Anwar al-Awlaki

Victims
1 killing, Sanaa, 2010: convicted in absentia in Yemen of incitement (2011); other plots and deaths attributed by US officials, never tried
Years active
October 6, 2010
Location
Sanaa, Yemen (killing); Sanaa, Yemen (trial); Las Cruces, New Mexico (birth); al-Jawf province, Yemen (death)
Method
Shot by a security guard at the office, who was convicted of the killing; al-Awlaki was convicted of incitement by email, not of the act (Yemeni court's finding)
Status
10 years' imprisonment in absentia, Sanaa, January 17, 2011. Never tried in the US. Killed before any US charge or trial: US strike, al-Jawf province, Yemen, September 30, 2011.

On January 17, 2011, the state security court in Sanaa, the court that hears terrorism cases in Yemen, sentenced Anwar al-Awlaki to 10 years in prison. He was not in the courtroom. The judgment held that the killing of a French national at the Sanaa office of an Austrian oil company the previous October had been "committed under the incitement of Anwar and Othman al-Awlaki," and it was the only verdict any court ever returned against him. On September 30, 2011, he was killed in a United States strike in al-Jawf province, in the Yemeni desert. No American court had charged him with anything.

That gap, between what the US government said he had done and what any court had found, runs through every part of his case. He was born in New Mexico, educated in Colorado and California, and served as an imam in San Diego and northern Virginia before he left the United States in 2002. By 2010 the US Treasury had designated him a leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the President of the United States, announcing his death, said he had directed two failed plots against American aircraft. In 2013 the government acknowledged that he was the one US citizen it had specifically targeted and killed since 2009. The courts that heard his family's challenges to that decision never ruled on whether it was lawful.

Las Cruces, Fort Collins and San Diego

Anwar al-Awlaki was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico, on April 21, 1971, the date the US Treasury lists, with April 22 given as an alternate. His birth made him an American citizen; he also held Yemeni citizenship. His father came from the Awlaq tribe, which dominated much of Shabwa province in eastern Yemen, and had studied agricultural economics in the United States before returning to Yemen and becoming the country's minister of agriculture.

The family went back to Yemen when Anwar was a boy, and he spent his teenage years there. In 1991 he returned to the United States on a Yemeni government scholarship to study engineering at Colorado State University, and after university he became a leader at a local mosque in Fort Collins. He then moved to San Diego, where he worked toward a master's degree in education and, from 1996, led the Masjid al-Ribat al-Islami for about four years.

The 9/11 Commission

His years in San Diego drew the attention of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Two of the men who took part in the September 11, 2001 attacks, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, spent time in San Diego in 2000, and the Commission found that they reportedly respected al-Awlaki as a religious figure and developed a close relationship with him. Interviewed after the attacks, he said he did not recognize al-Hazmi's name but identified his picture, admitted meeting him several times, and said he could not remember the specifics of what they discussed. He described al-Hazmi as a soft-spoken Saudi who came to the mosque with a companion and did not have a large circle of friends.

He left San Diego in mid-2000 and in January 2001 moved to Virginia, where he became one of the imams at the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church. He also served as a Muslim chaplain at George Washington University. Al-Hazmi later appeared at the Falls Church mosque, along with another of the September 11 hijackers. Al-Awlaki said he remembered al-Hazmi from San Diego but denied any contact with either man in Virginia. The Commission wrote that some FBI agents suspected otherwise and that it shared their suspicion, "given the remarkable coincidence" of the earlier relationship. It was unable to locate or interview him, and it concluded that it could not learn enough about his relationship with the two men to reach a conclusion. He was never charged with anything connected to the attacks.

Leaving the United States

He left the Falls Church mosque in 2002. That year he went to the United Kingdom and spent several months on a lecture tour, came back briefly to northern Virginia around late 2003, and in early 2004 moved to Yemen with his wife and children.

