The government opposed further review in the Supreme Court in March 1997, noting that it remained to be seen how the men would be resentenced.
On remand the district court imposed the 30-year terms again, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. This time the Supreme Court took the case. On June 5, 2000, in Castillo v. United States, a unanimous Court reversed. It held that the words in Section 924(c)(1) that fixed the type of item, and with it the 30-year term, created a separate substantive crime, an element of an aggravated offense that the jury had to find, and not a sentencing factor for the judge. The jury in San Antonio had never been asked that question. The case went back to the district court for new sentencing hearings.
In September 2000 the trial judge reduced the sentences. Livingstone Fagan, who had not appealed, had his term cut from 40 years to 15; the judge wrote that it would be "manifestly unfair not to reduce his sentence also." Avraam, Branch, Castillo, Whitecliff and Craddock also had their sentences reduced. All of the men convicted after the raid had been released by 2007.
In September 1993 the Treasury Department, which then oversaw the ATF, published its report on the bureau's investigation of Koresh. The Justice Department issued its own report on the events from February 28 to April 19. The House committees later summarized the two: the Treasury report criticized ATF personnel but cleared the department's senior officials, and the Justice report found no fault with the FBI or any department official. Later reviews faulted the bureau for failing to call off the raid after Koresh learned of the plans.
In 1995 the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the House Judiciary Committee held ten days of public hearings and heard roughly one hundred witnesses. Their joint report, issued on August 2, 1996, began with the Branch Davidians: "But for the criminal conduct and aberrational behavior of David Koresh and other Branch Davidians, the tragedies that occurred in Waco would not have occurred," and "the ultimate responsibility for the deaths of the Davidians and the four Federal law enforcement agents lies with Koresh." The committees were equally direct about the government. They found that the ATF's investigation was "grossly incompetent," that its raid plan for February 28 "was significantly flawed," that senior Treasury officials "routinely failed in their duty to monitor the actions of ATF officials," and that the Justice Department's decision to end the standoff on April 19 was "premature, wrong, and highly irresponsible."
In 1999 the Attorney General appointed a former United States senator as special counsel to investigate the questions that remained about the last day of the standoff. His interim report, released on July 21, 2000, cleared federal agents of responsibility for the deaths that day, found no improper use of the military and no conspiracy or cover-up in the original Justice Department inquiry, and placed the responsibility on "certain Branch Davidians and their leader David Koresh." It also found that the four agents had been killed by members of the community. His final report followed in November 2000. In December 2000 the House Committee on Government Reform issued a further report, "The Tragedy at Waco: New Evidence Examined," which found no reason to revise the committees' 1996 conclusions about the last day and criticized the Attorney General for failing to ensure the "vigorous and thorough investigation" the President had ordered.
The four agents were federal officers, and that is why the case against the surviving Davidians went to a federal court. Count 2 charged their murder under Sections 1111 and 1114 of Title 18, the provisions that cover the killing of federal officers, and voluntary manslaughter was the lesser offense the jury in San Antonio was allowed to consider under that count. Count 1, under Section 1117, required proof of an agreement to murder. The jury rejected it for every defendant, and with it the government's picture of a plan that ran back to Koresh's teaching about a final confrontation.
Section 924(c)(1) drove the long sentences. It required a mandatory term on top of the sentence for the underlying crime, and the 30-year term the judge imposed turned on a finding about the type of item involved. The question in Castillo was who made that finding. The Court's answer, that it was an element of a separate crime for the jury, removed the 30-year terms and with them most of each man's sentence.
Koresh's own part in the deaths of February 28 was never tested in court. The findings that hold him responsible are findings of leadership responsibility in congressional and Justice Department reports, not verdicts. The jury that heard the evidence against his followers rejected the charge that they had conspired to murder the agents, and convicted five of them only of voluntary manslaughter.
Who began the exchange on February 28 remains contested. The government's briefs and the 1996 House report place the start inside the building; the House committees said the question could not be decisively resolved; survivors have consistently said the agents began it. The same 1996 report that placed the ultimate responsibility on Koresh found that the warrant affidavit contained many false statements and that the raid should not have gone forward once surprise was lost.
1959: Vernon Wayne Howell is born in Houston, Texas.
1981: He goes to Waco and joins the Branch Davidians at Mount Carmel.
Late 1987: After a struggle for the leadership, he returns to Mount Carmel with seven men.
1988: Tried for attempted murder; his seven companions are acquitted and a mistrial is declared in his case.
1990: He legally changes his name to David Koresh.
June 9, 1992: The ATF formally opens its investigation of him.
February 28, 1993: ATF agents serve warrants at Mount Carmel; four agents, Conway LeBleu, Todd McKeehan, Robert Williams and Steven Willis, and six Branch Davidians die. The FBI takes over the same day.
March 2, 1993: He promises to come out after a sermon is broadcast, then says God has told him to wait.
March 23, 1993: The last person to leave before the end of the standoff walks out.
April 16, 1993: He tells negotiators he has finished a manuscript on the First Seal.
April 19, 1993: The standoff ends; Koresh dies in McLennan County, Texas, one of 76 members of the community who die that day.
August 1993: A federal grand jury in the Western District of Texas indicts twelve surviving Branch Davidians.
September 1993: The Treasury Department publishes its report on the ATF investigation.
February 26, 1994: The jury in San Antonio acquits all eleven defendants of murder and conspiracy to murder; five are convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
June 16 and 17, 1994: Sentences of up to 40 years are imposed.
August 2, 1996: The Fifth Circuit affirms the convictions and orders resentencing on Count 3. The House committees issue their joint report the same day.
June 5, 2000: The Supreme Court decides Castillo v. United States and sets aside the 30-year terms.
July 21, 2000: The special counsel's interim report places responsibility on certain Branch Davidians and their leader.
September 2000: The trial judge reduces the sentences.
December 28, 2000: The House Committee on Government Reform issues "The Tragedy at Waco: New Evidence Examined."
By 2007: All of the men convicted after the raid have been released.