On the morning of March 24, 2015, an Airbus A320 operated by Germanwings, the low-cost carrier of the Lufthansa group, left Barcelona for Düsseldorf with 144 passengers and six crew members aboard. It never arrived. The aircraft came down in the French Alps, in the mountain commune of Prads-Haute-Bléone in the department of Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, and everyone on board died. The co-pilot was Andreas Lubitz, a 27-year-old German who had flown for the airline as a first officer for less than a year.
Within two days, French prosecutors announced that the crash had not been an accident. The French civil aviation safety investigation authority, the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses, known as the BEA, reached the same conclusion in its final report a year later, finding that the collision with the ground "was due to the deliberate and planned action of the co-pilot who decided to commit suicide while alone in the cockpit." Lubitz was never charged and never tried. He died in the crash, and under French law no murder inquiry could be opened against a perpetrator who was dead. The criminal investigations that did follow, in France and in Germany, looked at whether anyone else bore responsibility, and both ended without a charge. The deaths of the 149 other people aboard therefore rest on the findings of a safety investigation and the statements of prosecutors, not on the judgment of any court.
Lubitz came from Montabaur, a town in the wooded hills of western Germany, about 40 miles northwest of Frankfurt. He finished his Abitur, the German university-entrance examination, at the Mons-Tabor secondary school in the town. Flying began for him well before any airline was involved. At about 14 or 15 he joined LSC Westerwald, a gliding club that flew from a grass runway in the hills near Montabaur, and as a teenager he earned his glider pilot's license there.
He kept his ties to the club after his career moved on. In the fall of 2014, a few months before the crash, he returned to Montabaur to renew his glider license, making about 20 takeoffs to meet the requirement.
His path to the airline cockpit ran on a long, tightly dated track. Between January and April 2008 he went through the entry selection courses of Lufthansa Flight Training, and on September 1, 2008, he began his basic training at the Lufthansa Flight Training pilot school in Bremen. On November 5, 2008, he suspended that training for medical reasons, and he resumed it on August 26, 2009. He passed the written examination for the airline transport pilot license on October 13, 2010, and from November 8, 2010, to March 2, 2011, he continued his training at the Airline Training Center in Phoenix, Arizona.
His private pilot license was issued on March 1, 2011. From June 15, 2011, to the end of 2013 he worked for Lufthansa as a flight attendant under contract while he completed his air transport training. Between September 27 and December 23, 2013, he took and passed his A320 type rating with Lufthansa in Munich. He joined Germanwings on December 4, 2013, and his multi-crew pilot license, the qualification that allowed him to fly as part of an airline crew, was issued on February 11, 2014.
From January to June 2014 he completed the airline's conversion training, including line flying under supervision. On June 26, 2014, he passed his proficiency check and was appointed co-pilot, and on October 28, 2014, he passed his operator proficiency check, which also revalidated his A320 rating. By March 2015 he had logged 919 flying hours, 540 of them on the A320.
The aircraft was an Airbus A320-211, registered D-AIPX. That morning it had flown from Düsseldorf to Barcelona with the same two pilots, and it was to carry them back on the return leg as flight 4U9525. The captain commanded the flight, and Lubitz was the pilot flying. Four cabin crew members worked in the cabin, and 144 passengers were aboard.
The BEA found that the co-pilot, alone on the flight deck during the cruise, deliberately brought the aircraft down.
That morning the Marseille en-route air traffic control center told the BEA that an A320 had crashed while crossing the French Alps. A safety investigation opened immediately under European Regulation No. 996/2010, which governs the investigation of civil aviation accidents in the European Union. The aircraft was destroyed.
Two separate inquiries began at once, and they ran side by side for years. The BEA's safety investigation existed only to improve aviation safety; it was not meant to assign blame or liability. The judicial investigation, under the authority of the Marseille public prosecutor, was the one that could lead to criminal proceedings. The prosecutor gave the lead role in the criminal inquiry to the research section of the air transport gendarmerie, the specialized unit that handles serious aviation cases in France.
The two inquiries depended on the same evidence, and the rules for sharing it had been written before the crash. The cockpit voice recorder reached the BEA for readout the day after the crash, and on reading it the agency concluded that an act of unlawful interference had probably been involved. In that situation, the European regulation and an advance arrangement signed on September 16, 2014, between the French Ministry of Justice and the BEA required the safety investigators to pass the relevant elements to the judicial authorities immediately, and left the agency free to decide whether to go on with its own work. It chose to go on. From then on the BEA alone spoke publicly for the technical side of the case, while the prosecutors spoke for the criminal side.
On March 26, 2015, the Marseille public prosecutor held a news conference and named Lubitz as the co-pilot. He said the crash had been deliberate. Prosecutors in Düsseldorf had meanwhile opened their own investigation in Germany.
On May 6, 2015, the BEA published a preliminary report, prepared from the information gathered in the first weeks of its work. The full analysis was left for the final report.
On June 11, 2015, the Marseille public prosecutor announced, at a news conference in Paris, the next stage of the French case. He said the French penal code forbade him to open a judicial investigation for murder, because the perpetrator was dead.
What he opened instead was an information judiciaire, a formal judicial investigation, against X, meaning against unknown persons, for involuntary homicide. Its purpose was to establish whether mistakes had been made in monitoring the co-pilot's psychological health and whether charges of manslaughter should be brought against anyone. The prosecutor's office seized the Marseille collective accidents center by a réquisitoire introductif, the written request that formally opens a judicial investigation, dated June 17, 2015, on the charge of involuntary homicides. The file went to three investigating judges of the center.
