On the night of October 31, 2009, a Seattle police field training officer named Timothy Brenton was killed in the city's Leschi district. The recruit he was training was injured and survived. Nine days earlier, police vehicles had been damaged by fire at a city facility in Seattle. A week after the killing, detectives took a 41-year-old Tukwila man named Christopher Monfort into custody, and the King County Prosecutor's Office charged him with aggravated first-degree murder, three counts of attempted first-degree murder and first-degree arson.
The case took more than five years to reach a verdict. Monfort's lawyers never disputed that he had caused the officer's death. They argued that he was insane, driven by a delusional disorder. The prosecution sought the death penalty, a trial judge struck that notice in 2013, and the Washington Supreme Court reinstated it later the same year in a ruling on how far courts in the state may review a prosecutor's decision to seek death. In June 2015 a King County Superior Court jury rejected the insanity defense and convicted Monfort of aggravated first-degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder and first-degree arson, acquitting him of one further count of attempted murder. The same jury declined to impose death. On July 30, 2015, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, and he died in custody in Washington on January 18, 2017.
Monfort was 41 in the autumn of 2009. As an adult he settled in the Seattle area, where he studied criminal justice at Highline Community College and went on to the University of Washington, where he was an honors student. The university awarded him a bachelor's degree in March 2008, with a major in Law, Societies and Justice. By 2009 he lived in Tukwila, a small city on Seattle's southern edge, and he had worked as a security guard. He had no criminal record before that autumn, a point his defense raised at sentencing.
His lawyers argued that he suffered from a delusional disorder. The prosecution's case was that he was legally sane and had planned his acts.
The first of the charged acts took place on Thursday, October 22, 2009, at a city facility in Seattle where police vehicles were kept. A fire was set that damaged four police vehicles, among them a mobile command vehicle valued at roughly half a million dollars, and caused minor damage to a neighboring building. Monfort was later charged with first-degree arson for the fire, and the State also brought an attempted first-degree murder count alleging that officers who responded had been endangered. No one was hurt. The department's arson and bomb squad took up the case, and patrols were stepped up at city facilities. For nine days the fire was an open arson case with no suspect. At trial the jury convicted him of the arson and acquitted him of one count of attempted murder.
The officer who died on October 31 had been a Seattle police officer since December 18, 2000. Before that he had served in the United States Army and was a veteran of the Gulf War, and he had worked for the police departments in Hoquiam and La Conner, two small cities in western Washington, before moving to Seattle.
He spent his Seattle career in the East Precinct. By 2009 he was a field training officer on the precinct's third watch, responsible for training new officers on patrol. The department routinely paired experienced officers with new ones, and that autumn he had been assigned a student officer who had recently graduated from the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Center. He had served the department for nine years.
On Halloween night the field training officer was killed in the Leschi district. The student officer was injured, recovered and later returned to patrol.
The Seattle Police Department's homicide unit took charge of the investigation.
Six days passed without an arrest. The break came on the afternoon of Friday, November 6, 2009, when a member of the public gave Seattle homicide detectives a tip. Detectives went to Tukwila that afternoon, and Monfort was taken into custody there. The State later charged that he had tried to kill officers during the arrest.
Detectives obtained search warrants and gathered evidence, and by the next day the Seattle Police Department said that its detectives believed the man in custody was responsible for the officer's murder, the attempted murder of the student officer and the October 22 arson. The department asked the King County Prosecuting Attorney to file formal charges. At a news conference on Saturday, November 7, an assistant chief of police named Monfort as the suspect and announced that he was also connected to the fire at the city facility.
On Thursday, November 12, 2009, the King County Prosecuting Attorney filed charges in King County Superior Court. Monfort was charged with one count of aggravated first-degree murder for the death of a law enforcement officer, three counts of attempted first-degree murder and one count of first-degree arson. As filed, the attempted-murder counts covered the injury to the student officer on October 31, the alleged attempt to harm responding officers on October 22 and the alleged attempt to kill officers in Tukwila on November 6. Under Washington law, aggravated first-degree murder carried only two possible sentences, life in prison without the possibility of parole or death, and the prosecutor had to decide whether to file a notice seeking death.
Monfort was arraigned in December 2009 and pleaded not guilty to all five counts, his lawyer entering the plea for him. He waived his right to a speedy trial, and no trial date was set.
Washington's death penalty statute required the prosecutor to file any notice of a special sentencing proceeding within 30 days of arraignment unless the court found good cause to extend the deadline, and to do so only when there was reason to believe that there were not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. A notice filed late barred the State from seeking death. For Monfort, the 30 days would have run out on January 13, 2010.
They did not run out, because both sides wanted more time for the same question. On the day of the arraignment the prosecutor offered to push the deadline to June 2010, asked the defense to send him its mitigation material within five months, and offered to meet before deciding. The defense agreed, and the court extended the deadline. In February 2010 the defense said it could not meet that schedule: professional guidelines for capital defense, it said, required an exhaustive investigation of the defendant's life. In the spring it asked for a deadline in December 2010. The court ordered the two sides to meet, and in May the prosecutor agreed to three more months, moving the deadline to September 2010 and asking for the material by August. The defense explained that delays in funding and in retaining experts had kept its investigation from starting until April.
