Robert Berdella pleaded guilty, and so no court ever reviewed the case against him. What the published reports hold instead are two lawsuits he brought from prison, one about his money and one about his mail. In April 1988 a young man escaped by jumping from a second-floor window of Berdella's house in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Kansas City and told police he had been held and tortured there; the search that followed turned up human skulls, photographs of bound captives and the records Berdella had kept of what he did to them. That August he pleaded guilty to the first-degree murder of Larry Pearson and was sentenced to life without parole, and in December 1988 he pleaded guilty to five more killings, those of Robert Sheldon, Mark Wallace, James Ferris, Jerry Howell and Todd Stoops.
The Missouri case began with an attorney, Sharlie Pender, whom Berdella hired in April 1988 to keep his finances in order while he waited for trial. After the convictions, the man who had escaped from the house, who by then had a suit of his own pending against Berdella, asked the court to put Berdella's estate in the hands of a trustee under Chapter 460, a Missouri statute for the property of imprisoned felons, and Frank Murphy was appointed in March 1989. When Berdella later sued Pender for malpractice, the trusteeship was why the suit was thrown out: a claim that concerned the estate belonged to the trustee to bring. Berdella, representing himself, argued that the legislature had repealed the statute in 1990 and that it was unconstitutional in any case. On December 17, 1991, the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected both arguments.
The federal case was against the superintendent of the Potosi Correctional Center, the prison's mail room clerk and the trustee himself. Berdella had been sending unstamped letters to Murphy for him to forward, to get around the spending limits Murphy had set; Murphy wrote to the Department of Corrections asking not to receive them, the prison refused to post a letter Berdella addressed to him, and Berdella was warned that another attempt would bring discipline. On August 4, 1992, the Eighth Circuit held that it had no power to hear the claims against Murphy, because Berdella's notice of appeal named the wrong order, and that he had not shown the mail restriction cost him anything in court, though the judges said the prison's policy ought to make an exception for legal mail. Rehearing was denied on September 14. Berdella died of a heart attack at the Missouri State Penitentiary on October 8, 1992, at forty-three.
Neither case is about the killings, and neither court says more about them than one clause naming the crimes of conviction. As a record of Berdella himself, the two opinions show a man a year or two into a life sentence quarreling with his own trustee over how much of his money he could spend, filing writs against the judge, bringing further suits against Murphy in Jackson and Cole counties and arguing his own case before the state's highest court. The absence is the more important fact. Because he pleaded guilty, the evidence was never tested in front of a jury, and no appellate court ever had occasion to set it down.
One name has been shortened. The man whose escape led to Berdella's arrest appears in the Missouri opinion only as the person who asked for the trustee, and here he is C.B. The opinion names him for a procedural reason, and nothing about him is lost by the initials. Sharlie Pender, Frank Murphy, the superintendent and the mail room clerk were parties to the lawsuits and are named as the courts named them, as are the six men Berdella pleaded guilty to killing in our own account above.
These opinions are in the public domain, and the text is the Caselaw Access Project's digitization of the South Western and Federal reporters, printed without spelling repair. It breaks several names where the printed column once broke them, Ber-della, Pen-der and Bran-son, and it gives the superintendent's name through much of the federal opinion as Délo, with an accent the caption does not carry. We have left all of it. The Eighth Circuit's footnote placing Berdella at the Jefferson City Correctional Center is the court's statement in August 1992; published accounts of his death two months later place it at the Missouri State Penitentiary, in the same city.
Robert A. BERDELLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sharlie PENDER, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 73616.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Dec. 17, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1992.
Robert A. Berdella, pro se.
Sharlie Pender, pro se.
[OPINION BY BENTON, Judge. type=majority]
BENTON, Judge.
In April 1988, while criminal charges were pending against appellant Robert Ber-della, he retained respondent Sharlie Pen-der, an attorney, to act as his agent to keep his personal financial affairs in order during his pretrial confinement. Following appellant’s conviction for first degree murder, forcible sodomy, and felonious restraint, C.B. — an individual with a suit, arising from appellant’s conviction, pending against appellant — filed for the appointment of a trustee pursuant to Chapter 460, RSMo 1986. This petition was granted; Frank Murphy was appointed trustee on March 16, 1989.
