On June 24, 2007, the Second Trial Chamber of the Iraqi High Tribunal found Ali Hassan al-Majid guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes for the Anfal campaign, the operations against the Kurdish population of northern Iraq that ran from February to September 1988. He had held civil and military authority over the north while those operations were carried out, and the court found that the orders behind them were his. It sentenced him to death on five of the twelve counts on which it convicted him. He was the only defendant other than Saddam Hussein ever charged with genocide over Anfal, and when the former president was executed in another case before the verdict, he became the only one convicted of it.
That judgment was the first of four death sentences. The same tribunal later condemned him for the suppression of the Shia uprising in southern Iraq in 1991, for the killing and displacement of Shia civilians in Baghdad and Najaf in 1999, and finally for the attack on Halabja in March 1988. A fifth case, over the execution of traders in 1992, ended in a 15-year term. Political disputes over his co-defendants held up the execution of the first sentence for more than two years. He was executed in Baghdad on January 25, 2010, eight days after the last verdict.
Before the regime fell, al-Majid had been a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, the body that governed Iraq under Saddam Hussein. He had begun as an army sergeant. His rise to the post that brought him before the tribunal came in March 1987, when the Baath Party placed him in charge of every state agency in the Kurdish region, the police, the army and the militias among them.
The legal instrument behind that grant mattered at trial. Revolution Command Council decision No. 160, dated March 29, 1987, gave him wide authority over the state's civil, military, security and party bodies in the north, and the tribunal treated it as the source of his power. A further decision authorized him to carry it out and to suspend or dismiss officials. The trial chamber found that the Executive Council of the Kurdish autonomous region, the governorates, and the security and military intelligence services of the north all answered to him. He exercised that authority as head of the North Organization Office of the Baath Party, a post the court found he held from March 1987 to September 1988, and he ran it from Kirkuk.
What he did with that authority was set out in documents the prosecution placed before the court. The central one was letter No. 4008, dated June 20, 1987, addressed to the commands of the army's First, Second and Fifth Corps. It declared the villages it covered closed from June 22, 1987, and the court read it together with an earlier letter, No. 3650 of June 3, 1987, which he had also signed, and with a letter of July 22, 1987, No. 5083, that carried his instructions on the handling of detainees. The Appellate Chamber found that it and the orders that followed directed the removal of Kurdish civilians from their villages, barred any human or animal presence from areas declared prohibited, imposed an economic blockade on those areas, and ordered the execution without trial of men between roughly 15 and 70 years of age found inside them. The court held that he did not merely pass these instructions down a chain of command. He issued them.
The campaign that followed took its name from the operations the army carried out across Iraqi Kurdistan in 1988. The tribunal found that there were eight of them, between February and September of that year, directed against the Kurds of the north across four governorates: Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Dahuk and Kirkuk.
The trial chamber traced them stage by stage. The first ran from February to mid-March 1988 in the Sargalu and Bargalu area and the valleys around it. The second, over the night of March 22 to 23, reached Qara Dagh and its neighboring villages. The third, from April 7 to April 20, covered Garmiyan, Chamchamal and Qadir Karam. The fourth began on May 3 and lasted ten days in the basin of the Lesser Zab. The fifth, sixth and seventh carried the operations on into August through the districts of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk, among them Kifri and Tuz Khurmatu. The eighth, which the court called the closure, ran from August 22 to September 6, 1988, in Dahuk governorate along the Turkish border. The judgment held that none of this was connected to the war with Iran, and that the operations had been aimed at Kurdish areas from the start. Survivors fled. Others were arrested and sent to camps, where the court found that many were tortured and held in conditions it described as harsh. Property was looted and villages were destroyed.
The court's own findings, as the Appellate Chamber later summarized them, gave the measure of the operations in the terms of the evidence before it. More than 3,000 villages were destroyed. More than 1,000 primary and middle schools and more than 2,000 mosques were affected. Tens of thousands of civilians were handed to the security committees, the North Affairs Bureau and the detention camps, and tens of thousands were killed. Thousands of detainees remained unaccounted for when the trial ended. The victim lists presented to the trial chamber ran, on average, to between 30 and 100 names apiece, and the court built its findings on witness statements, expert reports and the regime's own documents.
The attack on Halabja, a Kurdish town in the northeast, came in March 1988, in the middle of that period. It was not part of the Anfal indictment. The tribunal set it aside for a trial of its own, which did not open until December 2008 and did not end until January 2010.