The August date did not hold either. In July the defense said it had conducted 14 interviews and still needed to reach about 40 more people in 15 states, and it asked again for December. This time the prosecutor declined. He opposed the next defense motion while saying that he would consider mitigation evidence whenever it arrived, and the trial court denied the extension. An effort to obtain appellate review of that denial also failed.
On Thursday, September 2, 2010, about nine months after the arraignment, the King County Prosecuting Attorney filed the notice in King County Superior Court. The case was now a capital case. The pretrial process went on through 2011 and 2012.
The defense motion to strike the notice came almost two years after it was filed, and it was heard in October 2012. Early in 2013 the defense told the court that its mitigation package would follow within a month; by April the State had still not received it. In early February 2013 the defense filed notice that Monfort would plead not guilty by reason of insanity, arguing that because of a mental disease or defect he had been unable to tell right from wrong at the time of the killing. If a jury accepted that plea, he would be committed to the state psychiatric hospital rather than sent to prison. The defense later submitted a mitigation package of about 300 pages describing what it called extreme mental distress and a delusional disorder, but only after the prosecutor had already filed the death notice. After receiving it and meeting defense counsel, the prosecutor wrote that he still believed there were not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency.
The defense then moved to strike the death notice on two grounds. The first was that the prosecutor had improperly considered the facts of the crime in deciding to seek death. The second was that he had made his decision without an adequate factual basis, because he had acted before the defense had presented its mitigation evidence. In February 2013 the chief criminal judge of King County Superior Court, who was presiding over the case, rejected the first argument and accepted the second. He ruled that the prosecutor had not exercised his discretion as the statute and the constitution required, found that the prosecutor had relied on an inadequate inquiry into mitigation carried out by his own investigator, and struck the notice. He also allowed the case to continue on a capital footing so that the trial would not be delayed while the State appealed. In March 2013 both the State and the defense sought discretionary review in the Washington Supreme Court, and the court agreed to hear the case.
The Supreme Court heard argument on June 27, 2013. The State argued that the Legislature had deliberately given the decision to elected prosecutors rather than to the courts, that the defense had missed repeated deadlines, and that the prosecutor had considered all the mitigating information available to him. The defense argued that the trial judge had repeatedly been told that a mitigation package was being prepared and that the prosecutor had acted before he received it.
On November 14, 2013, the court reversed the trial court and reinstated the death notice. In State v. Monfort, No. 88522-2, it held that a county prosecutor may consider the facts of the crime when deciding whether to file a death penalty notice, and that a court's review of that decision is limited to whether the prosecutor had reason to believe that there were not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the standard written into the statute. The court began by confining itself to the record made in the trial court, declining a defense invitation to weigh the prosecutor's decision afresh on evidence the trial judge had never seen. On the first question it reasoned that the statute applies only to aggravated first-degree murder, so a prosecutor must look at the crime itself to know whether the statute applies at all, and that circumstances offered in mitigation can only be weighed against the conduct they are meant to mitigate. Considering them in a vacuum, the court said, would make no sense.
On the second question it drew a line between the two sides' duties. At a penalty trial the defense works to keep a jury from being persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigation is insufficient; the prosecutor, at the charging stage, needs only reason to believe it. The guidelines on which the defense had relied bind defense lawyers, who represent the accused, and not prosecutors, who do not. Applied to Monfort's case, the court found that the prosecutor had waited about nine months, had said he would consider mitigation at any time and had offered to meet, which it held to be the kind of individualized, flexible decision the law required rather than a fixed policy. Hearing from the defense before filing was normally desirable, the court said, but the statute did not demand it. From Monfort's lack of a criminal history and the facts of the case, the prosecutor could assess at least five of the eight mitigating factors the statute lists, and the gap that remained concerned Monfort's mental state. A court's task was only to decide whether the prosecutor had reason to believe that mitigation was insufficient, not whether the judge shared that belief.
One justice concurred in a separate opinion, agreeing with the result but writing that the phrase "reason to believe" sets an objective standard, so that a prosecutor's belief must also be objectively reasonable, and proposing that the State support such a decision with a short written statement. On this record the concurrence found the State's inquiry reasonable: its investigator had conducted about two dozen interviews by telephone and one by email, far less than an effective defense lawyer would do, but enough for the decision the prosecutor had to make.
The case went back to King County Superior Court for trial as a capital case.
Choosing a jury for a capital trial took months. Court staff worked through a pool of about 3,000 prospective jurors to reach 12 jurors and four alternates, and every one of them had to be death-qualified, meaning that anyone who said he or she would never impose death, or would always impose it, was excused. In October 2014 the defense called a law professor to testify about research on how that screening shapes the makeup of a jury and moved again to remove the death penalty from the case on that basis. The State filed a written response disputing the research and its methods, and the judge denied the motion.