In November 1990, appellant filed a petition alleging legal malpractice by respondent. In January 1991, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, invoking appellant’s legal incapacity under Chapter 460, RSMo Supp.1990. Appellant’s suggestions in opposition to this motion claimed that the 1990 amendments to Chapter 460 effectively repealed, or nullified, the chapter or that Chapter 460 is unconstitutional. The circuit court granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the case.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court, raising the same points filed in his suggestions in opposition to the motion to dismiss. On August 27, 1991, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that appellant had not notified the Attorney General of appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of Chapter 460.
The decision below is affirmed.
I. The Validity of Chapter 460
Appellant insists that Chapter 460 is invalid or unconstitutional, and has filed several writs in a related case requesting action against the trial judge on the basis of the unconstitutionality of Chapter 460.
In 1990, the General Assembly enacted two bills. House Bill 974 repealed all 25 sections of Chapter 460 in its entirety, and enacted no new sections equivalent to Chapter 460. Senate Bill 563 amended and reenacted two sections of Chapter 460, without mention of the other sections of Chapter 460.
A. The Effect of the 1990 Bills
Appellant claims that, as H.B. 974 was signed by the governor twenty-six days after S.B. 563, H.B. 974’s repeal of Chapter 460 should be read as also repealing the sections reenacted in S.B. 563. Appellant cites a nineteenth century court of appeals case, Lang v. Calloway, 68 Mo.App. 393 (1897), as support for this claim. Appellant is incorrect for two reasons.
First, to the extent that Lang implies a “later in time” rule for laws adopted in the same session, that decision was erroneous. The general rule in Missouri is and has been that acts adopted in the same session are to be construed in harmony, and, if they cannot be construed in harmony, then the more specific act takes precedence over the general. See Hull v. Baumann, 345 Mo. 159, 131 S.W.2d 721, 725 (1939); State v. Harris, 337 Mo. 1052, 87 S.W.2d 1026, 1029 (1936). In this case, it is clear that S.B. 563 is the more specific of the two acts — amending two sections of Chapter 460 where H.B. 974 repeals the entire chapter.
The logical underpinnings for this rule of construction are found in Article III, § 29 of the Missouri Constitution and § 1.130 RSMo 1986, and their predecessors, which create a uniform effective date for all laws passed in the same session of the legislature. Implicit in this provision is the recognition that the actual dates when the governor approves a bill or when the General Assembly passes a bill are not legally significant (except for “emergency” laws adopted in accordance with the provisions of Article III, § 29 of the Missouri Constitution).
The history of these two bills demonstrates that point. Each house passed its own bill first. H.B. 974, however, was amended by the Senate, while S.B. 563 was not amended by the House. These amendments had no connection, however, with Chapter 460. These amendments did have the effect of requiring the House to approve the amended version of H.B. 974 after approving S.B. 563. As the Senate passed S.B. 563 before the House passed the original version of H.B. 974, appellant’s argument requires the assumption that approximately two-thirds of the House members changed their minds twice about the existence of §§ 460.100, 460.250 in the space of 80 days with the second change occurring within the space of two weeks after the House’s passage of S.B. 563. Both bills, however, were signed by the legislative presiding officers and presented to the governor on the same date.
The effect of appellant’s argument would be to give the governor a new veto power in these circumstances. Such a power would be contrary to the terms of Article III, § 31 of the Missouri Constitution and to the intent underlying that section. Thus appellant’s argument is erroneous on the effect of the governor’s date of approval on the validity of Chapter 460.
Under the Missouri Constitution, both S.B. 563 and H.B. 974 have the same effective date. Mo. Const. Art. Ill, § 29. Therefore, neither is “later in time” for the purposes of statutory construction; and Lang is irrelevant to the present case.
Second, even if Lang were relevant, it would dictate giving effect to S.B. 563. Under Lang, bills passed in the same session of the General Assembly were read in pari materia; and a bill passed later in the same session would not be read to repeal a prior bill unless the later bill expressly repealed the prior bill or the two provisions inherently conflict. That is not the case with the two bills at issue here. H.B. 974 does not expressly repeal S.B. 563 nor is there any clear conflict between the two bills. Both S.B. 563 and H.B. 974 repeal the version of §§ 460.100 and 460.250 in effect on August 27,1990. While H.B. 974 repeals the provisions governing appointment of a trustee for an inmate, it does not prohibit a court from using its inherent powers to appoint such a trustee. As such, H.B. 974 can be read harmoniously with S.B. 563. Therefore, H.B. 974 does not operate to repeal §§ 460.100, 460.250 RSMo.Supp.1990.