Al-Majid's later career brought him to two other events that ended in tribunal convictions. In 1990, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, he was named the chief administrator of the occupied country. By 1991 he was minister of the interior, and in that post he coordinated the suppression of the uprising that broke out among the Shia of southern Iraq after Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War.
The 1992 case grew out of the sanctions that followed the war. Traders in Baghdad were accused of raising the prices of basic goods in breach of state price controls and were executed for it. The 1999 case followed the assassination of the Shia cleric Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr. In its aftermath the military was sent into Shia districts, mainly in Baghdad, to prevent demonstrations, and civilians were killed and driven from their districts in Baghdad and in Najaf.
After the United States and its allies invaded Iraq in March 2003, al-Majid was taken into United States custody in Basra in August 2003, and the capture was announced on August 21. He remained in United States custody through his first trials, while the Iraqi courts held jurisdiction over him.
The road to trial began with a referral. On April 2, 2006, the tribunal's chief investigative judge sent seven men to trial by his decree No. 2. Under Iraqi procedure the court was not bound by the charges in that referral: it heard the evidence first and drew up its own charge papers later, on February 20, 2007.
The Anfal case opened before the five judges of the tribunal's Second Trial Chamber on August 21, 2006, as case No. 1/(C) Second/2006. Seven men stood accused. Saddam Hussein, as head of the Revolutionary Command Council and general commander of the armed forces, was charged as the man who had granted al-Majid his powers. Al-Majid was charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; his five co-defendants faced charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The charges covered intentional attacks on civilians, attacks on protected buildings, the destruction and appropriation of property, murder, deportation and enslavement. In the pre-trial papers only he and the former president faced the charge of genocide, but at the first session the presiding judge asked every defendant to plead to all three categories of crime. All seven pleaded not guilty on every count. In September 2006 the Prime Minister and the Cabinet removed that presiding judge, and his successor led the court from the tenth hearing, on September 20, 2006, to the end.
The prosecution built its case in phases. The first, given over to the complainants, ran for twenty-three sessions, from August 21 to November 27, 2006, and sixty-five of them testified to what had happened to them and their villages. A prosecution witness phase followed over five sessions, from November 28 to December 7, 2006, in which nine people testified, many of them experts. Then came the documents. Over nine sessions, from December 18, 2006, to January 29, 2007, the prosecution worked through a referral file of some 4,935 documents, most of them official letters and instructions passed between the agencies of the state, and used them to trace a chain of command from the presidency through military intelligence and the army corps. The strand of that chain that ran through the Baath Party's northern command pointed at al-Majid. Audio recordings were played as well, among them at the session of January 23, 2007.
By the end, the judgment recorded, about 1,192 plaintiffs and witnesses had been identified. The court heard 90 of them and set the others aside as repeating statements already before it. Its file ran to 43 investigative dossiers, and the judges spent four days in the Kurdistan Region inspecting the places the witnesses had described, the camps among them.
The trial ran for ten months. During that time the former president was executed, on December 30, 2006, in a separate case. The proceedings against him in the Anfal case were stopped on January 8, 2007. The case went on against the six remaining defendants.
The defense case rested on several grounds. Al-Majid's lawyers argued that he had not personally committed any of the crimes and had no effective control over those who did; that genocidal intent had not been proved; that the army had sought only to kill armed rebels; that the operations had been part of the border war with Iran; that there was no evidence of the destruction of villages; that the charges were too vague to answer; and that he had acted under the orders of a superior. He denied any intent to commit genocide and denied knowing that civilians were being held, and he told the court that he had acted under emergency conditions, within decision No. 160 and the policy of the party. They also argued that the tribunal itself had been unlawfully created, since the Iraqi constitution prohibited special courts, and that witnesses for the defense had been unable or afraid to come forward. The court refused to hear defense witnesses who lived outside Iraq. Al-Majid himself called none, though the chamber gave him the chance to do so.
The trial chamber answered him in its judgment. It relied on his own admissions, among them his confirmation that he had issued letter No. 4008, and it found that the documents and the recordings showed that he knew what was being done in the north. It treated him as the supreme authority for the region and held him answerable for the acts of those under him under Article 15 of the tribunal's statute, which reaches a superior who knew or had reason to know of his subordinates' crimes and failed to stop them. It held, too, that his rank gave him no immunity.