In mid-2006 Yemeni authorities arrested him. The US Treasury later stated that he was imprisoned on kidnapping-for-ransom charges and over an alleged plot to kidnap a US official. He was held for about 18 months and was released in December 2007. He said afterward that FBI agents had questioned him repeatedly during his detention about his ties to the September 11 hijackers. After his release, the Treasury said, he went into hiding.

Fort Hood

On November 5, 2009, an Army psychiatrist, Major Nidal Hasan, killed 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas. He was charged with 13 counts of premeditated murder and 32 counts of attempted murder and was tried before a military court. Before the attack, Hasan had written to al-Awlaki.

An independent review of the FBI's handling of those messages, led by former FBI Director William Webster at the request of the bureau, took more than two years. A redacted version was made public on July 19, 2012. It recorded that Hasan sent al-Awlaki 18 emails, beginning in December 2008, and that al-Awlaki replied to two of them. FBI agents in San Diego, who were investigating al-Awlaki, saw the messages and passed them to the bureau's Washington Field Office, asking that Hasan's superiors be contacted. Agents in two counterterrorism task forces concluded that the emails fit Hasan's research on the effects of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, and no formal investigation was opened. The review judged the decision not to interview Hasan flawed, found shortcomings in FBI policies and procedures, and made 18 recommendations. After it, the FBI began alerting its headquarters whenever al-Awlaki's name came up in a terrorism investigation.

The review established contact, not command. No court found that al-Awlaki planned, directed or knew in advance of the Fort Hood attack, and he was never charged in connection with it.

Christmas Day 2009 and the Treasury designation

On December 25, 2009, a Nigerian man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to attack Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. The attempt failed. Abdulmutallab later pleaded guilty in federal court in Detroit to eight charges, among them the attempted murder of the 289 people aboard, and on February 16, 2012, he was sentenced to life in prison.

Al-Awlaki's part in that case was set out by the US government, first in a sanctions notice and later in court papers in Abdulmutallab's prosecution. In July 2010 the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated him a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. The Federal Register notice gives the designation date as July 12, 2010; the Treasury announced it on July 16. The designation froze any assets he held under US jurisdiction and barred Americans from dealing with him. In its announcement the Treasury called him a key leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, said he had pledged loyalty to the group's leader, recruited for it and helped focus it on planning attacks against US interests, and stated that he had prepared Abdulmutallab for the Christmas Day operation and directed him to carry it out over US airspace.

The government's sentencing memorandum in the Detroit case, filed in February 2012, went further. Drawing on Abdulmutallab's own statements to the FBI, prosecutors wrote that Abdulmutallab had traveled to Yemen in August 2009 to find al-Awlaki, had stayed with him for three days, and that al-Awlaki had given final approval to the plan, insisted that the target be a US airliner over US soil, and arranged for a film crew to record a statement from Abdulmutallab before the attempt. Those are the prosecution's assertions in another man's case, resting largely on that man's account. Al-Awlaki was dead by then, and no court tested them against him.

The Sanaa killing

On October 6, 2010, Jacques Spagnolo, a French national, was killed at the Sanaa office of OMV, the Austrian oil and gas company. A British man was wounded in the same incident. The man arrested at the scene was Hisham Mohammed Assem, a 19-year-old security guard at the office.

Yemeni officials first described the case as a criminal matter. The defense ministry said Assem probably acted for personal reasons, and OMV said it saw no political background to the killing. Assem himself told the court that he had acted over a personal dispute and that he had no connection with al-Awlaki or with terrorism. Prosecutors told a different story. They said Assem had acknowledged receiving messages from al-Awlaki over the internet urging him to kill the foreigners he worked with, and that the contact ran through emails Assem had exchanged with Othman al-Awlaki, Anwar's cousin. The confession prosecutors read in court linked Assem to al-Awlaki. Assem said the confession had been extracted under torture, that he had been made to sign it blindfolded and deprived of sleep, and that it was false.