Appellant also claims that these two sections, §§ 460.100 and 460.250 RSMo.Supp. 1990, cannot legally stand alone, for lack of substance. These two sections empower the trustee of an imprisoned convict and authorize compensation for the trustee. Appellant’s claim is based on the lack of specific provisions dealing with the procedures governing a Chapter 460 trustee.
The failure of the General Assembly to enact specific procedures for the appointment of Chapter 460 trustees is not a fatal flaw. This Court has the power to make procedural rules governing all legal matters subject only to the limitations of federal law and the Missouri Constitution. Mo. Const., Art. V, § 5. In addition, the provisions of Chapter 456 contain procedures that can apply to all trustees including Chapter 460 trustees.
B. The Constitutionality of Chapter 460
Appellant contends, on the basis of the decision of the federal court in Thompson v. Bond, 421 F.Supp. 878 (W.D.Mo.1976), that Chapter 460 is unconstitutional. The decision in Thompson was based on the former Missouri civil death statute which prevented an inmate from suing in any court. According to the district court, that statute covered personal actions, as well as actions for the convict’s estate. Id. at 881.
Chapter 460 has not come before this Court in several decades. In interpreting a statute under constitutional scrutiny, the presumption is that the General Assembly intended to, and did, enact a constitutional statute. “Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and will be found unconstitutional only if they clearly violate a constitutional provision ...; any doubt is to be resolved in favor of the law’s validity.” State v. Mahurin, 799 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Mo. banc 1990) (citations omitted). “This Court is required to construe legislative enactments so as to render them constitutional and avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, if it is reasonably possible to do so.” Simpson v. Kilcher, 749 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Mo. banc 1988).
Once appointed, a trustee has the power to “prosecute and defend all actions commenced by or against such convict.” Section 460.100 RSMo Supp.1990. This language does not deny a convict access to the courts for several reasons.
First, the convict, or the trustee on behalf of the convict's estate, is allowed to sue in all cases. This differs from the civil death statute in Thompson under which only a trustee could sue; and an inmate could not petition for the appointment of a trustee.
Second, the trustee's powers relate to the estate of the convict. The purpose of Chapter 460 is to protect creditors, and other “interested persons,” from the potential squandering of an inmate’s estate while the inmate was incarcerated. See §§ 456.-430, 460.010 RSMo 1986. Both the old and the new versions of § 460.100 limit the trustee to managing the estate of the convict. Those actions by the convict which do not affect the "estate” of the convict — like domestic relations or actions challenging the conditions of confinement or the inmate's conviction — are not subject to the provisions of Chapter 460.
This distinction — between actions that relate to the estate of the convict and those that do not — creates a conditional, procedural disability. Such a limited disability is authorized by § 561.016.1 RSMo 1986, which expressly permits disabilities provided by laws such as Chapter 460.
The 1990 amendment repealed the provision specifying who can apply for the appointment of a trustee. See 460.010 RSMo 1986. In addition to those interested parties discussed above, an inmate may now request the appointment of a trustee when the inmate believes that the estate would be better managed by someone on the outside. This change answers a key objection in Thompson, the inability of the inmate to request the appointment of a trustee. 421 F.Supp. at 883. Chapter 460, however, does not require that a trustee be appointed automatically upon incarceration.
The provisions of Chapter 460 do not unconstitutionally infringe on an inmate’s right of access to the courts. That leaves as the only remaining question whether Chapter 460 constitutes a violation of an inmate’s right to equal protection of the law. Inmates are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class and, as such, regulations affecting inmates as a class only need a rational basis. Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-63, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Incarceration creates difficulties for an inmate seeking to protect the interests of the estate. Legislation that allows courts to appoint a trustee to protect those interests is a reasonable mechanism to alleviate some of that difficulty. An additional reason for appointing a trustee is to alleviate the difficulties imposed by an inmate’s incarceration on the creditors of an inmate’s estate in collecting their accounts.
As such, Chapter 460 is a valid and constitutional mechanism for handling the problems related to an inmate’s estate during his incarceration.
II. Powers of the Trustee and the Circuit Court
Other issues raised in this case are the duty owed by the trustee to the estate, the duty of the trustee to the inmate, and the role of the circuit court and the inmate in enforcing those duties.