The chief judge of the Second Trial Chamber read the verdict on Sunday, June 24, 2007. He found that al-Majid had held civil and military authority over northern Iraq, that he had ordered troops to kill Kurdish civilians and to restrict civilians to designated areas, and that he had committed genocide.
The court convicted him on twelve counts under Law No. 10 of 2005, the tribunal's statute. He was sentenced to death on five of them: genocide under Article 11; murder as a crime against humanity and genocide as a crime against humanity under Article 12; enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity; and premeditated attacks on civilians as a war crime under Article 13. On the other seven counts he received life imprisonment for inhumane acts, ten years each for compulsory deportation, torture and ordering the deportation of civilians, fifteen years for looting, and seven years each for attacks on religious and educational buildings and for the unjustified destruction and confiscation of property. Under the Iraqi Penal Code's rule on multiple sentences, the most severe sentence governed. The court also ordered the confiscation of his property.
His co-defendants were sentenced the same day. The former defense minister, who had commanded the first Anfal operation, and the army's deputy chief of staff for operations were each sentenced to death on several counts. The director general of military intelligence and the director of military intelligence for the northern and eastern zones were sentenced to life imprisonment. The former governor of Nineveh province was acquitted for lack of evidence and released.
Every death and life sentence from the tribunal went automatically to a nine-judge appeals panel, and the trial chamber had ten days to send the file. Al-Majid's counsel lodged his appeal, and the complainants appealed too, through their own civil lawyers, against the acquittal of the former governor of Nineveh and against the sentence of the northern military intelligence director. The prosecution filed its reply on August 5, 2007, and asked the chamber to confirm al-Majid's death sentence. On September 4, 2007, the Appellate Chamber, by majority, rejected them and upheld the trial judgment in full, acting under Article 25(2) of the statute.
The appeals judgment answered each of the defense grounds in turn. On personal responsibility, the chamber held that Article 15 of the statute reached those who ordered crimes as well as those who carried them out. On intent, it held that the documents and testimony showed an intent to destroy the Kurds as a group, and that the scale of force used against a population of a single ethnic group confirmed it. It rejected the argument that the army had pursued only armed rebels, for the same reason. It rejected the claim that the operations had been part of the border war, finding that they had reached cities far from the border. It found that the documents proved the destruction of inhabited villages and cities. It found the charges detailed and consistent with national and international standards. And on superior orders it found that al-Majid had issued the orders himself. It also held that he had acted together with Saddam Hussein and others under a common criminal plan, and that he had known of and intended the forced transfers and detentions.
On the tribunal's own legitimacy, the chamber held that it was a specialized court, not an exceptional one, and that it was consistent with Article 95 of the Iraqi constitution. On the defense witnesses, it found that the defense had supplied incomplete addresses and that the witnesses had not appeared. It upheld the acquittal of the former governor of Nineveh and rejected the victims' appeal against his release.
Under Iraqi law, a sentence upheld on appeal was to be carried out within 30 days. Al-Majid's was not. Death sentences required the approval of the three-member Presidency Council, and the council divided over the two military co-defendants sentenced with him. The legal disputes that followed carried the case past the deadline in October 2007.
On February 29, 2008, the Presidency Council endorsed al-Majid's death sentence alone, with execution to follow within a month. It did not approve the sentences of the former defense minister and the deputy chief of staff for operations. The month passed, and the execution still did not take place: the disagreement over the two other Anfal sentences held it up. All three men stayed in United States custody, under Iraqi jurisdiction.
The second trial opened on August 21, 2007, while the Anfal appeal was still pending. Its subject was the suppression of the uprising in southern Iraq after the Gulf War, when al-Majid was interior minister. There were fifteen defendants, former military and government officials, and they were charged at the opening with crimes against humanity. The chief judge was the same jurist who had presided at the Anfal verdict.
On Tuesday, December 2, 2008, the tribunal found al-Majid guilty of war crimes for his role in crushing the uprising and sentenced him to death. The conviction concerned his part in the killings that followed the uprising. He was 67 years old.
His co-defendants in that trial were sentenced in the same session. A former Baath Party official who had led the party in the Basra region in the early 1990s was sentenced to death. The former defense minister from the Anfal case received 15 years. The army's former deputy chief of staff for operations received life imprisonment. Three other defendants received life terms, five others 15 years, and three were acquitted.
The third trial concerned the operations against Shia districts in 1999, after the cleric's assassination on February 19 of that year. Al-Majid stood trial with other former officials, among them the former deputy prime minister. The charges were the killing of Shia civilians in the Baghdad district now known as Sadr City and in Najaf, and their displacement in raids on their districts.