Trial in his absence

The trial opened on Tuesday, November 2, 2010, in Sanaa. Anwar and Othman al-Awlaki had been added as defendants at the last minute, both in absentia, charged with plotting to kill foreigners and with belonging to al-Qaeda; prosecutors also charged both men with forming an armed gang to kill foreigners in Yemen. The hearing was adjourned so that notices of the charges could be published in local newspapers for the two absent men and so that a lawyer could be assigned to Assem.

When the court sat again on November 6, its presiding judge ordered that Anwar al-Awlaki be "arrested by force, dead or alive." By then he was believed to be in a mountainous region of Yemen, sheltered by family and tribal religious leaders who said he had no ties to terrorism; the Treasury's 2010 notice had placed him in Shabwah Governorate. Yemeni officials had already said they would not hand him to the United States: as a Yemeni citizen, they said, he had to be prosecuted in Yemen, and the constitution forbade the extradition of citizens. In November the lawyer appointed for both al-Awlakis told the court that they had no "connection or contact" with Assem and that he did not know where his client was.

Eight witnesses testified that they had seen Assem commit the killing. On January 17, 2011, the court gave its judgment. Assem was sentenced to death. Anwar al-Awlaki was convicted in absentia of belonging to al-Qaeda and inciting the killing of foreigners and sentenced to 10 years in prison; Othman al-Awlaki was convicted in absentia of incitement and sentenced to eight. The court said the three men had been "working within a terrorist group," and the judgment, as read in Sanaa, linked them to unspecified terrorist organizations without naming al-Qaeda. The judge described the killing as an attack on public order. Assem rejected the verdict and said he would appeal.

The judgment had its critics in Yemen. A human rights lawyer in Sanaa said the prosecution had produced no evidence of al-Awlaki's involvement and called the proceeding a political tribunal. No appeal on al-Awlaki's behalf is on record, and he never served any part of the sentence.

The challenge in Washington

By the time the Sanaa trial began, al-Awlaki's case had reached an American courtroom by another route. In August 2010 his father, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights, sued the President, the director of the CIA and the secretary of defense in the US District Court for the District of Columbia. The suit asked the court to rule that, outside armed conflict, the government could kill a US citizen abroad only as a last resort against an imminent threat to life, and to require the government to disclose the standard it used to place citizens on a list for lethal action.

On December 7, 2010, the court dismissed the case without reaching its merits. It held that the father lacked standing to assert his son's rights, and it held that some executive decisions to kill a US citizen overseas are "constitutionally committed to the political branches" and beyond judicial review. The judge acknowledged the "somewhat unsettling nature" of that conclusion, called the case "unique and extraordinary," and wrote that the merits "must await another day."

Al-Jawf, September 30, 2011

Early on Friday, September 30, 2011, al-Awlaki was killed in al-Jawf province, about 140 kilometers from Sanaa, roughly eight kilometers from the town of Khashef. He was 40. Yemen's defense ministry announced the death in a statement that said he had been killed "along with some of his companions," and a senior White House official confirmed it. Samir Khan, a US citizen of Pakistani origin who had co-edited the AQAP magazine Inspire, died in the same strike. US officials put the number of other dead at two; a local tribal leader put the total at seven.

The announcement came from the President. Speaking at Fort Myer, Virginia, that morning, before a ceremony for the incoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Barack Obama said al-Awlaki had been "the leader of external operations" for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, that he had "directed the failed attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009," and that he had directed the failed attempt against US cargo planes in 2010. The President also said that al-Awlaki and his organization had been "directly responsible for the deaths of many Yemeni citizens." Those statements are the government's account. None of them was ever put to a court with al-Awlaki as a defendant.

Acknowledgment and the second lawsuit

On May 22, 2013, the Attorney General wrote to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and to the leaders of both parties in Congress. Since 2009, the letter said, the United States had "specifically targeted and killed one U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi." It stated that the decision had been subjected to "an exceptionally rigorous interagency review." The letter named three other Americans killed in US counterterrorism operations who, it said, "were not specifically targeted": Samir Khan, Jude Mohammed and al-Awlaki's 16-year-old son, who died in a separate strike in Yemen.

