Byran Uyesugi

Victims
7 co-workers murdered in Honolulu, November 2, 1999. Convicted June 13, 2000, of first-degree murder (all seven deaths) and attempted second-degree murder; affirmed on appeal, 2002.
Years active
November 2, 1999
Location
Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii
Method
Murder in the first degree (causing the deaths of more than one person in the same incident); attempted murder in the second degree.
Status
Life without the possibility of parole (count 1), August 8, 2000; minimum term of 235 years set on the attempted-murder count, November 2000; conviction affirmed December 26, 2002.

On the morning of November 2, 1999, Byran K. Uyesugi, a 40-year-old copier repairman who had worked for the Xerox Corporation in Honolulu since 1984, killed seven of his co-workers at the company's building on Oahu. He surrendered to police that afternoon. Hawaii has no death penalty, and the state had never seen a multiple murder of this size. It was the largest in the islands' history.

There was never any question at trial about who had done it. The defense conceded the killings and argued instead that Uyesugi was legally insane, a man who had spent a decade believing that the people he worked with were conspiring to ruin him. Eleven psychiatrists and psychologists testified. All of them agreed that he was mentally ill. They disagreed only on whether his illness had robbed him of the capacity the law cares about. On June 13, 2000, a Circuit Court jury of six men and six women deliberated for about 80 minutes and found him guilty as charged of murder in the first degree and attempted murder in the second degree. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, the most severe sentence Hawaii law allows, and the Supreme Court of Hawaii unanimously affirmed the conviction in December 2002.

Before 1999

Uyesugi graduated from Roosevelt High School in Honolulu in 1977 and lived in Honolulu. He had no felony record.

He had been with Xerox for about fifteen years, servicing copiers at customer sites across Oahu. A manager later described him to a psychiatrist as a generally good and functional employee, with one exception: during a performance review he refused to sign his appraisal because he believed co-workers had been tampering with his work. That belief, that others were sabotaging the machines he repaired, ran through everything that came later. A psychiatrist who treated him in the early 1990s testified that his delusions focused exclusively on his work group.

1993: a warning and an evaluation

The first public sign of trouble came in September 1993. On September 21 of that year, after a confrontation at a customer's site, Uyesugi kicked in an elevator door, causing damage put at between $1,000 and $2,000. He was arrested for criminal property damage. The charge was later dismissed after he completed anger-management counseling, and the bill for the door was paid. Around the same time he had a confrontation with a co-worker over a copy machine, and Xerox heard that he had made threats against people in his group.

The company gave him a choice: get professional help or be fired. He agreed to inpatient care at a hospital on Oahu.

The psychiatrist who directed the hospital's psychiatric programs evaluated him over five days. He diagnosed a delusional disorder and a paranoid personality. Uyesugi told him that a co-worker held a grudge, that the company was trying to discredit him so it could fire him, and that a corporate lawyer on the mainland had ordered defective parts sent to him. He believed someone was interfering with his hobbies at home. He denied making threats and talked about suing the people he believed were persecuting him, but he spoke of no physical action. He resisted any suggestion that he was ill.

The hospital judged him safe enough for an open unit rather than its locked intensive ward and released him after five days for outpatient treatment. A psychiatrist with his health plan then saw him. That doctor did not think he was a danger to others and recommended that he return to work after two therapy visits, while still advising further evaluation and treatment. Uyesugi told him the company was overreacting and that he was just doing his job. His last appointment was on January 31, 1994. Xerox took him back on a written condition: any further threat or act of violence would bring immediate termination.

At trial, the defense described the delusions as having begun about ten years before the killings and as having never let go.

The seven men who died on November 2, 1999, were Uyesugi's co-workers, and at least five of them belonged to the same work group: Melvin Lee of Waipahu, Ronald Kataoka of Mililani, Ronald Kawamae of Makiki, John Sakamoto of Kalama Valley, Ford Kanehira of Kaneohe, Christopher Jason Balatico and Peter Mark.