On Monday, March 2, 2009, the tribunal convicted him of premeditated killing as a crime against humanity, together with the displacement of civilians, and sentenced him to death for the third time. Two co-defendants were also sentenced to death: a former army officer and a senior member of the Baath Party. Four were sentenced to life imprisonment, among them the president's former personal secretary. The former deputy prime minister was acquitted, with three others.
The traders case had opened on April 29, 2008. It concerned the execution of 42 Baghdad merchants in July 1992, men accused at the time of driving up food prices, and a judge of the tribunal said at the outset that the defendants faced charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Nine days after the third death sentence, on March 11, 2009, the tribunal ruled. It judged the executions a crime against humanity. Al-Majid was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his part in them. The former deputy prime minister, acquitted in the 1999 case, received the same 15-year term. Two half-brothers of the former president were sentenced to death for their own roles.
The case of Halabja came last. The trial opened before the Iraqi High Tribunal on December 21, 2008, three weeks after the second death sentence. Al-Majid sat with three co-defendants: the former defense minister and two former intelligence officials, all four already facing execution or life imprisonment. They were charged with crimes against humanity for the attack on the town in March 1988. The presiding judge had also presided over his first two trials.
At the time it opened, al-Majid was still held in a United States detention center, but he was due to pass into the custody of the Iraqi government under the security agreement between the two countries that took effect on January 1, 2009.
On Sunday, January 17, 2010, the court delivered its verdict. It found al-Majid guilty of deliberate murder as a crime against humanity for ordering the attack on Halabja, and sentenced him to death. It was his fourth death sentence. His three co-defendants received prison terms in the same session: 15 years each for the former defense minister and the former director of military intelligence, and 10 years for a former regional military intelligence chief.
Eight days after the Halabja verdict, on Monday, January 25, 2010, Ali Hassan al-Majid was executed in Baghdad.
The defense disputed the lawfulness of the tribunal, the sufficiency of the evidence of genocidal intent, and the fairness of the conditions under which witnesses for the defense could be called; the Appellate Chamber rejected each of those grounds in September 2007. The first presiding judge in the Anfal trial was removed a few weeks after it opened.
The tribunal's findings put the dead of the Anfal campaign at tens of thousands, with thousands more unaccounted for, without fixing a total.
March 29, 1987: Revolution Command Council decision No. 160 gives al-Majid authority over the state's civil, military, security and party bodies in northern Iraq.
June 3, 1987: He signs letter No. 3650 on the prohibited zones.
June 20, 1987: Letter No. 4008, later central to the Anfal judgment, is issued.
February to September 1988: The eight operations of the Anfal campaign.
March 1988: The attack on Halabja.
1990: He is named chief administrator of occupied Kuwait.
1991: As interior minister, he directs the suppression of the uprising in southern Iraq.
1992: Traders accused of breaching price controls are executed.
February 19, 1999: A senior Shia cleric is assassinated; Shia civilians in Baghdad and Najaf are killed and displaced in the operations that follow.
August 2003: Taken into United States custody in Basra; the capture is announced on August 21.
April 2, 2006: The chief investigative judge refers seven defendants, al-Majid among them, to trial in the Anfal case.
August 21, 2006: The Anfal trial opens before the Iraqi High Tribunal.
September 20, 2006: A new presiding judge takes over the Anfal trial from its tenth hearing.
December 18, 2006, to January 29, 2007: The prosecution presents its documentary evidence over nine sessions.
December 30, 2006: Saddam Hussein is executed after the Dujail verdict; proceedings against him in the Anfal case end on January 8, 2007.
February 20, 2007: The trial chamber issues its charge papers.
June 24, 2007: Al-Majid is convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and sentenced to death.
August 21, 2007: The trial over the 1991 uprising opens.
September 4, 2007: The Appellate Chamber upholds the Anfal judgment.
February 29, 2008: The Presidency Council endorses his Anfal death sentence.
April 29, 2008: The traders trial opens.
December 2, 2008: Second death sentence, for the suppression of the 1991 uprising.
December 21, 2008: The Halabja trial opens.
March 2, 2009: Third death sentence, for the 1999 killings.
March 11, 2009: Sentenced to 15 years in the 1992 traders case.
January 17, 2010: Fourth death sentence, for the attack on Halabja.
January 25, 2010: Executed in Baghdad.