The French file did not stay in France. At the end of December 2015, the Düsseldorf prosecutor's office received the court files from the French investigating judge on a data carrier. They had to be translated before the German investigators could begin to evaluate them, a task the office expected to take several months.
The BEA published its final report on March 13, 2016, under file number BEA2015-0125, and the agency's director presented it to the press. It dealt as much with the system around the co-pilot as with the flight itself.
The agency had widened the investigation well beyond the flight itself. To examine how pilots' fitness was certified, it brought in medical experts, psychiatrists among them, and specialists in medical certification from civil aviation authorities and from the French railway and electricity industries.
On the aircraft, the findings were short. It held a valid certificate of airworthiness, its maintenance records showed no faults incompatible with the planned flight, and the flight data and voice recordings showed no system failure that could have contributed to the crash. Both pilots held the licenses and ratings the flight required.
On the cause, the report was direct. It found that the crash resulted from the deliberate and planned action of the co-pilot, and that the system of medical certification for pilots, in particular its reliance on pilots to report a decline in their own fitness between periodic examinations, had not succeeded in keeping him from flying while he was experiencing mental disorder with psychotic symptoms. It named three factors that may have contributed to that failure: the co-pilot's probable fear of losing his ability to fly professionally if he reported his condition; the financial consequences he faced, since he had no specific insurance covering loss of income if he were found unfit to fly; and the absence of clear guidelines in German regulations on when a threat to public safety outweighs medical confidentiality.
The report also stated that neither the authorities nor his employer could have acted to keep him off the flight that day, because no one, not the co-pilot himself and not anyone around him, had informed them of his condition.
In Germany the case took a different legal form. The Düsseldorf public prosecutor's office ran a Todesermittlungsverfahren, a death investigation, which was not directed against any particular person. Its question was whether anyone still living could be held criminally responsible, including the physicians who had seen the co-pilot before the crash, and the work was led by an experienced prosecutor from the office's capital-crimes section.
While the investigation was open, the office said that apart from the co-pilot its investigators saw no one who could share responsibility, and that German law therefore offered no starting point for criminal proceedings. The Marseille prosecutor had offered to hand the French case over to Düsseldorf. The German office said that no formal request to take it had arrived, and the case stayed in France.
The Düsseldorf public prosecutor's office announced on January 9, 2017, almost two years after the crash, that it had closed its investigation. It found no sufficient evidence of guilt by anyone still alive in connection with the crash, and no indication that anyone other than Lubitz had been involved. It found that the airline had no knowledge of his condition and that he had confided his intentions to no one, including the doctors treating him. Had suspicion fallen on any living person, the office said, criminal proceedings, for example for negligent homicide, would have been opened against that person. None were. The office set out its conclusion in a closing memorandum.
The French judicial investigation lasted almost seven years. On February 21, 2022, the vice-presidents in charge of investigation at the collective accidents unit of the Marseille judicial court issued an ordonnance de non-lieu, an order dismissing the case, in the inquiry against X for involuntary homicide by a natural person and by a legal entity. The order followed the submissions of the Marseille prosecutors and was made public in early March 2022.
The judges had before them the opinion of a public-health medical inspector and the report of a psychiatric expert. They held that the offense of involuntary homicide was made out against no natural person and no legal entity.
On the central question, the judges found that the co-pilot's act had not been foreseeable, because his suicidal intention had been known to no one, and that no one could have acted in advance to prevent the crash. They found no characterized fault and no deliberate breach of a duty of care by Germanwings, by Lufthansa, or by their managers or employees. The prosecutors' office also closed any proceedings concerning the doctors who might have known of his condition in the months before the crash. With that order, the last criminal case arising from the deaths came to an end, and no charge had been brought against anyone.
No court has tested the conclusion that the co-pilot acted deliberately. It rests on the BEA's analysis of the flight recorders and on the statements of the French and German prosecutors, and the French judges who closed the case in 2022 treated his act as a premise of their order, not a matter they decided at trial. The BEA presented his fear of losing his license as probable, not established. What is known of his reasons goes no further than the BEA's account of his condition and the factors it listed.
September 1, 2008: Begins basic training at the Lufthansa Flight Training pilot school in Bremen.
November 5, 2008: Suspends training for medical reasons.
August 26, 2009: Resumes training.
November 8, 2010 to March 2, 2011: Continues training in Phoenix, Arizona.
December 4, 2013: Joins Germanwings.
June 26, 2014: Appointed co-pilot after his proficiency check.
Fall 2014: Renews his glider license at the Montabaur club.
March 24, 2015: Flight 4U9525, Barcelona to Düsseldorf, crashes at Prads-Haute-Bléone; all 150 aboard die. The BEA opens a safety investigation.
March 26, 2015: The Marseille public prosecutor names the co-pilot and says the crash was deliberate.
May 6, 2015: The BEA publishes its preliminary report.
June 11, 2015: The Marseille prosecutor announces a judicial investigation against unknown persons for involuntary homicide.
June 17, 2015: A réquisitoire introductif opens the judicial investigation before the Marseille collective accidents center.
December 2015: The Düsseldorf prosecutor's office receives the French court files.
March 13, 2016: The BEA publishes its final report.
January 9, 2017: The Düsseldorf prosecutor's office closes its investigation.
February 21, 2022: Marseille investigating judges issue a non-lieu order closing the French case.