The killings took place at the start of the working day. Seven men died, and the conduct toward an eighth man, who survived, became the attempted-murder count at trial. Uyesugi surrendered to the Honolulu Police Department that afternoon.

Charges and the long wait for trial

That week prosecutors charged him with one count of murder in the first degree, seven counts of murder in the second degree and related offenses under the state's arms law. At his arraignment in District Court he pleaded not guilty.

Xerox dismissed him the day after the killings. On November 9, 1999, a grand jury indicted him on one count of murder in the first degree, seven counts of murder in the second degree and one count of attempted murder in the second degree. The case moved to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, where he pleaded not guilty again on November 15.

On December 10, 1999, the court appointed an independent panel of three examiners, a psychiatrist and two psychologists, to assess his fitness and his state of mind. The panel agreed unanimously that he suffered from a delusional disorder or schizophrenia. All three described the same core belief, fixed and false, that his co-workers were conspiring against him. They also found him fit to stand trial, and concluded that he had known right from wrong and had been able to conform his behavior to the law. That finding framed the trial: the state accepted that Uyesugi was ill and set out to prove that he was not insane in the legal sense.

On February 2, 2000, relying on the panel's reports, the circuit judge then handling the case found Uyesugi fit to stand trial and able to assist in his defense. Three days later the defense gave formal notice that it would rely on insanity.

The case then passed to the judge who would try it. In March 2000 she denied a defense motion to dismiss the indictment. Jury selection began on April 24, 2000.

The trial

The trial opened on May 15, 2000. Over ten days of evidence the jury heard 55 witnesses.

The prosecution's case was that Uyesugi had a mental disorder but knew what he was doing and knew it was wrong. It relied on his conduct and his planning. The state also put before the jury his history with the company, including the 1993 incidents, the threats he was said to have made at the time and the written agreement under which he had kept his job.

The three court-appointed examiners testified in the second week. All three diagnosed delusions. All three also concluded that the delusions were not the main cause of the killings; they traced them instead to anger, with the people at the center of his beliefs as its focus. Each relied on his calm conduct before and after the killings to find that he understood right from wrong and could control his actions, and one of the psychologists found no significant impairment of either capacity. Under cross-examination, one of them agreed that a person with a delusional disorder can function normally.

The defense did not contest the killings. It asked the jury to find him not guilty by reason of insanity, or in the alternative to find that he had acted under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, which would reduce the charges to manslaughter. Its theory was that Uyesugi had lived for at least ten years inside a delusion that his co-workers were conspiring to discredit him, that he could function normally in every part of life the delusion did not touch, and that within it he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of what he did. The defense experts agreed that he knew killing was wrong in general. Their point was that the delusion had made the wrongfulness of this conduct invisible to him.

The 1993 doctors were called. The hospital psychiatrist told the jury that he had diagnosed the delusional disorder, had not considered Uyesugi dangerous and had released him for outpatient treatment. The outpatient psychiatrist described the two visits in early 1994 and his view that there was no imminent danger at work. A clinical psychologist who had tested Uyesugi at the company's request in October 1993 testified that he had diagnosed a delusional disorder then and regarded it as a classic case. He told the jury that people with the disorder generally do not deteriorate socially, intellectually or at work, and that Uyesugi had denied intending to hurt anyone.

Three defense experts, two psychiatrists and a psychologist, testified that Uyesugi was legally insane, and one added that extreme emotional distress could reduce the murder charges to manslaughter. The two defense psychiatrists who testified on May 30 diagnosed a delusional disorder of the persecutory type, a fixed and false belief that no evidence can shift, in a person who otherwise appears normal. They concluded that it had substantially impaired his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct on November 2. One testified that without the delusions he would not have killed any of the seven men. Both also found, however, that he had been able to conform his conduct to the law. On May 31, Uyesugi told the trial judge that he understood his rights and would not testify.