An analysis of the type of trust created under Chapter 460 clarifies these issues. The traditional concern underlying Chapter 460 has been the balancing of the rights of creditors and the rights of the inmate over the estate. As such, a Chapter 460 trust contains elements of both constructive trusts and spendthrift trusts. A Chapter 460 trust resembles a constructive trust in that it is imposed to protect those with legitimate claims on the estate at the time of the inmate’s incarceration. A Chapter 460 trust resembles a spendthrift trust as, while it permits the inmate some access to his estate, it prevents wasting the estate before all creditors are paid.
These two underlying concepts define the powers of the trustee. The trustee has a duty, under both common law concepts of fiduciary duty and the specific language of § 460.100 RSMo Supp.1990, to pursue any meritorious claims that the estate has against third parties and to present any meritorious defense against any third party, including alleged creditors. The trustee has a duty to provide money from the estate for the “support” of the inmate. The trustee has the duty to manage that estate as a “prudent person” would. This duty includes all the powers listed in § 456.520 RSMo 1986 to the extent that they are consistent with the purposes of a Chapter 460 trust.
The duty of the circuit court is somewhat restricted by the nature of the trust imposed on an inmate. As the purpose of the trust is to prevent an inmate from wasting the estate, it would defeat this purpose to require a full trial of every allegation raised by an inmate against a trustee. The circuit court does, however, have a duty to remove a trustee who refuses to perform his duties. Cf § 456.190 RSMo 1986. As such, especially in cases where the trust was imposed on the inmate at the request of a creditor, the judge of the circuit court should examine the petition of the inmate to determine if it indicates a violation of the trustee’s duty (as opposed to a mere dislike of the decisions of the trustee). Only if the petition alleges facts which constitute a violation of duty should the court require formal proceedings.
The judgment below is affirmed.
All concur.
These writs are denied by separate order in accordance with this opinion.
There will be cases where the division between the estate (or property) and the person of the convict is not clear. A good rule of thumb is the relief sought. If the inmate is seeking an injunction, writ, or decree that would have a direct effect on his personal status, then he has a right to file the suit and pursue it without the involvement of the trustee. If the injunction, writ, or decree would affect an inmate’s property or damages are sought, then, if a trustee has been appointed, the inmate cannot sue on her own behalf; and the trustee is the only person authorized to pursue the action. There will be some actions, like divorces, that do not fit cleanly into either category in which the inmate would be allowed to sue on his own behalf but the trustee might be an interested party in any property settlement.
Robert A. BERDELLA, Appellant, v. Paul K. DELO; Thelma Branson; and Frank J. Murphy, individually and in his official capacity, Appellees.
No. 91-2823.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted April 16, 1992.
Decided Aug. 4, 1992.
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 14, 1992.
Craig M. Schmid, St. Louis, Mo., argued, for appellant.
Greg A. Perry, Jefferson City, Mo. and Mary E. Kenney, argued, William A. Lynch, Kansas City, Mo., on the brief, for appellees.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and ARNOLD, District Judge.
The HONORABLE MORRIS S. ARNOLD, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
[OPINION BY BEAM, Circuit Judge. type=majority]
BEAM, Circuit Judge.
On October 17, 1989, Robert A. Berdella, then, an inmate at the Potosi Correctional Center (PCC) in Missouri, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against Paul Delo, the superintendent of the PCC, Thelma Bran-son, the mail room clerk at the PCC, and Frank J. Murphy, the court-appointed trustee of Berdella’s estate. On July 11, 1990, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Murphy based on the rule of res judicata. Nearly a year later, on June 26, 1991, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Delo and Branson based, in part, on qualified immunity. Ber-della appeals these orders. We hold that Berdella’s notice of appeal is insufficient as to the district court’s July 11, 1990, order and affirm the court’s June 26, 1991, order.
I. BACKGROUND
Berdella is currently serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole or probation. After Berdella’s sentencing, Murphy was appointed trustee of his estate pursuant to Missouri state law. See Mo. Ann.Stat. ch. 460 (Vernon 1956 & Supp. 1992). Disagreements soon arose between Berdella and Murphy over Murphy’s management of the estate. In particular, Berdella objected to limits Murphy imposed on his spending.