With the jury seated, opening statements were heard on Tuesday, January 20, 2015, in the King County Courthouse in Seattle, before the same judge who had presided over the pretrial litigation.
The prosecution told the jury that the events of October 22, October 31 and November 6 formed one connected course of conduct, planned in advance, and that Monfort had been legally sane throughout. The defense did not contest that Monfort had caused the officer's death. It presented him as a man with a diagnosed delusional disorder. Psychology experts called by the two sides disagreed about his mental state.
Testimony ran for about two months and included dozens of witnesses, much of it on the question of sanity. The jury began deliberating on Monday, June 1, 2015.
On Friday, June 5, 2015, the jury returned its verdicts. It rejected the insanity defense. It found Monfort guilty of aggravated first-degree murder for the death of the Seattle officer, guilty of attempted first-degree murder of the student officer who had been with him on October 31, guilty of attempted first-degree murder of the Seattle police sergeant involved in the arrest on November 6, and guilty of first-degree arson for the October 22 fire. It found him not guilty of one count of attempted first-degree murder. The judge told the jurors that the verdict meant they would return for a second phase to decide whether the sentence would be life in prison or death, and they were ordered back on June 16.
In the special sentencing proceeding the defense asked the jury to spare Monfort's life, pointing to his mental illness and to his lack of any criminal record before 2009. The prosecution asked for death. The penalty phase began with statements from both sides on Tuesday, June 16, 2015. The State was allowed a single witness on the impact of the crime, while the defense planned to call more than 40 witnesses in support of mitigation over the following weeks. A death sentence required the agreement of all twelve jurors; if they could not agree, the sentence would be life in prison without the possibility of parole. Closing arguments began on Wednesday, July 22, resumed the next morning and ended on Thursday, July 23, 2015, and the jury returned its decision the same afternoon after a short deliberation: it did not find that there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, and so it did not impose death.
The formal sentencing took place on Thursday, July 30, 2015, in King County Superior Court. Statements were heard, and Monfort spoke. The judge imposed a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
After sentencing Monfort was held in a state penitentiary in Washington. He died on Wednesday, January 18, 2017. The Washington Department of Corrections said there were no signs of foul play and no evidence of self-harm. He had served a little under eighteen months of his life sentence.
Monfort did not deny causing the officer's death; the contest at trial was over his sanity, and the jury resolved it against him. Psychology experts gave opposing views of his mental state, and the defense diagnosis of a delusional disorder was never accepted as a legal excuse.
The attempted-murder counts changed in description between the charging papers and the arraignment. The November 2009 charges tied one count to the student officer, one to the October 22 fire and one to the arrest, while the arraignment listing described one count for the student officer and two for officers at the arrest. The jury convicted on the counts concerning the student officer and the Seattle police sergeant and acquitted on one count.
The State's allegation that officers responding to the October 22 fire had been endangered went to the jury as an attempted-murder count. The two attempted-murder convictions named the student officer and the sergeant, and the conviction for the fire itself was for first-degree arson.
October 22, 2009: A fire damages police vehicles at a city facility in Seattle; later charged as first-degree arson.
October 31, 2009: A Seattle police field training officer is killed and his student officer injured in the Leschi district of Seattle.
November 1, 2009: The Seattle Police Department announces the investigation.
November 6, 2009: Monfort is taken into custody in Tukwila after a tip to Seattle homicide detectives.
November 7, 2009: Police name Monfort as the suspect and link him to the October 22 fire.
November 12, 2009: Charged in King County Superior Court with aggravated first-degree murder, three counts of attempted first-degree murder and first-degree arson.
December 2009: Pleads not guilty to all five counts and waives a speedy trial.
December 2009: Deadline for the death penalty decision extended to June 2010 by agreement.
May 2010: Deadline extended again, to September 2010; a further defense request is later denied.
September 2, 2010: The King County Prosecuting Attorney files a notice seeking the death penalty.
December 3, 2010: Case continued to May 20, 2011, for a trial-setting conference.
October 2012: Defense motion to strike the death notice is heard.
February 2013: Notice of an insanity defense filed; the trial court strikes the death notice.
March 2013: Both sides seek review in the Washington Supreme Court.
June 27, 2013: The Washington Supreme Court hears argument.
November 14, 2013: The Washington Supreme Court reverses and reinstates the death notice (State v. Monfort, No. 88522-2).
October 2014: During jury selection, the trial court denies a defense motion to remove the death penalty on the basis of research on death qualification.
January 20, 2015: Opening statements in King County Superior Court.
June 1, 2015: Jury begins deliberating.
June 5, 2015: Insanity defense rejected; convicted of aggravated first-degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder and first-degree arson; acquitted of one count of attempted first-degree murder.
June 16, 2015: The penalty phase begins.
July 22, 2015: Penalty-phase closing arguments begin.
July 23, 2015: The jury declines to impose death.
July 30, 2015: Sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
January 18, 2017: Dies in custody in Washington.