Two prosecution experts testified in rebuttal that he was not insane. The first, a psychologist, found a serious mental disorder but no extreme mental or emotional disturbance and no breakdown in self-control, and concluded that Uyesugi knew killing was legally and morally wrong. The last of them, a psychiatrist from New York, submitted a report of about 80 pages. He concluded that Uyesugi had schizophrenia but had known that his actions were wrong and had remained in control of them. Across all eleven mental-health witnesses the diagnoses ran from delusional disorder to schizophrenia; no one testified that he was well.

There were disputes about language. Experts on both sides gave the jury different meanings for the word "appreciate" in the statutory test. The defense psychiatrists read it as the ability to weigh or judge accurately; one of them testified that Uyesugi knew killing was wrong but, because of his illness, could not gauge how wrong it was. One court-appointed psychiatrist saw no difference between appreciating and knowing, and the state's rebuttal psychologist defined the word as to know or realize, though he conceded that it went beyond simply knowing what was legally right or wrong. On June 1, 2000, the defense withdrew the instructions it had requested on the insanity defense; the trial judge gave the statutory language without a definition, telling the jury that words carried their usual meaning.

The evidence closed with the eleventh expert on June 1. The jury received its instructions on June 2. Closing arguments and the verdict both came on June 13, 2000.

Verdict

The jury was told that the state had to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defense had to show that Uyesugi was more likely than not insane. On the first-degree count it could return guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity; a guilty verdict on that count made verdicts on the seven second-degree counts unnecessary. It could also find manslaughter if it accepted the claim of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

On June 13, 2000, after about 80 minutes, the jury returned a unanimous verdict. It found Uyesugi guilty as charged of murder in the first degree, finding that he had intentionally and knowingly caused the deaths of all seven men, and guilty of attempted murder in the second degree.

Sentence

Sentencing took place on August 8, 2000, before the same Circuit Court judge. On the first-degree murder count the sentence was mandatory: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole on the attempted-murder count, to run consecutively.

In November 2000 the Hawaii Paroling Authority held a hearing to fix the minimum term on the attempted-murder sentence. It set the minimum term at 235 years.

Appeal

The Office of the Public Defender took his appeal to the Supreme Court of Hawaii. Its opening brief, dated June 8, 2001, attacked three things: the jury instructions, which it said had failed to define the legal terms of the insanity defense; the admission of evidence it called unfair, above all the extended testimony of the victims' families; and the performance of his trial lawyers. In all it raised five groups of claims, and the court rejected every one in an opinion filed on December 26, 2002.

The central argument was that the trial judge should have defined two words in the insanity instruction, "appreciate" and "wrongfulness." Because the defense had not objected at trial and had withdrawn its own requested definitions, the court reviewed for plain error. It held that "appreciate" needed no definition. On "wrongfulness" it adopted, for Hawaii, a subjective and objective test: whether the defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct from the point of view of a reasonable person in his position, under the circumstances as he believed them to be. It found that the evidence did not call for a special instruction on the point, because the defense had never argued that Uyesugi believed his conduct was morally justified.

The court held that the unanimity instructions, read as a whole, were not prejudicially insufficient or misleading. It assumed that the trial judge might have erred by not stepping in on her own during the prosecution's opening statement and the testimony of family members, but found no plain error: that testimony filled about 33 of some 1,800 pages of transcript, did not dwell on the effect of the crime on the families, and was not woven into the state's case, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. It found no plain error in the admission of certain prosecution exhibits and related expert testimony about property he owned that had played no part in the killings, holding the evidence relevant to his state of mind and planning. The claim against his trial lawyers rested on two failures: not asking for a definition of "appreciate," and not objecting to the opening statement or to the questioning of the families. The court pointed out that counsel had not failed to request the definition but had withdrawn a request already made, and it held that he had not shown that his lawyers' performance was deficient or that it had cost him a meritorious defense, so no further hearing on that claim was needed.