In an attempt to circumvent Murphy’s spending limits, Berdella began to send unstamped third-party correspondence to Murphy instead of stamping the correspondence himself and mailing it directly from the PCC. In response, Murphy twice wrote to the Missouri Department of Corrections (Department), asking the Department to restrict Berdella’s mail to him. Under Department policies governing inmate mail then in effect, the Department honored written requests by persons outside the prison not to be sent mail from inmates. Although Murphy only sought to prevent Berdella from sending third-party correspondence to him, his letters to the Department were ambiguous and could easily be read as requesting that he not receive any mail from Berdella. The Department interpreted Murphy’s letters in this manner.
Pursuant to the Department’s policy, Berdella was notified about Murphy’s request not to receive mail from him. When Berdella later attempted to mail a letter to Murphy, Branson, who knew about the restriction on Berdella’s mail, conferred with Delo. Following her discussion with Delo, Branson refused to post the letter and reminded Berdella in writing of Murphy’s request. The written reminder also warned Berdella that further attempts to post mail to Murphy would result in disciplinary action.
As a result of the continuing dispute between Berdella and Murphy over the management of Berdella’s estate, Berdella filed several suits against Murphy. In the present section 1983 action, Berdella alleged that Murphy wrongfully limited his prison spending and directed the prison staff not to post his mail in order to prevent him from serving legal documents on Murphy. Berdella also asserted claims against Delo and Branson, alleging that the restrictions on his mail to Murphy and the threat of disciplinary action violated his constitutional rights.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Murphy
Berdella asserts that the district court erred in granting Murphy summary judgment. Murphy counters that we need not reach the merits of this issue because Berdella failed to appeal the district court’s July 11, 1990, order dismissing him. We agree. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require a notice of appeal to “designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from.” Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). Berdella’s notice, however, only refers to the district court’s June 26, 1991, order. When Berdella filed his notice of appeal, he also filed a document entitled “Motion for Appeal from Full Record.” Although the motion indicates that Berdella wished to appeal the “full record,” the motion refers in particular to the June 26, 1991, order and only that order. Murphy’s name does not appear in the caption of either the notice of appeal or the motion for appeal, and the July 11, 1990, order was not attached to either document.
Berdella urges us to construe his notice of appeal liberally because he is a pro se litigant. He emphasizes that his motion for appeal states he is appealing from the “full record.” Although we traditionally construe notices of appeal liberally, particularly those of pro se litigants, an intent to appeal the judgment in question must be apparent and there must be no prejudice to the adverse party. See, e.g., Huston v. Mitchell, 908 F.2d 275, 277 (8th Cir.1990); McAninch v. Traders Nat’l Bank of Kansas City, 779 F.2d 466, 467 n. 2 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182, 106 S.Ct. 2917, 91 L.Ed.2d 545 (1986); McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 672 F.2d 652, 659 (8th Cir.1982). In McAn-inch, for example, the appellants’ notice of appeal failed to list an order granting summary judgment to certain defendants and another order dismissing one of the plaintiffs. We held that intent to appeal these orders was apparent from the procedural history of the case and the inclusion of the orders on the appeal information form. See McAninch, 779 F.2d at 467 n. 2.
We do not believe that Berdella’s intent to appeal the district court’s July 11, 1990, order is apparent from either his notice of appeal or the procedural history of the case. The July 11, 1990, order and the June 26, 1991, order addressed distinct and severable issues. An appeal of one order, therefore, would not inherently imply a desire to appeal the other. Even if we consider Berdella’s motion for appeal in evaluating his notice of appeal, the notice still does not evince an intent to appeal the July 11, 1990, order. Berdella cites no authority for the proposition that the words “full record” sufficiently indicate an intent to appeal any and every order issued by the district court in the course of a suit, and we refuse to so hold. Berdella also ignores the fact that his motion for appeal, like his notice of appeal, specifically states that he is appealing the June 26, 1991, order and contains no reference to the July 11, 1990, order.
In addition, the procedural history of this case lends little support to Berdella’s assertion that his intent to appeal the July 11, 1990, order was apparent. Although Ber-della could not have challenged the order before entry of final judgment unless he received permission for an interlocutory appeal, this fact alone is not dispositive. At the time Berdella filed his notice of appeal, he was also asserting similar claims against Murphy in two separate actions in Missouri state court. See Berdella v. Murphy, No. CV91-5199 (Jackson County, Mo. Cir.Ct.); Berdella v. Murphy, No. CV191-579CC (Cole County, Mo.Cir.Ct.). Given the existence of these state actions, Berdel-la’s failure to include the July 11, 1990, order in his notice of appeal is demonstrative, if anything, of an intent to abandon the federal forum and pursue his claims against Murphy in state court.