His father, by then the personal representative of the estates of his son and grandson, sued again, this time for money damages from current and former officials, joined by Samir Khan's mother. On April 4, 2014, the federal court in Washington dismissed that case too. It rejected the government's request to bar such claims entirely and found that the father had stated a plausible due process claim on his son's behalf, but it held that it could not create a damages remedy for the killing without intruding on the war powers of the President and Congress, and it described the judiciary's role in such matters as "exceedingly limited."

Context: the court in Sanaa and the absence of a US charge

The court that convicted al-Awlaki was Yemen's specialized state security court in Sanaa, which hears terrorism cases. It tried him under Yemeni law as a Yemeni citizen, and Yemen's position was that, because its constitution barred the extradition of citizens, any trial of him had to take place there. His conviction was entered in absentia, after notices of the charges were published in local newspapers, and he was represented in his absence by an appointed lawyer who told the court he had no contact with his client.

In the United States his legal position rested on executive action rather than criminal process. The July 2010 designation was made under Executive Order 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, on findings that he acted for or on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and provided support for acts of terrorism. In November 2010, reporting from Sanaa noted that charging him in the United States would make it easier to demand his extradition. No US indictment was ever filed.

Disputed and unproven points

The Yemeni conviction is the only judicial finding against al-Awlaki, and it was contested from the start. The man convicted of the killing said he had acted over a personal dispute, denied any contact with al-Awlaki and said his confession was obtained under torture; Yemeni defense officials and the company initially called the killing a criminal matter with no political background; and a Sanaa human rights lawyer said the prosecution offered no evidence of al-Awlaki's involvement. Against that stands the court's finding that the killing was committed under his incitement.

His role in the Christmas Day 2009 attempt and the 2010 cargo plot rests on US government statements: the Treasury's 2010 designation, the President's statement of September 30, 2011, and the prosecution's 2012 sentencing memorandum in Abdulmutallab's case, which relied largely on Abdulmutallab's own statements. The President's statement that al-Awlaki and his organization were responsible for the deaths of many Yemeni citizens named no incident. His link to the Fort Hood attack, as the Webster review recorded it, was an exchange of emails in which he answered two of 18 messages. His contacts with two September 11 hijackers remained, in the 9/11 Commission's word, without a conclusion. None of these matters was tried.

Timeline

April 21, 1971: Anwar al-Awlaki is born in Las Cruces, New Mexico (alternate date April 22).

1991: Returns to the United States to study engineering at Colorado State University.

1996 to 2000: Leads a San Diego mosque.

January 2001: Moves to Virginia and becomes an imam at Dar al-Hijrah in Falls Church.

2002: Leaves the Falls Church mosque and the United States.

Early 2004: Moves to Yemen.

Mid-2006 to December 2007: Held by Yemeni authorities.

November 5, 2009: Fort Hood attack; Hasan had written to him 18 times.

December 25, 2009: Failed attempt on Northwest Airlines Flight 253.

July 2010: Designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US Treasury (dated July 12, announced July 16).

August 2010: His father sues in federal court in Washington.

October 6, 2010: Jacques Spagnolo is killed in Sanaa.

November 2, 2010: Trial opens in Sanaa, with al-Awlaki a defendant in absentia.

November 6, 2010: The Sanaa court orders him taken "dead or alive."

December 7, 2010: The Washington suit is dismissed.

January 17, 2011: Convicted in absentia in Sanaa and sentenced to 10 years.

September 30, 2011: Killed in a US strike in al-Jawf province, Yemen.

February 16, 2012: Abdulmutallab is sentenced to life in Detroit.

July 19, 2012: The Webster review of the FBI's Fort Hood handling is made public.

May 22, 2013: The Attorney General confirms that the United States specifically targeted and killed him.

April 4, 2014: The damages suit over his death is dismissed.