All five justices agreed that the conviction stood. Two of them concurred in the result only. Their separate opinion found the errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given the defendant's burden of proof and the strong evidence that he had not lacked capacity, but disagreed with the majority on five points: it would have defined "appreciate" as the ability to grasp the nature or significance of the wrongfulness of the conduct, would not have tied "wrongfulness" to moral justification because delusions need not rest on moral grounds, and would have required unanimity clauses in the insanity and mitigating-manslaughter instructions and a different order for those instructions. The concurrence was amended on January 9, 2003.

Uyesugi has remained in the custody of the State of Hawaii since November 1999, but for most of that time he has been held on the mainland. By 2004 he was among the Hawaii prisoners housed in Mississippi. In November 2009, ten years after the killings, he was serving his sentence, and by 2019 he had been transferred to a facility in Arizona, where his life term without parole continued.

Context: insanity and first-degree murder in Hawaii

Two Hawaii statutes decided this case. The first defines murder in the first degree. Among its forms is intentionally or knowingly causing the deaths of more than one person in the same or separate incidents, and the jury was instructed that it had to find that Uyesugi caused the deaths of two or more of the people named. Conviction carries a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole; second-degree and attempted murder carry life with the possibility of parole, and manslaughter up to twenty years, extendable to life.

The second is the state's insanity test. A person is not responsible for conduct if, as a result of physical or mental disease, disorder or defect, the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law. Since a 1982 amendment the defense has been affirmative: the defendant must prove it, here by a preponderance of the evidence, and the jury was told that "lack of substantial capacity" did not mean a total lack of capacity. An acquittal on that ground would not have freed Uyesugi; it would have led to discharge, conditional release or commitment to the Hawaii State Hospital as the court found appropriate. Hawaii law also allows a murder charge to be reduced to manslaughter when the defendant acted under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and the prosecution must disprove that defense once it is raised. The jury rejected both routes.

The question at the center of the case was never factual. Every expert who examined Uyesugi agreed that he was mentally ill; the jury and the appellate court decided only that his illness had not removed his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of what he did or to conform his conduct to the law. Two justices of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, while concurring in the result, would have instructed the jury differently on several points. The motive was never established beyond the delusion described at trial.

Timeline

1977: Uyesugi graduates from Roosevelt High School in Honolulu.

1984: He begins working for the Xerox Corporation in Honolulu.

September 21, 1993: After a confrontation at a customer's site he damages an elevator door; he is arrested for criminal property damage, and the charge is later dismissed.

1993: At the company's demand he is evaluated over five days in hospital and diagnosed with a delusional disorder; he returns to work under a written condition.

January 31, 1994: His last outpatient psychiatric appointment.

November 2, 1999: Seven co-workers are killed in Honolulu; Uyesugi surrenders to police that afternoon.

November 1999: He is charged, and pleads not guilty at arraignment.

November 9, 1999: A grand jury indicts him on nine counts.

November 15, 1999: He pleads not guilty in Circuit Court.

December 10, 1999: The court appoints a panel of three examiners, which later finds him mentally ill but fit to stand trial and not legally insane.

February 2, 2000: The court finds him fit to stand trial.

February 5, 2000: The defense gives notice of an insanity defense.

April 24, 2000: Jury selection begins.

May 15, 2000: The trial opens in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit.

May 31, 2000: He tells the court he will not testify.

June 2, 2000: The jury is instructed.

June 13, 2000: The jury finds him guilty as charged of murder in the first degree and attempted murder in the second degree.

August 8, 2000: He is sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

November 2000: The Hawaii Paroling Authority sets a minimum term of 235 years on the attempted-murder sentence.

June 8, 2001: The Office of the Public Defender files his opening brief on appeal.

December 26, 2002: The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirms the conviction.

2004: He is held in Mississippi among Hawaii prisoners housed there.

November 2009: He is serving his sentence ten years after the killings.

2019: He is held in Arizona after a transfer.