Berdella’s omission of any reference to the district court’s July 11,1990, order in his notice of appeal is more than a mere technical deficiency. Berdella has failed to comply with Rule 3(c) and, as such, we lack jurisdiction to consider his argument that the district court erred in granting Murphy summary judgment. See Yoder v. Nutrena Mills, Inc., 294 F.2d 505, 506 n. 1 (8th Cir.1961); cf. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 2408, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988) (court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over party in class action where party’s name inadvertently omitted from notice of appeal).
B. Délo and Branson
Berdella also contends that the district court erred in granting Délo and Branson summary judgment. On appeal, Berdella essentially argues that Délo and Branson interfered with his right to correspond with non-inmates in violation of the First Amendment and denied him meaningful access to the courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Délo and Branson respond in part by asserting that Berdella has failed to set forth facts showing a constitutional violation occurred. We agree.
In reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment we apply the same standard as the district court. E.g., Meyer v. Barnes, 867 F.2d 464, 466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 825, 110 S.Ct. 86, 107 L.Ed.2d 51 (1989). Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The nonmov-ing party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Berdella initially claims that the Department’s policy honoring a person’s request not to receive mail from an inmate violates his First Amendment right to correspond with non-inmates. We disagree. The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on outgoing inmate mail must be generally necessary to protect a legitimate government interest. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811-12, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), overruled in part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411-14, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1880-82, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) (limiting Procunier to outgoing mail). Applying the Procunier standard, this court held invalid a prison policy that prohibited inmates from corresponding with anyone who had not previously consented to receive mail. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 211-12 (8th Cir.1974). We indicated in Fin-ney, however, that the government’s interest in protecting the public from harassment by inmates would justify prohibiting an inmate from sending mail to persons who have affirmatively requested that mail not be received from an inmate. Id. at 211.
We see no reason not to follow Finney here. The Department’s policy is generally necessary to serve the government’s legitimate interest in protecting the public from harassment. Summary judgment in favor of Délo and Branson as to this aspect of Berdella’s First Amendment claim, therefore, is proper.
Berdella next asserts that Délo and Branson’s enforcement of the Department’s policy denied him meaningful access to the courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Although we are concerned with the potential effects of the Department’s policy and believe that the policy should contain an exception for mail related to court proceedings, we conclude that Berdella failed to show that he was prejudiced by Délo and Branson’s conduct.
It is well established that an inmate has a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). To assert a successful claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts, however, an inmate must demonstrate that he suffered prejudice. See, e.g., Flittie v. Solem, 827 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir.1987); Grady v. Wilken, 735 F.2d 303, 305-06 (8th Cir.1984). In Grady, for example, an inmate alleged that prison officials had denied him meaningful access to the courts when his transfer to a segregated unit for violating prison rules resulted in the loss of his mailing privileges for twenty days. The inmate had a lawsuit pending during this period. We held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the prison officials because the policy involved was constitutional under Procunier and the inmate had failed to demonstrate that the loss of mailing privileges prejudiced his lawsuit. Grady, 735 F.2d at 305-06.
Like the inmate in Grady, Berdella has not shown that the restrictions on his mail denied him meaningful access to the courts. As discussed above, the Department’s policy is valid under Procunier and Berdella has failed to show that he suffered prejudice as a result of his inability to communicate with Murphy either as trustee of his estate or as a party-opponent.
Although a trustee of an inmate’s estate under chapter 460 has a duty to provide for the inmate’s support, the primary purpose of the trust is to protect the legitimate claims of the inmate’s creditors and to prevent the inmate from wasting the estate. See Berdella v. Pender, 821 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Mo.1991). In managing the estate, the trustee may consider, but need not follow, the inmate’s instructions. See Thompson v. Bond, 421 F.Supp. 878, 883 (W.D.Mo.1976). Because litigating every disagreement between the inmate and the trustee would undermine the trust’s purpose of avoiding wasting of the estate, the inmate must allege a violation of the trustee’s duty, not merely a dislike of the trustee’s decisions. Berdella, 821 S.W.2d at 851. Although Berdella is not pleased with how Murphy has managed his estate, he has failed to set forth facts showing he was prejudiced by his inability to communicate with Murphy as trustee of the estate.
