Christopher Pittman was twelve years old in November 2001, when his paternal grandparents, Joe Frank Pittman and Joy Pittman, died in rural Chester County, South Carolina. He had lived with them for only a matter of weeks. The next day the boy confessed to the Chester County Sheriff's Department, and the state set out to try him not as a child but as an adult. It took more than three years to bring him before a jury. In February 2005 that jury convicted him of both murders, and a circuit judge gave him the shortest sentence the law allowed: thirty years, with no possibility of parole.
From there the case climbed through every level of the courts. The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the convictions on June 11, 2007, over a dissent. The Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear a challenge to the sentence on April 14, 2008. Then, in 2010, a circuit judge found that the trial lawyers had made serious errors and ordered a new trial. Before that trial could begin, Pittman pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in December 2010 and accepted a sentence of 25 years. Two questions ran through all of it: whether a child of twelve could be made to answer for a killing as a grown man would, and whether, as the defense claimed, the prescription antidepressant he had been taking had driven him to it.
That autumn he had come from Florida to Chester to live with his grandparents, who enrolled him in school and kept up his treatment for depression. In the days before the deaths, by the state supreme court's account, he had been in trouble at school.
On the morning after, two men who were volunteer firemen with the Corinth Fire Department met the boy. He told them a stranger had kidnapped him and killed his grandparents, and that he had got away. They took him to the fire station and called the police. A Chester County deputy, who at first treated him as a victim and a witness, took an oral statement and then a written one, and both repeated the story of a kidnapper; the courts later found that neither statement was custodial. By that afternoon the investigation had turned toward the boy himself, and the deputy took him to the sheriff's office. There she advised him of his Miranda rights, and advised him again when a detective joined them. Under further questioning he gave a third statement, this one confessing to both deaths, and he read it and signed it. He was arrested for double homicide and arson.
South Carolina's family court had first claim on a child his age. The state moved to transfer the case to the court of general sessions, where adults are tried, and after evaluations by the Department of Juvenile Justice and a waiver hearing, the family court granted the motion in June 2003, weighing the eight Kent factors the state uses for such decisions. The transfer changed everything about the stakes. In family court, a conviction would have meant custody only until he turned 21. In adult court, a murder conviction carried thirty years to life. He would spend more than three years in custody before a jury heard the case.
The trial ran in Charleston from January 31 to February 15, 2005. Pittman did not testify. The defense, through its expert witnesses, argued that the antidepressant had left him involuntarily intoxicated and unable to tell right from wrong; the manufacturer denied any link to homicide, and the state's position was that the drug had nothing to do with the deaths.
Age was the other battleground. Under South Carolina law, a child between seven and fourteen is presumed incapable of committing a crime, and the state must overcome that presumption. The defense said only expert testimony could do it. The trial court let the jury decide on the evidence it had heard, including what the firemen and the investigators described. The judge declined to instruct the jury on involuntary or voluntary manslaughter, and on the intoxication defense applied the state's existing test for insanity, which asks whether the defendant could tell legal or moral right from wrong, rather than the broader standard the defense requested.
On February 15, 2005, the jury found Pittman guilty of murder in both deaths. The judge imposed two concurrent terms of thirty years, the minimum. By law he could not take the defendant's age into account, and the sentence carried no possibility of parole.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed on every point raised. The majority held that lay testimony was enough to put the question of capacity to the jury, without an expert. It found no speedy trial violation in a delay of three years and two months that arose from the complexity of the case and from the defense's own requests. It upheld the family court's waiver, and it held that the thirty-year sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. On the confession, it applied the test of the totality of the circumstances and refused to require that an interested adult be present; age alone did not make the confession involuntary. It held that taking a prescribed drug could not support an involuntary manslaughter charge for intentional acts, and it declined to hold that a guardian's corporal punishment could be legal provocation for a child to use deadly force.
One justice dissented. He would have held that a beating by a parent or guardian can be legal provocation for a child, with any cooling-off period left to the jury, and he would have required that a child under fourteen consult an interested adult before waiving his rights. He would have reversed both convictions and ordered a new trial.
The petition to the Supreme Court of the United States was limited to the sentence, arguing that thirty years without parole for a crime committed at twelve was cruel and unusual punishment. On April 14, 2008, the Court denied certiorari without comment. The drug question was never before it.
The case reopened on post-conviction review. At a 2009 hearing, Pittman testified that the lead trial lawyers had never told him a South Carolina jury could accept that the drug played a part and still convict of murder. Before the trial, prosecutors had offered a plea to voluntary manslaughter, and the defense had turned it down to go before a jury. In July 2010, a circuit judge granted a new trial, finding that the defense team had made several errors, among them the failure to pursue a plea agreement.
The retrial never came. On December 9, 2010, Pittman pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter before a circuit judge, who sentenced him to 25 years in prison, and he gave up any further appeals of the conviction. As of December 2010, that 25-year term was the sentence he was serving.
The central claim of the defense, that the medication caused the killings, was put to a jury and rejected, and the state supreme court upheld the verdict; the manufacturer denied any link throughout. Pittman's own position, in an interview recorded before the jury began deliberating, was that the medicine was responsible.
Whether his confession was voluntary, and whether a child under fourteen must have an interested adult beside him before waiving his rights, divided the state supreme court. The 2010 plea ended the case before a second jury could weigh those questions.
Autumn 2001: Pittman moves from Florida to live with his grandparents in Chester, South Carolina.
November 28, 2001: His grandparents die in Chester County.
November 2001, the next day: He confesses in his third statement and is arrested for double homicide and arson.
June 2003: The family court waives jurisdiction and sends the case to the court of general sessions.
January 31, 2005: The trial opens in Charleston.
February 15, 2005: The jury convicts him of both murders; he receives two concurrent 30-year terms.
June 11, 2007: The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirms, with one justice dissenting.
April 14, 2008: The Supreme Court of the United States denies certiorari.
2009: A post-conviction hearing is held.
July 2010: A circuit judge grants a new trial over the errors of the trial defense.
December 9, 2010: He pleads guilty to voluntary manslaughter and is sentenced to 25 years.