We also find no prejudice resulting from Berdella’s inability to communicate with Murphy as a party-opponent. Although the restriction on Berdella’s mail threatened to prejudice his actions against Murphy by interfering with his ability to serve court documents on Murphy, Berdella served several documents through a third-party and has not set forth facts showing he was prejudiced by his alleged inability to serve additional documents through similar or other alternative means. Summary judgment in favor of Délo and Branson on Berdella’s claim that he was denied meaningful access to the courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, therefore, is proper.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we lack jurisdiction to address Berdella’s objections to the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Murphy and we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Délo and Branson.
Berdella is currently incarcerated at the Jefferson City Correctional Center in Missouri.
The Department policy in question reads: There shall be no restrictions on the number of persons to whom an inmate may write nor the number of letters an inmate may mail except as outlined in this procedure. 1. Persons who do not wish to receive mail from an inmate may request in writing that the correspondence be terminated. This will include the parent or legal guardian of any person who is under 18 years of age. The inmate should be informed in writing by institutional staff that the correspondence is not to be continued. Such correspondence should not be resumed unless authorized in writing by the person wishing to resume correspondence. 2.Any time a restriction is imposed as noted above, written documentation should be placed in the inmate’s classification file. Mo. Dep’t of Corrections, Proc. No. IS13-1.1(III)(A). .Murphy's first letter, dated May 17, 1989, reads in pertinent part: Also, I do not want Mr. Berdella’s correspondence sent to me. If possible, I would prefer to have just the green check with its description of the item. I do not consider myself Mr. Berdella's censor. If I have questions after receiving a green check I will call you. Murphy’s second letter, undated, reads in pertinent part: Also, I wrote once before saying that I did not want to receive Mr. Berdella’s correspondence. I know this may represent an inconvenience, but I will appreciate your cooperation in this regard.
When Murphy later learned about the misunderstanding he clarified his request.
Berdella also filed an amended notice of appeal on October 2, 1991, well beyond the 30-day limit provided in Rule 4(a). The amended notice referred to several district court orders, including the July 11, 1990, order. This notice, however, was treated as initiating a separate appeal which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal was without prejudice to Berdella’s first appeal. See Berdella v. Delo, No. 91-3460 (8th Cir. Nov. 19, 1991).
Berdella additionally contends that his notice of appeal is sufficient because the June 26, 1991, order constitutes a final judgment in which all interlocutory orders, including the July 11, 1990, order merged. Berdella’s analysis is correct to the extent that the appeal of a final order permits the review of issues resolved in earlier orders, if proper notice is given. See Drake v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 553 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir.1977); 15A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3905.1 (2d ed. 1992). Berdella carries this principle too far here, however, in asserting that the appeal of a final order alone also serves as sufficient notice of appeal for separate, distinct issues and theories of recovery addressed in earlier orders.
The district court did not classify Berdella’s claims in the same manner as we do. In particular, the district court never expressly recognized that Berdella’s First Amendment arguments asserted more than a violation of his right to correspond with non-inmates. Although the district court rejected Berdella's denial of meaningful access to the courts claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, it held that Berdella’s right to correspond under the First Amendment was violated because the Department’s policy lacked adequate safeguards to insure that an inmate’s communication with a party-opponent was not completely severed. In our view, however, this analysis concerns Ber-della’s meaningful access to the courts, not his right to correspond. As such, although we affirm the district court's decision, our reasoning differs slightly.
The district court held that the less-stringent rational basis standard established in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), for reviewing restrictions on an inmate's constitutional rights applied in this case. The court reasoned that Procunier did not apply because the Procunier Court was concerned primarily with the rights of non-inmates to receive mail from inmates. See Procunier, 416 U.S. at 408, 94 S.Ct. at 1808-09. Here, in contrast, the only rights affected were Berdella’s because Murphy did not wish to receive mail from Berdella. The district court’s reasoning, however, does not fully comport with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Thornburgh, which simply drew a distinction between outgoing and incoming mail. The Thornburgh Court applied the less-stringent Turner standard to restrictions on incoming mail because of the heightened security risk presented by such mail, not because only the inmate's rights were affected by the restrictions. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 411-14, 109 S.Ct. at 1880-82. Because we find no heightened security risk presented by outgoing mail to unwilling recipients, we conclude the Procunier standard still applies in the present case.
This right may stem from both the First Amendment right to petition and the Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. See Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm’n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1427 n. 7 (8th Cir.1986).